
UNRAVELLING CORRUPTION II

Exploring changes in the public sector perspective 1993-1999

April 2001

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|-----|
| SUMMARY | 4 |
| Changes in perceptions | 4 |
| Impact of experience | 5 |
| Identified corruption risk areas | 5 |
| Major lessons for corruption minimisation in the public sector | 6 |
| 1. INTRODUCTION | 8 |
| 1.1 Why are employees' attitudes and beliefs about corruption important? | 8 |
| 1.2 Why are employees' attitudes and beliefs about corruption important? | 9 |
| 1.3 Presentation of survey findings | 11 |
| 2. UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION | 13 |
| 2.1 Which behaviours were considered corrupt? | 13 |
| 2.2 Is there a shared understanding about which behaviours are considered to be 'corrupt'? | 16 |
| 2.3 How do public sector employees decide which behaviours are corrupt? | 18 |
| 2.4 Are differences in perceptions of the scenarios related to background characteristics of the respondents? | 21 |
| 2.5 How undesirable, harmful and/or unjustified were the behaviours considered to be? | 30 |
| 2.6 Are perceptions of whether or not the behaviour is corrupt related to perceptions of desirability, harmfulness and justification? | 32 |
| 2.7 Do mitigating factors make a difference? | 34 |
| 3. TAKING ACTION ABOUT PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION | 37 |
| 3.1 Changes in reported responses to the scenarios between 1993 and 1999 | 37 |
| 3.2 The relationship between what is considered corrupt and response to scenario | 40 |
| 3.3 Relationship between background characteristics and action chosen | 44 |
| 4. IMPACT OF EXPERIENCE | 55 |
| 4.1 Does experience in a particular area of work affect judgments of whether a behaviour is considered corrupt? | 55 |
| 4.2 Does having experience in a particular area of work affect action chosen in response to the scenarios? | 58 |
| 5. MEASURING ATTITUDES | 61 |
| 5.1 Attitudes to what is corrupt | 62 |
| 5.2 Attitudes about what is acceptable behaviour | 64 |
| 5.3 Attitudes to reporting corruption | 66 |
| 6. FURTHER EXPLORATION OF FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS | 72 |
| 6.1 What best distinguishes those who consider the scenarios to be corrupt from those who do not? | 72 |
| 6.2 What best distinguishes those who choose different types of action? | 74 |
| 7. DISCUSSION | 79 |
| 7.1 Overview of changes in public sector perceptions | 79 |
| 7.2 Recognising corruption | 81 |
| 7.3 Taking action about workplace corruption | 83 |
| 7.4 What should public sector agencies do to increase their corruption-resistance? | 86 |
| REFERENCES | 90 |
| APPENDIX 1: SAMPLING AND QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN DETAILS | 92 |
| APPENDIX 2: 1999 QUESTIONNAIRE | 101 |
| APPENDIX 3 : PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS | 102 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| Length of employment in the NSW public sector | 102 |
| Supervisory role | 103 |
| Salary levels | 103 |
| Gender | 104 |
| Frequency of participation in different types of work | 104 |
| Interrelationships between background factors | 105 |
| APPENDIX 4: ADDITIONAL STATISTICAL DETAILS | 107 |
| APPENDIX 5: LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS – BACKGROUND TO CHAPTER 6 | 123 |
| General | 123 |
| Looking at a specific example – What best distinguishes those who consider ‘COMPUTER TENDER’ to be corrupt from those who consider it not corrupt? | 123 |
| Logistic regression predicting those who consider the scenarios corrupt from those who do not | 125 |
| Logistic regressions predicting action respondent would take in each scenario | 127 |

SUMMARY

Public sector employees are in a key position both to observe any workplace corruption and to take action about it. Their attitudes and beliefs have a direct impact on the perpetuation or prevention of public sector corruption.

In 1999, the Independent Commission Against Corruption repeated its 1993 *Unravelling Corruption* survey in order to examine changes in public sector employees' perceptions of workplace behaviours and attitudes towards taking action about potentially corrupt activities they may witness at work. This survey was designed in 1993 to explore public sector employees' social definitions of corruption and to identify barriers to taking action about corruption.

The main aim of the current report is to describe how public sector perceptions of workplace behaviours and attitudes to reporting corruption have changed over recent years. Consequently, within this report, findings from the 1993 and 1999 surveys are compared in terms of:

- public sector employees' perceptions of scenarios and the types of behaviours they consider to be corrupt (see Chapter 2)
- what the respondents say they would do when faced with such scenarios and factors which might stop people from taking action about corruption (see Chapter 3)
- attitudes to what is corrupt as well as to reporting corruption (see Chapter 5).

The 1999 perceptions are of interest in their own right. Perceptions held in 1999 provide a way of identifying both available strengths to build on and areas where further attention would assist in minimising public sector corruption.

A secondary aim of this research is to explore the impact of experience on both public sector employees' understanding of corruption and on their choice of action (see Chapter 4).

Given the large number of survey findings documented in this report, a brief summary statement is included at the beginning of each section of the results in order to assist readers.

The comparison of results from the two surveys has revealed some significant changes as well as some important consistencies between 1993 and 1999.

Changes in perceptions

All of the changes are indicative of the NSW public sector becoming more corruption-resistant than it was in 1993. Examples include public sector employees in 1999:

- more frequently identifying conduct to be corrupt than in 1993. This is crucial because a first step in minimising corruption is being able to identify it when it occurs in the workplace (see Section 2.1 in the body of the report for more information)
- perceiving the behaviours in the scenarios as more undesirable, more harmful and less justified than in 1993 (Section 2.5)
- being more likely to say they would report the matter within their organisation than they had been in 1993 (Section 3.1)

- being even more likely than in 1993 to believe that it was worth reporting corruption both because something *can* (86% in 1993; 90% in 1999) and *will* (74% in 1993; 79% in 1999) be done about it (Section 5.3)
- considering justifications for behaviour such as the ends justify the means (79% in 1999; 73% in 1993) or 'everybody does it' (94% in 1999; 92% in 1993) as even less acceptable than they had been in 1993 (Section 5.1)
- being more likely than they had been in 1993 to consider avoiding procedure to get past bureaucratic red tape as unjustified (50% in 1999; 45% in 1993) (Section 5.2)
- being more likely to be concerned about private sector organisations offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business than they had been in 1993 (81% in 1999; 75% in 1993) (Section 5.2)
- being less likely to agree that 'People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it' (69% in 1999; 74% in 1993). However, the substantial number still agreeing with this statement suggests that significant work remains for public sector managers to create organisational cultures in which employees feel and are safe to report corruption (Section 5.3).

It is also of interest that the views of male and female respondents, which were quite divergent in 1993, are now much closer. Similarly, there is less difference between the views of supervisors and non-supervisors than there was in 1993 (Sections 2.4, 3.3, 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3).

Impact of experience

A feature of the 1999 survey, which had not been included in the 1993 survey, was an examination of the effect of experience in a particular area of work (such as recruitment selection or tender selection) on both understanding of corruption and choice of action in response to the scenario.

A positive finding was that those with experience in particular areas of work (that is, those who are most likely to be in a position to observe corruption in such work) are more likely to say that they would report the behaviour within their organisation (Section 4.2).

Of more concern is that experience in recruitment does not seem to affect perceptions of whether the scenarios concerning recruitment practices are corrupt. For example, more than one-third of those who regularly participate in recruitment selection considered that it was not corrupt to use one's position to get a friend a job (Sections 4.1).

Identified corruption risk areas

This research has identified further work that is needed in order to better equip public sector employees to recognise corruption or more generally to be able to recognise inappropriate workplace behaviour. Three specific risk areas which need to be addressed are:

- a lack of common understanding about what is meant by 'corrupt conduct' adds to the difficulty in communicating about corruption and minimising corruption
- there is a range of behaviours where respondents were not clear whether or not the behaviour should be labelled as 'corrupt'. For example, opinion was divided in the

case of theft with mitigating circumstances and for the scenarios in which rules were not followed, yet a 'reasonable' outcome was reached

- more than one-third of those who regularly participate in recruitment selection considered that it was *not* corrupt to use one's position to get a friend a job. (For further information about each of these corruption risk areas see Section 7.2.)

Factors identified from this research as the most significant potential barriers stopping employees from taking action about workplace misconduct are:

- the conduct being considered justified when it should not be
- the attitude that *There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful will be done about it*
- concern about personal and professional retaliation
- not knowing how and where to report corruption. (For further information about these each of these corruption risk areas see Section 7.3.)

Major lessons for corruption minimisation in the public sector

1. Foster a common definition of what is corrupt in order to address the current lack of shared understanding by:
 - identifying and addressing 'grey' areas where employees are unsure of the appropriate behaviour
 - focussing on the consequences or harmfulness of behaviour as a useful strategy of communicating messages about corruption
 - identifying, then challenging, explanations used to excuse or ignore corrupt behaviour
 - focussing on public duty principles
 - addressing educational messages across all subgroups of public sector employees.
2. Review the nature of training given to those who participate in selection panels to address the risks identified in recruitment selection.
3. Equip employees with a capacity to act if they witness workplace misconduct by ensuring that:
 - individual public sector agencies have reporting mechanisms in place
 - these reporting mechanisms include protection for those who use them
 - all employees are informed about:
 - the existence of these internal mechanisms and how they work,
 - external reporting channels available to the employees, and
 - the Protected Disclosures Act 1994.

4. Incorporate information about how and where to report corruption and other forms of workplace misconduct into induction training.
5. Management needs to take, and be seen to take, effective action against corrupt behaviour in order to convince employees of the value of reporting corruption.
6. More needs to be done to create organisational cultures in which employees feel safe to report corruption.

For further information about what public sector agencies can do to increase their corruption-resistance refer to Section 7.4.

1. INTRODUCTION

This report describes how public sector perceptions of workplace behaviours and attitudes to reporting corruption have changed over recent years.

In 1993 the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) conducted the first large scale survey of attitudes to corruption in Australia. This survey provided significant insight into the nature and the diversity of NSW public sector employees' beliefs about what they considered to be corrupt behaviour in the workplace as well as identifying barriers to taking action about corruption. The awareness of the employees' perspective that was gained through this innovative survey has informed efforts to minimise corruption in the workplace across the NSW public sector. The results of the 1993 survey were presented in an ICAC report entitled *Unravelling Corruption: A Public Sector Perspective*.

The material from the 1993 survey has been widely used. The scenarios and findings have been incorporated into ICAC educational material and Corruption Prevention seminars. The survey has provided a model for other government agencies (state and federal) in designing their own fraud or corruption prevention awareness surveys. Researchers in other states and other countries have repeated the survey. Criminology students have used the data from the 1993 survey as part of their research methodology and data analysis courses.

The ICAC repeated this survey in 1999 to see whether attitudes and perceptions held by NSW public sector employees had changed from those held in 1993.

1.1 Why are employees' attitudes and beliefs about corruption important?

Much has been written about the difficulties in defining corruption. The literature draws the distinction between 'public opinion' (or 'social') definitions of corruption and 'formal' (or 'legal') definitions of corruption. Public opinion definitions are those that are based on individual beliefs and not necessarily reflected in law or formalised rules. Formal definitions are specified in law or by some formally recognised set of rules (for example, legislation such as the ICAC Act, government guidelines, policy documents, codes of conduct, etc.). Social definitions have been found to have a greater impact than formal definitions of corruption in determining which types of conduct people identify and respond to as corrupt¹.

One way of identifying social definitions of corruption is through surveys of employees' attitudes and beliefs about corruption.

Employees' views are important for several reasons. Personal beliefs about corruption (or 'public opinion definitions' or 'social definitions' of corruption) can impact upon the perpetuation of corrupt practices. Since employees are in the best position both to observe any workplace corruption and to take action about it, it is important to consider their attitudes and beliefs. If people do not recognise the activity which they may be witnessing, or in which they may be participating, as 'corrupt', or at least as 'undesirable', then they are not likely to do anything about it. If they do recognise the behaviour as 'corrupt', but believe that, for example, such behaviour is appropriate given the circumstances, they are also unlikely to attempt to change their behaviour or do anything about the behaviour of others.

1.2 Overview of methodology

The data discussed in this report were collected through two surveys of random samples of NSW public sector employees. A summary of the methodology is provided below. For more information on how the sample was drawn and a more detailed rationale for the design of the questionnaire refer to Appendix 1.

The 1993 survey

Given the lack of previous research, the 1993 survey was intended to be exploratory. It had two broad aims:

- i. to explore public sector employees' understanding of corruption, and
- ii. to identify factors which may hinder NSW public sector employees taking action about corruption which they may observe at work.

Questionnaires were distributed to a random sample of 1,978 NSW public sector employees between May and August 1993. A total 1,313 of these returned completed questionnaires (giving a response rate of 66.4%). The sample was chosen in such a way that all NSW public sector employees, from the highest to the lowest paid, had an equal chance of being randomly selected to participate. The results and conclusions drawn from this 1993 survey are presented in full in Gorta and Forell (1994).

The 1999 survey

Questionnaires were distributed to a random sample of 1,503 NSW public sector employees between March and July 1999. A total of 785 of these questionnaires were completed and returned (giving a response rate of 52.2%). A copy of the 1999 questionnaire is provided in Appendix 2. For a profile of those who responded see Appendix 3.

The questionnaire used in the 1999 survey was almost identical to that used in 1993. Both the 1993 and 1999 questionnaires were designed to preserve the anonymity of respondents and their organisations, and were made up of three parts:

- i. questions about the respondent's position in the public sector and gender (background characteristics),
- ii. brief descriptions of twelve scenarios together with rating scales for perceptions and responses to these scenarios,
- iii. twelve attitude statements.

The only changes from the 1993 survey were in the initial section of the questionnaire which sought information on respondent background characteristics. The specific salary rates were updated from those used in the 1993 survey. Questions about frequency of participation in recruitment selection, tender selection and overnight travel for work were added to the 1999 survey. The purpose of including these questions was to explore whether having experience in a particular area of work affects judgments of whether behaviour is corrupt and/or affects action chosen in response to the scenarios. The 1993 question about the respondent's educational qualifications, which had been found to be the least useful of the 1993 demographic questions, was excluded from the 1999 questionnaire to make room for these additional questions about work experience. Both the 1993 and 1999 questionnaires sought information about the respondent's length of employment in the public sector, whether the respondent was currently working in a supervisory role and the respondent's gender.

The second section of both questionnaires included brief descriptions of the same twelve scenarios. The twelve scenarios were developed in 1993 to depict different types of potentially corrupt conduct which could occur in any public sector organisation. The scenarios and the abbreviations by which they are referred to in the remainder of this report are listed in Table 1.

For each scenario respondents were asked the same questions. As was the case in 1993, they were asked to rate, on a six point scale, how *desirable*, how *harmful*, and how *justified* they considered the behaviour to be. They were also asked to judge whether the conduct was corrupt or not. They were then asked what action they would take. Possible responses were:

- nothing
- talk to the employee
- talk to the employee's supervisor, or other appropriate person within the organisation or
- report it outside the organisation.

The twelve attitude statements in the final section of the questionnaire concerned different aspects of corruption: three concerned definitions of corruption, three concerned the range of behaviours which may be considered acceptable, and six concerned reporting corruption. Respondents were asked whether they 'strongly disagreed', 'disagreed', 'agreed' or 'strongly agreed' with each of the statements. These attitude statements were unchanged from the 1993 survey.

Care was taken in the design and administration of both the 1993 and 1999 surveys to minimise the possible impact on the results of the study being conducted by the ICAC (see Appendix 1 for further details). This included:

- designing the questionnaire in such a way that people could express their condemnation of the behaviour without having to apply the label 'corrupt'
- stressing the study's focus on exploring the range of *personal* views held about corruption (hence their being no right or wrong answers)
- assuring respondents that neither they nor their organisations could be identified at any stage, and
- enabling responses to be returned directly to the researchers rather than through senior officers of their own organisations.

Analysis

On return, questionnaires were checked by the ICAC Research Section for completion and clarity. All comments made on the questionnaires were copied and collated. Data entry was conducted by an agency engaged by the ICAC and data analysis was undertaken by the Research Section.

Data were analysed using the SPSS 9.0 for Windows statistical software package. The statistics used were largely descriptive (for example, percentages, means and standard deviations). The inferential statisticsⁱⁱ used included simple univariate tests (such as chi-square [χ^2], analyses of variance and t-tests, depending on the level of measurement) as well as more complex logistic regressions (see Appendix 5).

Allowance was made within the analysis for any differences in background characteristics between 1993 and 1999 respondents (such as there being a higher proportion of male respondents in 1999 than in 1993, see Appendix 3). For example, differences in the 1999 responses and the 1993 responses were examined separately for each demographic subgroup (for example, female respondents, male respondents, supervisors, non-supervisors, etc.).

The quantitative data analysis was supplemented by a qualitative analysis of the additional comments which some respondents added to clarify their answers. Overall, 94 (or 12%) of the respondents offered at least one comment - some wrote essays!

1.3 Presentation of survey findings

Given the large number of survey findings documented in this report, a brief summary statement is included at the beginning of each section of the results in order to assist readers access the material more easily.

Survey results are presented in five chapters:

- Chapter 2 (*Understanding Corruption*) provides findings about public sector employees' perceptions of the scenarios and the types of behaviours they consider to be corrupt
- Chapter 3 (*Taking Action about Public Sector Corruption*) describes what the public sector employees say that they would do when faced with such scenarios and factors which might stop people from taking action about corruption
- Chapter 4 (*Impact of Experience*) explores the effect of having experience in a particular area of work (such as recruitment or tendering) on judgments of whether (recruitment or tendering) scenarios are considered corrupt and/or whether such experience affects action chosen in response to the scenario
- Chapter 5 (*Measuring Attitudes*) provides findings concerning public sector employees' attitudes to what is corrupt as well as attitudes to reporting corruption
- Chapter 6 (*Further Exploration of Factors Affecting Decisions*) uses a statistical technique, known as logistic regression, to identify the factors which best distinguish:
 - those who consider the scenarios to be corrupt from those who do not, and
 - those who choose different types of action in response to the scenarios.

Implications of these results are considered in the final chapter of this report.

This report focuses on the results of the 1999 survey and how these results differ from those of the 1993 survey. While some of the 1993 survey results are presented in this report, more details of the 1993 results can be found in Gorta and Forell (1994).

Table 1: Scenarios used and their abbreviations

| Scenario Description | Abbreviation |
|--|---------------------------------|
| A government employee is offered \$300 from a company to accept a tender which is before him. He takes the money to put towards a new stereo system. | STEREO |
| A government employee occasionally takes a box of note pads and pens from the office stores cupboard to donate to the local community centre. | TAKE NOTE PADS |
| To avoid the hassle of advertising, a government employee appoints a colleague to a vacant position. She has the reputation of being the best person for the job. | JOB FOR COLLEAGUE |
| Each year, a government employee accepts a leather bound executive diary from a firm of consultants whom she occasionally engages for use by her section. | LEATHER DIARY |
| A government employee, responsible for buying office equipment, takes a second job selling stationery to his own department. | 2ND JOB |
| To hasten the process, a government employee bypasses tendering procedures and selects a company known for its excellence, to provide a \$100,000 computer training package. | COMPUTER TENDER |
| A government employee uses her position to get a friend a public sector job. | JOB FOR FRIEND |
| A government employee threatens to dismiss another staff member, if he 'blows the whistle' on fraud within their section. | WHISTLEBLOWER |
| A government employee often gives confidential information about department clients to a friend who works in a private insurance company. | CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION |
| A government employee is offered \$300 from a company to accept a tender which is before him. He only takes the money to cover his child's hospital bills. | HOSPITAL BILLS |
| A government employee regularly spends part of the day using office facilities, to organise his private catering business. | CATERING BUSINESS |
| A government employee regularly adds extra days onto her business trips to visit friends. She claims the extra days as part of her travel expenses. | BUSINESS TRIPS |

2. UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION

The twelve scenarios involved activities which are common to a wide range of public sector agencies: recruitment, purchasing, tendering, use of consultants, use of office resources and provision of information.

In order to explore public sector employees' social definitions of corruption, all of the scenarios used in this survey were created to contain some potentially undesirable features. This, however, does not necessarily mean that they could or should be described as 'corrupt'. The scenarios were designed to contain a range of factors (such as frequency of the activity and presence/absence of mitigating circumstances) which might affect people's judgments of whether or not the behaviour is corrupt. Respondents were instructed that the purpose of the questionnaire was to explore the range of individual or personal views about corruption and that for this reason there were no right or wrong answers. (For further information about the selection of the scenarios and the design of the questionnaire please refer to Appendix 1.)

This first section of the results examines the percentage of respondents who consider each of the individual scenarios to be corrupt.

2.1 Which behaviours were considered corrupt?

More of the 1999 respondents considered the scenarios to be corrupt than 1993 respondents.

The scenarios most frequently considered to be corrupt in 1999 were the same as those most frequently considered to be corrupt in 1993.

The percentages of respondents who considered each scenario to be corrupt in 1993 and 1999 are compared in Table 2. As can be seen from this table, in nine of the twelve scenarios a significantly larger proportion of the respondents considered the behaviour to be corrupt in 1999 than had been the case in 1993. There were no scenarios where fewer people considered the behaviour corrupt in 1999 than in 1993. (Refer to Table 1 in Chapter 1 for the list of abbreviated names used to describe scenarios.)

Table 2: Comparison of percentage who considered each scenario corrupt in 1993 with 1999

| Scenario ^{III} | % who considered the behaviour to be corrupt | |
|--------------------------|--|------|
| | 1993 | 1999 |
| STEREO* | 96.4 | 98.5 |
| TAKE NOTE PADS * | 62.5 | 68.1 |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE* | 60.8 | 65.6 |
| LEATHER DIARY* | 20.4 | 24.2 |
| 2 ND JOB* | 73.7 | 80.3 |
| COMPUTER TENDER* | 56.2 | 63.2 |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | 64.4 | 68.1 |
| WHISTLEBLOWER* | 94.8 | 97.1 |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 92.9 | 93.4 |
| HOSPITAL BILLS* | 93.6 | 96.9 |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 76.7 | 79.3 |
| BUSINESS TRIPS* | 92.2 | 95.3 |


* For each of these scenarios the difference between the percentage that considered the behaviour to be corrupt in 1993 and the percentage that considered the behaviour to be corrupt in 1999 was statistically significant. In each case respondents were more likely to consider the behaviour to be corrupt in 1999 than in 1993. For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.1 in Appendix 4.

Figure 1 depicts these percentages graphically. In this figure scenarios are presented in decreasing order of the percentage who considered them to be corrupt in 1999.

From Table 2 and Figure 1 the following key observations can be made:

- in both 1993 and 1999, the level of agreement among respondents' perceptions of corruption differed amongst the scenarios. That is, some of the scenarios were considered to be corrupt by almost all of the respondents, one of the scenarios was considered *not* to be corrupt by the majority of respondents, and opinion was more divided about other scenarios
- the scenarios most frequently considered to be corrupt in 1993 were the ones which were also most frequently considered to be corrupt in 1999. In both years over ninety per cent of respondents considered the same five of the twelve scenarios to be corrupt
- almost all of the respondents in both years agreed that the behaviour was corrupt in all three of the scenarios which involve a direct financial gain and where the behaviour would be illegal (STEREO, HOSPITAL BILLS and BUSINESS TRIPS)

**Figure 1: Percentage who considered each scenario corrupt
1993 and 1999**



- iv. there was also high consensus in both years that the scenario describing threats to a whistleblower was corrupt (WHISTLEBLOWER)
- v. similarly there was a high level of consensus that provision of confidential information was corrupt when there was no personal gain received by the person supplying the information (CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION)
- vi. there was relatively less, though still substantial, consensus that the behaviour was corrupt for those scenarios which involved a financial gain which was less direct (2ND JOB and CATERING BUSINESS)
- vii. opinion was more divided in the case of theft with mitigating circumstances (TAKE NOTE PADS)
- viii. opinion was also divided for the scenarios in which rules were not followed yet a 'reasonable' outcome was reached (JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and COMPUTER TENDER)
- ix. interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly in the absence of any information about the friend's ability to perform the required work, opinion was also divided about whether or not using one's position to get a friend a public sector job was corrupt (JOB FOR FRIEND)
- x. there was a high level of agreement that the scenario in which the employee was the recipient of an unsolicited gift (LEATHER DIARY) was *not* corrupt.

2.2 Is there a shared understanding about which behaviours are considered to be 'corrupt'?

Public sector employees differ in the way they define corruption.

Combinations of the scenarios considered to be corrupt by different groups of individuals are of interest because they provide a way of exploring criteria that people use to decide what is corrupt and what is not.

If, for example, a respondent were to label behaviour as corrupt only if there was a direct personal gain received by the perpetrator, one might hypothesise that such a respondent would consider STEREO, LEATHER DIARY, 2ND JOB, HOSPITAL BILLS, CATERING BUSINESS and BUSINESS TRIPS to be corrupt but not TAKE NOTE PADS, JOB FOR COLLEAGUE, COMPUTER TENDER, JOB FOR FRIEND, WHISTLEBLOWER or CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. Of course the actual scenarios placed in each category depend, in turn, on how broadly one defines 'personal gain': it would be possible to argue either that there is an element of personal gain or that there is not such an element of gain for each of 2ND JOB, JOB FOR FRIEND and WHISTLEBLOWER. It is of interest that in 1993 or 1999 no one actually made judgments which followed either of these particular patterns.

As can be seen from Table 3, in both 1993 and 1999 there was a lot of individual variation in the combinations of scenarios which were considered corrupt. In 1993 a total of 254 different combinations of the twelve scenarios were considered to be corrupt (representing an average of 4.3 respondents per combination). In 1999 a total of 168 different combinations of the twelve scenarios were considered to be corrupt (representing an average of 4.4 respondents per combination).

That so many different combinations of scenarios were judged to be corrupt by the respondents refutes any notion of there being a common understanding of what is meant by 'corrupt conduct' which is shared by most public sector employees. Hence it is not simply a matter of looking at the difference between a legal definition of corruption (such as sections 8 and 9 of the *Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988*) and a social definition which is held by NSW public sector employees. Rather than there being only one social definition of corruption, there would appear to be a number of such definitions. Thus, any one public sector employee's understanding of what is meant by the term 'corrupt' may not be shared by his or her colleagues. This lack of commonality of understanding adds to the difficulty of controlling corruption.

Table 3: Comparison of most frequent combinations of scenarios considered to be corrupt

| Combinations of scenarios considered to be corrupt | 1993 | | 1999 | |
|--|---|----------------|---|-----------------|
| | No. | % [*] | No. | % ^{**} |
| All 12 scenarios considered to be corrupt | 141 | 12.9 | 120 | 16.2 |
| All except LEATHER DIARY | 153 | 14.0 | 104 | 14.1 |
| All except LEATHER DIARY & COMPUTER TENDER | 26 | 2.4 | 37 | 5.0 |
| All except LEATHER DIARY & TAKE NOTE PADS | 43 | 3.9 | 26 | 3.5 |
| All except LEATHER DIARY & COMPUTER TENDER & JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 20 | 1.8 | 19 | 2.6 |
| All except LEATHER DIARY & COMPUTER TENDER & JOB FOR COLLEAGUE & JOB FOR FRIEND | 16 | 1.5 | 17 | 2.3 |
| All except LEATHER DIARY & JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 15 | 1.4 | 15 | 2.0 |
| All except LEATHER DIARY & COMPUTER TENDER & JOB FOR COLLEAGUE & TAKE NOTE PADS | 17 | 1.6 | 13 | 1.8 |
| All except LEATHER DIARY & COMPUTER TENDER & 2 ND JOB | 13 | 1.2 | 12 | 1.6 |
| All except LEATHER DIARY & JOB FOR COLLEAGUE & COMPUTER TENDER & 2 ND JOB | 9 | 0.8 | 12 | 1.6 |
| All except LEATHER DIARY & JOB FOR FRIEND | 23 | 2.1 | 12 | 1.6 |
| All except LEATHER DIARY & 2 ND JOB | 23 | 2.1 | 12 | 1.6 |
| All except LEATHER DIARY & COMPUTER TENDER & TAKE NOTE PADS | 14 | 1.3 | 10 | 1.4 |
| All except TAKE NOTE PADS & CATERING BUSINESS & LEATHER DIARY | 13 | 1.2 | 9 | 1.2 |
| All except TAKE NOTE PADS & JOB FOR COLLEAGUE & LEATHER DIARY & COMPUTER TENDER & JOB FOR FRIEND | 24 | 2.2 | 8 | 1.1 |
| Other combinations | A further 239 combinations were used by the other 545 respondents | | A further 153 combinations were used by the other 314 respondents | |
| Total no. of different combinations | 254 | | 168 | |
| Average number of respondents per combination | 4.3 | | 4.4 | |

* Percentages for 1993 were calculated out of 1095 because this was the total number of respondents who rated all 12 scenarios. The survey was administered as a self-completion questionnaire, with each scenario presented on a separate page. Unfortunately, despite the scenarios and the pages being numbered, some respondents missed pairs of pages. Fortunately the pages skipped were fairly evenly distributed across the scenarios. Only 1095 (83.6%) made judgments about all scenarios. The 218 who missed some judgments failed to make judgments about a total of 383 scenarios (an average of 1.8 judgments each).

** Similarly, percentages for 1999 were calculated out of 740 because this was the total number of respondents who rated all 12 scenarios. The 45 respondents who missed some judgments failed to make judgments about a total of 75 scenarios (an average of 1.7 judgments each).

2.3 How do public sector employees decide which behaviours are corrupt?

Different criteria are used in deciding whether or not a behaviour is corrupt, for example:

- some respondents equate corruption with breaking the rules
 - some appear to categorise their perceptions of undesirable behaviour into non-overlapping categories such that if it falls into another negative category (e.g. theft or dishonesty) then it cannot also be corrupt
 - some consider whether the behaviour is corrupt or not is subject to a range of further qualifications about the behaviour.
-

Although information on criteria for determining how public sector employees decide what is corrupt was not explicitly sought as part of the survey, some insight can be obtained from the spontaneous comments respondents wrote on their questionnaires. These comments are summarised in Table 4.

The types of comments made in 1993 and 1999 were similar. One general observation is that the criteria used for determining which behaviours are corrupt appear to differ both among individuals and among scenarios. More specific observations about the ways some public sector employees decide what is corrupt and what is not include:

- some comments suggest that some respondents equate corruption with breaking the rules: as long as procedures are followed, behaviour cannot be corrupt
- some respondents appeared to categorise their perceptions of undesirable behaviour into non-overlapping categories such that if it falls into another negative category then it cannot also be corrupt (e.g., 'not corrupt but is theft', 'not corrupt but is fraud')
- some considered that whether the behaviour, as stated in the scenarios, is corrupt or not corrupt is subject to a range of further qualifications about the behaviour (for example, how often it happens, whether it was a temporary or permanent position).

While these comments provide useful clues as to how public sector employees decide which behaviours are corrupt, from these comments it is not possible to quantify how many use each of the different strategies.

Table 4: Summary of comments made by respondents in 1993 and 1999 about how they defined corruption

| Scenario | Stated reason for behaviour NOT being corrupt | Perception of corruption would depend on: |
|---------------------|---|--|
| STEREO | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not corrupt, just stupid * | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> if was the lowest tender * |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not corrupt but theft, i.e. because it is theft it cannot be corrupt ** No personal gain * Seen as an appropriate use of public resources given that community centres are (or should be) publicly funded and they are under-resourced* | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> how often it happens ** if the employee requests permission from his supervisor # if employee makes the donation on behalf of his workplace # |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> If she is the best person for the job, why waste valuable resources # Justified to save time and money ** Not corrupt, just wrong # Not corrupt, just laziness * Not corrupt, against government policy * | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> departmental policy, e.g. organisation may allow for direct appointment if the salary increase is less than 5% and approved by the CEO ** length of appointment * whether permanent or temporary * |
| LEATHER DIARY | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is a gift for patronage, not in return for any favours # It is normal commercial business practice ** The value of the diary is such that it would be regarded as a token ** Not employee initiated ** | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> if the gift was unsolicited # if it does not influence the employee's decision ** if the gift is of low cost # if procedure is followed e.g., the employee reports receiving the gift to his/her supervisor; the gift is recorded in the gift register ** time of year (e.g., Christmas) # if the diary is used for work-related purposes * if given as a thank you rather than a bribe ** |
| 2 ND JOB | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is a one-off event # Tender process is a waste of time anyway # Office equipment is different from stationery * I can't see the problem * Not corrupt, but unprofessional * | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> if action approved and procedure followed ** the amount purchased # if supply quotes # quality and price of goods * |

Table 4 – continued

| Scenario | Stated reason for behaviour NOT being corrupt | Perception of corruption would depend on: |
|--------------------------|--|--|
| COMPUTER TENDER | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No personal gain * It is practical * Not corrupt, but it is against government policy * Not corrupt, but stupid * | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> if employee has no connection with outside supplier # if employee has not received any 'incentives' to award the contract # if it is approved by the delegated officer # if the need to hasten the process is real and justifiable *# if following the rules * |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No personal gain * This is standard in society * Not corrupt, but unethical * Not corrupt, but could be harmful * | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> whether the person can do the job better than other applicants # how she used her position to get a friend a job *# whether position is temporary or permanent * salary of position * qualifications of friend * |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not corrupt, vicious behaviour * Not corrupt, something of industrial relations * | - |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No personal gain * Not corrupt, illegal * Not corrupt, just stupid * | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> whether any 'consideration' involved # |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> As a one-off situation # Not corrupt, just stupid * | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> if it was the lowest tender * |
| CATERING BUSINESS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not corrupt, dishonest * Not corrupt, just lazy * | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> how much time is taken *# depends on when – e.g. lunchtime, after hours *# if given permission * ability of employee to perform his work * if employee is putting in hours for free # |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not corrupt but is fraud *# Not corrupt but is theft * Not corrupt but is dishonest * | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> how often it happens * if during her business trip she works a 20-hour day * |

* Comment provided in response to 1993 survey.

Comment provided in response to 1999 survey.

*# Comment provided in response to both 1993 and 1999 surveys.

2.4 Are differences in perceptions of the scenarios related to background characteristics of the respondents?

Different respondent characteristics were related to the behaviour being considered to be corrupt, depending upon the scenario.

Information was collected on a range of demographic and employment-related (background) factors in order to explore whether attitudes and perceptions differed between respondents with different background characteristics. Table 5 provides a summary of the background factors which were found in 1999 to be statistically related to judgments that individual scenarios were corrupt. For each scenario, the relationship between whether or not the behaviour was considered to be corrupt and each of the following background factors was considered:

- gender of respondent
- supervisory role
- salary
- length of service
- whether participate in recruitment
- whether participate in tender selection
- whether participate in overnight travel.

Only those variables where any differences found were statistically significant are discussed. For example, gender is not mentioned in relation to eleven of the twelve scenarios in Table 5 because in 1999 there was no difference between the percentage of male respondents and the percentage of female respondents who consider the behaviour corrupt in these eleven scenarios.

As can be seen from Table 5, there are no clear-cut patterns in terms of background factors which are related to being more likely to judge a behaviour to be 'corrupt'. For five of the scenarios, none of the background factors that we measured in this survey was found to be related to differences in perceptions of the behaviour. The factors that were statistically related differed amongst the other seven scenarios. It is, therefore, not possible to simplify the results by saying that any one salary group, gender, etc is more likely to perceive scenarios as corrupt than any other group.

Since the scenarios described diverse types of conduct, it is not surprising that different respondent characteristics were related to the behaviour being considered to be corrupt in different scenarios. While one cannot know the reasons for these differences, the following observations are made about those subgroups who were more likely to consider the behaviour to be corrupt:

- for some scenarios, it was those who might become potential victims of the conduct (that is, those in the lowest three salary categories in relation to the JOB FOR COLLEAGUE scenario and non-supervisors in relation to the WHISTLEBLOWER scenario)

- for some other scenarios it was those who have experience in the relevant work area (that is, those who occasionally or regularly participate in tender selection in relation to the STEREO and HOSPITAL BILLS scenarios)
- for some scenarios it was those who were less likely to be involved in the relevant work area (that is, those in the lowest of the four salary categories in relation to the COMPUTER TENDER scenario and those in the two lowest salary categories in relation to the LEATHER DIARY scenario)
- for other scenarios it was much it is more difficult to suggest a reason behind the relationship (for example, why there was a gender difference in relation to the LEATHER DIARY scenario or why different lengths of employment affected perceptions of the HOSPITAL BILLS scenario – see Table 5).

The effects of each of these background characteristics on whether or not behaviours are considered to be corrupt are considered one at a time and discussed in more detail in the sections which follow. Interrelationships between the different background factors (for example, male respondents tend to be more likely to directly supervise staff than do female respondents) are discussed in Appendix 3. For further information on what best distinguishes those who consider the scenarios to be corrupt from those who do not, refer also to Section 6.1 in Chapter 6.

Table 5: Background factors related to perception that behaviour was corrupt in 1999

| Scenario | Entire sample | % who considered behaviour to be corrupt in 1999 | |
|--------------------------|---------------|---|--|
| | | Significant differences between subgroups* | |
| | | Those who were more likely to consider the behaviour to be corrupt were those who: | |
| STEREO | 98.5 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> had been employed in the public sector for 1 year or more (98.9%) rather than those employed in the public sector for less than 1 year (91.1%) occasionally or regularly participate in recruitment (99.4%) rather than those who never participate in recruitment (97.6%) occasionally or regularly participate in tender selection (99.6%) rather than those who never participate in tender selection (97.7%) | |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | 68.1 | (No significant respondent characteristics) | |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 65.6 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> are in the three lowest of the four salary categories (66.9%) rather than earning more than this (49.2%) | |
| LEATHER DIARY | 24.2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> are in the two lowest salary categories (27.7%) rather than those in the two highest categories (19.0%) male respondents (26.5%) rather than female respondents (19.8%) | |
| 2 ND JOB | 80.3 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> occasionally or regularly participate in recruitment (83.4%) rather than those who never participate in recruitment (77.1%) occasionally or regularly participate in overnight travel for work (83.8%) rather than those who never participate in overnight travel for work (75.4%) | |
| COMPUTER TENDER | 63.2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> are in the lowest of the four salary categories (73.5%) rather than those in the three highest salary categories (59.4%) never participate in recruitment (67.0%) rather than those who occasionally or regularly participate in recruitment (58.9%) | |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | 68.1 | (No significant respondent characteristics) | |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | 97.1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> non-supervisors (98.2%) rather than supervisors (95.5%) | |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 93.4 | (No significant respondent characteristics) | |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | 96.9 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> had been employed in the public sector for 1-5 years (100.0%) and those employed in the public sector for more than 10 years (97.1%) rather than were those employed in the public sector from 5 to 10 years (95.5%) or those employed there for less than 1 year (91.1%) occasionally or regularly participate in tender selection (98.9%) rather than those who never participate in tender selection (96.0%) | |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 79.3 | (No significant respondent characteristics) | |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 95.3 | (No significant respondent characteristics) | |

* For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.2 in Appendix 4.

Do men and women differ in the behaviours that they consider to be corrupt?

In 1993, women were more likely than men to consider many of the behaviours to be corrupt.

In 1999, male and female responses were more similar.

Some previous research has suggested that women tend to identify corrupt behaviour more readily than men do. Using an American sample, Welch and Peters (1977) found that women are less tolerant of corruption than men. Grabosky, Braithwaite and Wilson (1987) have found that Australian women regard white-collar offences as marginally more serious than do men. More recently, Larkin (2000) has reported findings indicating that female internal auditors are better able to identify ethical behaviour than are male internal auditors in America. In their review of empirical studies assessing ethical decision making in business, Loe, Ferrell and Mansfield (2000) described the findings concerning gender differences as being mixed and confusing. They concluded that the bulk of studies 'either determined no significant gender differences or found females tend to be more ethically sensitive than males' (p. 187).

The 1993 ICAC survey results were consistent with this previous research in so much as female respondents were more likely than their male counterparts to rate seven of the twelve scenarios^{iv} as corrupt. The 1993 survey also demonstrated that the effect of gender is not straightforward. Female respondents were less likely to rate one of the twelve scenarios as corrupt (LEATHER DIARY). For each of the other four scenarios in 1993 there was no statistically significant difference between the proportions of male and female respondents who judged the scenarios to be corrupt.

The 1999 results were markedly different from the 1993 results. In 1999 there were no scenarios which female respondents were significantly more likely than their male counterparts to rate as corrupt. In eleven of the twelve scenarios there were no statistically significant differences between the proportions of male and female respondents who judged the scenarios to be corrupt. Consistent with the 1993 finding, in 1999 female respondents were less likely than male respondents to rate the LEATHER DIARY scenario as corrupt. (See Table 5.)

Have men and women changed their views about what is corrupt since 1993?

Men were more likely to consider the behaviours to be corrupt in 1999 than they had been in 1993.

Women's views have remained the same.

When the responses of female respondents in 1993 are compared with the responses of female respondents in 1999, it can be seen that there was only one scenario where the judgments were significantly different between the two surveys. In 1999 female respondents were more likely to judge the HOSPITAL BILLS scenario to be corrupt than they had been in 1993. The relative consistency in judgments of female respondents across the two surveys is in marked contrast to the judgments of male respondents. In 1999 males were more likely to consider ten of the twelve scenarios to be corrupt than they had been in 1993. Refer to Table 6.

Figure 2 illustrates the percentages of male and female respondents who considered the TAKE NOTE PADS scenario to be corrupt in 1993 and 1999. Changes in perceptions of this scenario are typical of changes in perceptions of other scenarios. That is, changes between 1993 and 1999 appear to reflect an increase in the proportion of male respondents considering behaviours to be corrupt to match the proportion of female respondents who considered the behaviours to be corrupt in 1993.

Figure 2: Comparison of percentage of men and women who consider TAKE NOTE PADS scenario to be corrupt in 1993 and 1999




Table 6: Comparison of percentages of male and female respondents who considered each scenario corrupt in 1993 with 1999

| Scenario | % who considered the behaviour to be corrupt | | | | Significant change between 1993 and 1999?* |
|--------------------------|--|------|---------|------|--|
| | Males | | Females | | |
| | 1993 | 1999 | 1993 | 1999 | |
| STEREO | 95.8 | 98.6 | 97.3 | 97.9 | Males – yes Females - no |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | 59.5 | 68.8 | 66.2 | 68.6 | Males – yes Females - no |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 56.7 | 66.8 | 65.8 | 63.7 | Males – yes Females - no |
| LEATHER DIARY | 23.0 | 26.5 | 16.6 | 19.8 | Males - no Females - no |
| 2 ND JOB | 73.1 | 80.2 | 74.7 | 79.3 | Males – yes Females - no |
| COMPUTER TENDER | 53.0 | 62.1 | 60.2 | 65.3 | Males – yes Females - no |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | 61.7 | 69.7 | 67.2 | 63.9 | Males – yes Females - no |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | 93.1 | 96.9 | 96.9 | 97.5 | Males – yes Females - no |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 90.9 | 93.3 | 95.7 | 93.7 | Males - no Females - no |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | 93.9 | 96.5 | 93.0 | 97.5 | Males – yes Females - yes |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 73.9 | 80.2 | 80.2 | 77.2 | Males – yes Females - no |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 90.5 | 95.1 | 94.4 | 95.4 | Males – yes Females - no |

* For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.3 in Appendix 4.

Do supervisors differ from non-supervisors in what they consider to be corrupt?

In 1993, supervisors were more likely than non-supervisors to consider some of the behaviours to be corrupt.

In 1999, supervisor and non-supervisor responses were more similar.

In 1993, supervisors were more likely to consider the behaviour in four of the scenarios^v corrupt than were non-supervisors. There were no statistically significant differences between supervisors and non-supervisors in the other eight scenarios.

In 1999, there was only one scenario in which supervisors and non-supervisors differed significantly. Non-supervisors were more likely than supervisors to consider the WHISTLEBLOWER scenario to be corrupt (see Table 5).

Have supervisors and non-supervisors changed their views about what is corrupt since 1993?

Non-supervisors were more likely to consider the behaviours to be corrupt in 1999 than they had been in 1993.

Supervisors' perceptions remained relatively unchanged between 1993 and 1999.

When the responses of supervisors in 1993 are compared with the responses of supervisors in 1999, it can be seen that there was only one scenario where the judgments were significantly different between the two surveys. The relative consistency in judgments of supervisors across the two surveys is in marked contrast to the judgments of non-supervisors. In 1999 non-supervisors were more likely than they had been in 1993 to consider ten of the scenarios to be corrupt. Refer to Table 7.

Table 7: Comparison of percentages of supervisors and non-supervisors who considered each scenario corrupt in 1993 with 1999

| Scenario | % who considered the behaviour to be corrupt | | | | Significant change between 1993 and 1999? ^a |
|-----------------------------|--|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--|
| | Supervisors 1993 | Supervisors 1999 | Non-supervisors 1993 | Non-supervisors 1999 | |
| STEREO | 98.7 | 98.2 | 94.5 | 98.6 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | 65.3 | 71.3 | 60.0 | 65.8 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 63.7 | 64.1 | 58.2 | 67.0 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes |
| LEATHER DIARY | 20.4 | 25.4 | 20.3 | 23.7 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - no |
| 2 ND JOB | 74.3 | 80.1 | 73.4 | 80.4 | Supervisors - yes Non-supervisors - yes |
| COMPUTER TENDER | 55.4 | 60.2 | 56.7 | 65.5 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | 67.1 | 65.2 | 61.8 | 70.3 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | 96.0 | 95.5 | 93.9 | 98.2 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 94.2 | 93.4 | 91.9 | 93.4 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - no |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | 96.9 | 97.0 | 91.1 | 96.8 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 79.4 | 79.0 | 74.2 | 79.4 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 93.4 | 94.9 | 91.3 | 95.5 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes |

^a For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.4 in Appendix 4.

Do those at different salary levels differ in what they consider to be corrupt?

Salary makes a difference in the perception of some scenarios. In 1999 those in the higher salary categories were less likely to consider some behaviours to be corrupt.

Respondents were asked to nominate to which of four categories their salary belonged. The four salary categories corresponded to NSW public sector clerical gradings of: Grade 4 or below, Grades 5-8, Grades 9-12, or above Grade 12.

In 1993, in seven of the scenarios there were no statistically significant differences in the perceptions of respondents at different salary levels. In those scenarios where there were differences, no one pattern was evident. For some scenarios^{vi} those in the lowest of the four salary categories were less likely to say that the behaviours were corrupt than were those in other salary categories. In contrast, for other scenarios^{vii} it was those in the higher salary categories who were less likely to say that they were corrupt.

In 1999, in nine of the scenarios there were no statistically significant differences in the perceptions of respondents at different salary levels. For the remaining three scenarios^{viii}, it was those in the higher salary categories who were less likely to consider the behaviours to be corrupt (see Table 5).

Hence in both 1993 and 1999 those in the higher salary categories were less likely than those in lower salary categories to consider the behaviour to be corrupt in the two scenarios where expedience was the motive (JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and COMPUTER TENDER).

Have respondents from different salary categories changed their views about what they consider to be corrupt since 1993?

Of the four salary groups, it was those in the lowest salary group whose perceptions changed the most. Those in the lowest salary group were more likely to consider six of the scenarios to be corrupt in 1999 than they had been in 1993.

When the responses of those in each of the four salary groups in 1999 were compared with the responses of those from the corresponding salary groups in 1993, it was found that for the majority of scenarios and salary groups there had been little change in perceptions between 1993 and 1999. Of the four salary groups, it was those in the lowest salary group whose perceptions had changed the most.

More specifically, it was found that in 1999:

- those in the lowest salary group were more likely to consider that the behaviour in six of the scenarios was corrupt than they had been in 1993^{ix}
- those in the second lowest salary group were more likely to consider that the behaviour in three of the scenarios was corrupt than they had been in 1993^x
- those in the second highest salary group were more likely to consider that the behaviour in two of the scenarios was corrupt than they had been in 1993^{xi}
- those in the highest salary group were more likely to consider that the behaviour in one of the scenarios was corrupt than they had been in 1993^{xii}.

There is no apparent pattern among the scenarios where perceptions have changed.

Do those who have been employed in the public sector for different lengths of time differ in what they consider to be corrupt?

Length of service tends not to affect judgments of what is corrupt for most scenarios.

In both 1993 and 1999, length of time in the public sector was found to be related to judgments about whether or not the behaviour was considered to be corrupt in only two of the twelve scenarios. However, the particular scenarios for which length of employment in the public sector affected judgments were not the same in 1993^{xiii} and 1999^{xiv}.

Have those who have been employed for different lengths of time changed their views about what is corrupt since 1993?

Of the four length of service categories, it was those who had been employed in the public sector for 1 to 5 years whose perceptions changed the most. In 1999 those employed for 1 to 5 years were more likely to consider five of the scenarios to be corrupt than their counterparts had been in 1993.

When the 1999 responses for each of the four length of service categories were compared with the 1993 responses, it was found that for the majority of scenarios and length of service categories there had been little change in perceptions. Of the four length of service categories, it was those who had been employed for one to five years whose perceptions had changed the most.

More specifically, it was found that in 1999:

- those who had worked in the public sector for less than one year were more likely to consider that the behaviour in two of the scenarios was corrupt than had respondents who had the same length of service 1993^{xv}
- those who had worked in the public service from one to five years were more likely to consider that the behaviour in five of the scenarios was corrupt than they had been in 1993^{xvi}
- there was no statistically significant difference from perceptions in 1993 for any of the twelve scenarios for the those who had been employed in the public sector for five to ten years
- those who had worked in the public sector for more than ten years were more likely to consider that the behaviour in three of the scenarios was corrupt than they had been in 1993^{xvii}.


Once again, there is no apparent pattern among the scenarios where perceptions have changed.

2.5 How undesirable, harmful and/or unjustified were the behaviours considered to be?

In 1999, a larger proportion of respondents considered some of the behaviours to be undesirable, harmful and unjustified than in 1993.

While not all respondents considered all of the scenarios to be corrupt, this does not mean that they considered the behaviours to be desirable.

Figure 3: Average perceived desirability, harmfulness and justification - 1999



Respondents were asked to rate on separate six-point scales, how desirable, harmful and justified they considered the behaviours in each of the scenarios to be, with the least desirable, most harmful and least justified rating being '1' and the most desirable, least harmful and most justified rating being '6'. On average, all of the scenarios, except LEATHER DIARY, were rated at the 'very undesirable', 'very harmful' and 'not justified' ends of the scales in both 1993 and 1999. LEATHER DIARY was rated towards the middle of the scale. Average perceived desirability, harmfulness and justification for each of the scenarios in 1999 is displayed in Figure 3.

In Figure 3 the scenarios are presented in decreasing order of the percentage who considered them to be corrupt in 1999. It is interesting to note that the relative ordering of the scenarios in terms of desirability, harmfulness or justification of the behaviour does not simply reflect the order of scenarios most likely to be considered corrupt. For example, the COMPUTER TENDER scenario is considered less desirable, more harmful and less justified than one would expect based on the percentage of respondents who considered it to be corrupt. While the COMPUTER TENDER scenario was one of the least likely to be considered corrupt, it is near the middle of the scenarios in terms of its average (un)desirability and harmfulness ratings.

Have perceptions changed since 1993?

Overall, perceptions of the behaviours were more negative in 1999 than they were in 1993. As can be seen from Table 8, in 1999 a larger proportion of respondents considered the behaviours to be undesirable in six of the twelve scenarios, harmful in eight of the scenarios and unjustified in nine of the scenarios. There were no scenarios where significantly fewer considered the behaviour to be undesirable, harmful or unjustified in 1999 than in 1993.

Table 8: Comparison of percentage who considered each scenario undesirable, harmful or not justified in 1993 with 1999

| Scenario | % who considered the behaviour to be | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
| | undesirable* | | harmful* | | not justified* | |
| | 1993 | 1999 | 1993 | 1999 | 1993 | 1999 |
| STEREO | 96.0 | 97.4 | 95.4** | 98.1 | 97.3 | 98.6 |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | 84.6 | 90.5 | 70.4 | 74.4 | 84.3 | 90.8 |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 79.1 | 85.9 | 76.3 | 82.3 | 77.1 | 82.2 |
| LEATHER DIARY | 47.4 | 57.6 | 37.7 | 44.5 | 45.8 | 53.9 |
| 2 ND JOB | 88.9 | 93.6 | 86.7 | 92.8 | 88.7 | 94.3 |
| COMPUTER TENDER | 81.3 | 88.8 | 79.3 | 86.1 | 79.1 | 85.9 |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | 80.9 | 86.1 | 78.0 | 83.4 | 81.5 | 85.5 |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | 96.7 | 96.8 | 97.2 | 98.2 | 96.1 | 96.6 |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 98.2 | 98.1 | 98.1 | 98.3 | 98.4 | 98.7 |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | 96.1 | 97.2 | 94.5 | 96.5 | 92.6 | 95.9 |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 95.7 | 96.4 | 92.9 | 93.4 | 95.6 | 96.6 |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 97.6 | 98.6 | 95.6 | 98.5 | 97.2 | 99.0 |

* For this analysis, ratings '1', '2' or '3' were grouped together and labelled 'undesirable', 'harmful,' or 'unjustified' (depending upon the scale). Similarly ratings '4', '5' or '6' were grouped together and labelled 'desirable', 'not harmful,' or 'justified' (depending upon the scale).

** Responses which had changed significantly between 1993 and 1999 are presented in bold typeface. For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.5 in Appendix 4.

2.6 Are perceptions of whether or not the behaviour is corrupt related to perceptions of desirability, harmfulness and justification?

Just because some public sector employees do not label a behaviour as corrupt does not mean that they believe the behaviour is desirable.

The perception of whether or not a behaviour is corrupt is, however, related to perceptions of how undesirable, harmful and/or unjustified that behaviour is considered.

Figure 4 shows the percentage of respondents who considered the behaviours to be undesirable in 1999. In this figure, respondents are divided between those who considered the behaviour to be corrupt and those who did not. Figures 5 and 6 show the same comparison for perceived harmfulness and justification respectively^{xviii}.

From Figures 4, 5 and 6 the following observations are of interest:


- a judgment of a behaviour as 'not corrupt' cannot be equated with the behaviour as being considered as desirable (or harmless or justified). For most scenarios, a sizeable proportion of those who considered the behaviour as not corrupt also considered the behaviour to be undesirable, harmful and unjustified

- almost all of those who considered the behaviours to be corrupt also considered them to be undesirable, harmful and unjustified.

It is also noteworthy that in 1999 while a similar percentage considered the COMPUTER TENDER (63.2%), JOB FOR COLLEAGUE (65.6%), JOB FOR FRIEND (68.1%) and TAKE NOTE PADS (68.1%) scenarios to be corrupt, there were interesting differences in the way these scenarios were rated in terms of desirability, harmfulness and justification.

The COMPUTER TENDER and JOB FOR COLLEAGUE scenarios described similar situations of procedure not being followed with some mitigating circumstances. In the COMPUTER TENDER scenario, tendering procedures were by-passed to select a company known for its excellence to provide a computer training package. In the JOB FOR COLLEAGUE scenario, recruitment procedure was by-passed to appoint a colleague with the reputation for being the best person for the job. Despite the similarity between the two scenarios, on average the JOB FOR COLLEAGUE scenario was considered significantly more desirable^{xx}, less harmful^{xx} and more justified^{xxi} than was the COMPUTER TENDER scenario.

Figure 4: Percentage who considered each scenario undesirable - 1999



While the same percentage (68.1%) considered the JOB FOR FRIEND and TAKE NOTE PADS scenarios to be corrupt and there was no significant difference in the average perceived desirability of the two scenarios, on average the TAKE NOTE PADS scenario was considered less harmful^{xxii} and the JOB FOR FRIEND scenario was considered more justified^{xxiii}. Similarly, the TAKE NOTE PADS scenario was considered less harmful than the JOB FOR COLLEAGUE scenario^{xxiv} and the JOB FOR COLLEAGUE scenario was considered more justified than the TAKE NOTE PADS scenario^{xxv}.

Figure 5: Percentage who considered each scenario harmful - 1999





Figure 6: Percentage who considered each scenario unjustified - 1999



2.7 Do mitigating factors make a difference?

Public sector employees did attend to aspects of scenarios such as motivation for and consequences of the behaviour, in addition to the actual conduct.

However, within the specific examples used in this study, the mitigating circumstances had little practical effect on the overall numbers who judged the scenarios to be corrupt.

In addition to a simple description of the behaviour, some of the scenarios used in this study described mitigating circumstances. Their effect on judgments of corruption is examined here.


What difference does it make how the money is used?

Two of the scenarios described the same behaviour: *A government employee is offered \$300 from a company to accept a tender which is before him.* However, the money is used for different purposes in the two scenarios. In one *He takes the money to put towards a new stereo system (STEREO)*, while in the other *He only takes the money to cover his child's hospital bills (HOSPITAL BILLS)*. This pair of scenarios was included in order to examine the effect of mitigating circumstances on the perception of the situation.

In both 1993 and 1999, each of these scenarios was judged to be corrupt by almost all of the respondents (98.5% for STEREO and 96.9% for HOSPITAL BILLS in 1999). As can be seen in Figure 7, the vast majority of respondents in 1999 did not alter their judgments as to whether the scenario was corrupt - that is, they either said that both STEREO and HOSPITAL BILLS were corrupt (96.3%) or that both scenarios were not corrupt (0.9%). Of the small number of respondents who judged one scenario as corrupt and the other as not corrupt, significantly more respondents said that the STEREO scenario was corrupt and the HOSPITAL BILLS was not corrupt (2.2%) than those who said that HOSPITAL BILLS was corrupt and STEREO was not (0.6%). While this was statistically significant, the mitigating circumstances had little practical effect on the overall numbers with the vast majority considering both scenarios to be corrupt.

The STEREO scenario was judged to be significantly less desirable^{xxvi} and less justified^{xxvii} than the HOSPITAL BILLS scenario in both 1993 and 1999. In 1999 the STEREO scenario was judged to be significantly more harmful^{xxviii} than the HOSPITAL BILLS scenario. Even though the mitigating circumstances made a statistically significant difference to the judgments of desirability, harmfulness and justification in 1999, it had little practical effect with most respondents judging both scenarios to be undesirable, harmful and unjustified.

Figure 7: Judgment of behaviour as corrupt: STEREO and HOSPITAL BILLS scenarios, 1999




Are there circumstances where it is appropriate not to follow recruitment procedure?

Another two scenarios depicted the same behaviour: that of recruiting a new employee without following the formal process. One scenario is described as *To avoid the hassle of advertising, a government employee appoints a colleague to a vacant position. She has the reputation for being the best person for the job (JOB FOR COLLEAGUE)*. The description of the other scenario did not provide information on the calibre of the person being appointed: *A government employee uses her position to get a friend a public sector job (JOB FOR FRIEND)*.

In 1999, approximately two out of every three respondents judged the JOB FOR COLLEAGUE scenario to be corrupt (65.6%), while a slightly higher proportion (68.1%) judged JOB FOR FRIEND to be corrupt. The percentage of those who stated that the JOB FOR FRIEND scenario was corrupt and JOB FOR COLLEAGUE not corrupt (14.9%) was only marginally greater than the percentage of those who stated that the JOB FOR FRIEND was not corrupt and the JOB FOR COLLEAGUE was corrupt (12.1%). As was the case in 1993, in 1999 most respondents (73.0%) judged the behaviour in both scenarios the same way: either both scenarios were corrupt (53.2%) or both were not corrupt (19.8%). (See Figure 8.)

In 1999, there were no statistically significant differences in the perceived desirability, perceived harmfulness or perceived justification of these two scenarios.

Figure 8: Judgment of behaviour as corrupt: JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and JOB FOR FRIEND scenarios, 1999



3. TAKING ACTION ABOUT PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION

The second major focus of the 1993 and 1999 surveys was to identify factors which hinder public sector employees taking action about corrupt conduct which they might observe at work.

Reporting the behaviour, either within or outside the organisation, is one possible form of response to corruption. However, to restrict respondents to the options of whether or not they would report the activity is to deny the range of alternatives available when faced with possible corrupt conduct. Recognising this, for each scenario, respondents were offered a choice of four responses to the question 'what would you do about it?'. These response options were:

- nothing
- talk to the employee
- talk to the employee's supervisor or another appropriate person within the organisation (abbreviated within this report as 'report internally')
- report it outside my organisation (e.g., Police, ICAC) (discussed within this report as 'report externally').

This second chapter of results describes what public sector employees say they would do when faced with such scenarios, how their choice of action relates to their perceptions of the scenario and how choice of action relates to characteristics of the respondent.

When considering survey results about choice of action, it should be kept in mind that respondents were asked to say what they *thought they would do* in each of twelve specific scenarios. We have no evidence to suggest that, if actually faced with these scenarios, their actions would mirror their responses. In spite of this, responses to these scenarios do provide insight into some of the factors which affect action chosen in response to corruption. Further implications of these results are discussed in Chapter 7.

3.1 Changes in reported responses to the scenarios between 1993 and 1999

Respondents in 1999 were significantly more likely to say that they would report the matter within their organisation than respondents in 1993.

Both similarities and differences in responses to the scenarios between 1993 and 1999 are apparent from Table 9 and Figures 9 to 12.

From Table 9 it can be seen that the general pattern of responding to the scenarios is similar between 1993 and 1999. Notably, in both years:

- i. there is considerable variation in the responses selected for each scenario. For all scenarios, each of the possible responses was selected by at least some respondents
- ii. in most (ten of the twelve) scenarios, the majority of respondents said that they would report internally^{xix}

- iii. it was uncommon for respondents to opt to say that they would report the conduct externally. For most scenarios, 10% or less of the respondents stated that they would report the conduct externally^{xxx}
- iv. a number of respondents indicated, by ticking more than one box on the questionnaire, that they would take more than one action (e.g., talk to the employee and then if that were not effective, report internally).

Table 9: Comparison of responses to scenarios - 1993 and 1999

| Scenario | % nominating response | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | 1993 | | | | 1999 | | | |
| | Do nothing | Talk to employee | Report internally | Report externally | Do nothing | Talk to employee | Report internally | Report externally |
| STEREO | 10.7 | 19.8 | 59.5* | 10.0 | 8.9 | 18.8 | 64.2 | 8.0 |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | 27.1 | 49.3 | 22.4 | 1.2 | 24.4 | 49.0 | 26.1 | 0.5 |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 30.4 | 14.7 | 50.3 | 4.6 | 26.7 | 12.1 | 56.5 | 4.7 |
| LEATHER DIARY | 72.7 | 17.8 | 8.6 | 0.9 | 66.5 | 20.6 | 12.7 | 0.3 |
| 2 ND JOB | 19.7 | 16.4 | 58.4 | 5.5 | 17.6 | 13.3 | 61.5 | 7.6 |
| COMPUTER TENDER | 27.9 | 14.9 | 49.8 | 7.3 | 21.3 | 11.8 | 57.9 | 9.0 |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | 32.7 | 14.9 | 47.6 | 4.8 | 30.1 | 14.9 | 49.9 | 5.1 |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | 5.8 | 4.5 | 50.6 | 39.1 | 5.8 | 5.1 | 49.6 | 39.5 |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 6.6 | 10.9 | 57.8 | 24.8 | 6.7 | 11.9 | 62.6 | 18.8 |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | 12.7 | 25.1 | 53.1 | 9.1 | 10.4 | 22.5 | 58.7 | 8.4 |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 13.5 | 27.9 | 55.6 | 3.0 | 14.0 | 24.9 | 58.2 | 3.0 |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 11.9 | 19.5 | 62.5 | 6.2 | 10.0 | 14.5 | 67.6 | 7.9 |

* Responses which had changed significantly between 1993 and 1999 are presented in bold typeface. For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.6 in Appendix 4.

When responses from the two surveys are compared, it can be seen that respondents tended to be more likely in 1999 than in 1993 to say that they would report the matter internally (see Figure 11) and less likely to say that they would do nothing (see Figure 9). Trends in the percentage who said that they would talk to the employee (Figure 10) or report externally (Figure 12) are less clear cut.

A related finding was that, on average, respondents in 1999 considered that they would report the matter internally in more of the scenarios^{xxxi}. The average number of scenarios where they said that they would do nothing^{xxxi}, talk to the employee^{xxxi} or report externally^{xxxi} did not differ significantly between 1993 and 1999.

Figure 9: Percentage who said that they would 'do nothing' - 1993 and 1999







Figure 10: Percentage who said that they would talk to the employee - 1993 and 1999



**Figure 11: Percentage who said that they would report internally
1993 and 1999**



**Figure 12: Percentage who said that they would report externally
1993 and 1999**



3.2 The relationship between what is considered corrupt and response to scenario

It is not possible to assume that once a behaviour is identified as *corrupt*, people will necessarily take action about it.

On the other hand, a substantial proportion of those who considered the behaviour was *not corrupt* still report it or take some other action.

Figures 13 to 16 illustrate the differences in choice of action between those who consider the behaviour to be 'corrupt' and those who said that the behaviour was 'not corrupt' for four of the individual scenarios. These graphs are typical of 1999 responses to the scenarios.

Consistently, these graphs illustrate that:

- the patterns of responding to each scenario differ between those who consider the behaviour to be corrupt and those who consider that it was not corrupt
- those who considered it to be corrupt were more likely to say that they would report internally or externally and less likely to say that they would do nothing than were those who did not consider it to be corrupt
- for each scenario, some of the respondents who consider the behaviour to be corrupt would elect to do nothing about it, others would choose to talk to the employee
- a substantial proportion of the respondents who said that the scenario was not corrupt, said that they would still report it or take other action such as talk to the employee.

Figure 13: TAKE NOTE PADS 1999 - Comparison of actions chosen by those who consider behaviour corrupt and those who consider behaviour not corrupt




Figure 14: JOB FOR FRIEND 1999 - Comparison of actions chosen by those who consider behaviour corrupt and those who consider behaviour not corrupt




Figure 15: CATERING BUSINESS 1999 - Comparison of actions chosen by those who consider behaviour corrupt and those who consider behaviour not corrupt





Figure 16: COMPUTER TENDER 1999 - Comparison of actions chosen by those who consider behaviour corrupt and those who consider behaviour not corrupt



3.3 Relationship between background characteristics and action chosen

In order to determine whether changes in responses to the scenarios were present across the board or confined to specific subgroups of respondents, answers to the 1999 survey were compared to answers to the 1993 survey for each possible action (do nothing, talk to the employee, report internally and report externally) to each scenario for each subgroup^{xxxv}. Subgroups whose responses differed significantly between 1993 and 1999 are listed in Table 10. The absence of a subgroup from the table indicates that responses for that particular subgroup did not differ between 1993 and 1999 for that action for that scenario.

From Table 10 it can be seen that:

- a number of the subgroups were less likely in 1999 than in 1993 to say that they would do nothing in response to nine of the scenarios
- in six of the scenarios several subgroups were less likely in 1999 than in 1993 to say that they would talk to the employee
- in nine of the scenarios several subgroups were more likely in 1999 than in 1993 to say that they would report internally
- there was even less consistency with regard to changes between 1993 and 1999 in the proportions who said that they would report externally. Some subgroups were both less likely to report externally for some scenarios and more likely to report externally for other scenarios (e.g. supervisors said that they would be less likely to report CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION externally yet they would be more likely to report 2ND JOB and COMPUTER TENDER externally in 1999 than in 1993).

Table 10: Summary of subgroups whose responses to scenarios changed between 1993 and 1999

| Scenario | Significant changes in responses between 1993 and 1999* | |
|-------------------|--|---|
| | 1999 – Groups <i>less</i> likely to: | 1999 – Groups <i>more</i> likely to: |
| STEREO | do nothing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - non-supervisors (10.4% in 1999 compared with 15.8% in 1993) - those in the public sector for 1-5 years (6.5% in 1999 compared with 14.1% in 1993) report externally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (8.9% in 1999 compared with 13.4% in 1993) | report internally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (63.2% in 1999 compared with 54.4% in 1993) - non-supervisors (63.0% in 1999 compared with 54.5% in 1993) |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | do nothing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - non-supervisors (29.5% in 1999 compared with 35.1% in 1993) | report internally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the lowest salary group (31.5% in 1999 compared with 23.6% in 1993) |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | do nothing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the highest salary group (8.3% in 1999 compared with 25.9% in 1993) talk to the employee: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (10.4% in 1999 compared with 15.9% in 1993) - those in the second highest salary group (12.6% in 1999 compared with 19.7% in 1993) | report internally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (58.2% in 1999 compared with 50.7% in 1993) - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (60.1% in 1999 compared with 52.5% in 1993) - non-supervisors (54.1% in 1999 compared with 45.4% in 1993) - those in the highest salary group (76.7% in 1999 compared with 51.7% in 1993) |
| LEATHER DIARY | do nothing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - supervisors (60.6% in 1999 compared with 67.2% in 1993) - non-supervisors (70.7% in 1999 compared with 76.9% in 1993) - male respondents (62.6% in 1999 compared with 68.5% in 1993) - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (62.2% in 1999 compared with 70.3% in 1993) - those in the lowest salary group (67.1% in 1999 compared with 75.7% in 1993) - those in the second lowest salary group (68.4% in 1999 compared with 74.9% in 1993) - those in the highest salary group (55.0% in 1999 compared with 72.4% in 1993) talk to the employee: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the second highest salary group (22.2% in 1999 compared with 31.2% in 1993) | report internally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (14.6% in 1999 compared with 10.2% in 1993) - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (15.3% in 1999 compared with 9.3% in 1993) - supervisors (14.0% in 1999 compared with 8.1% in 1993) - those in the second lowest salary group (14.3% in 1999 compared with 8.8% in 1993) |

* For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.7 in Appendix 4.

Table 10 continued

| Scenario | Significant changes in responses between 1993 and 1999* | |
|---------------------|---|--|
| | 1999 – Groups less likely to: | 1999 – Groups more likely to: |
| 2 ND JOB | <p>do nothing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the highest salary group (1.6% in 1999 compared with 10.2% in 1993) <p>talk to the employee:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (11.5% in 1999 compared with 16.4% in 1993) - supervisors (13.2% in 1999 compared with 18.3% in 1993) - those in the second lowest salary group (12.1% in 1999 compared with 18.1% in 1993) | <p>report externally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - supervisors (10.5% in 1999 compared with 5.5% in 1993) - those in the second highest salary group (9.2% in 1999 compared with 3.2% in 1993) |
| COMPUTER TENDER | <p>do nothing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - supervisors (16.7% in 1999 compared with 22.2% in 1993) - non-supervisors (24.9% in 1999 compared with 32.5% in 1993) - male respondents (19.3% in 1999 compared with 26.3% in 1993) - those in the public sector for 1-5 years (20.6% in 1999 compared with 31.1% in 1993) - those in the lowest salary group (25.6% in 1999 compared with 34.4% in 1993) <p>talk to the employee:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (11.7% in 1999 compared with 15.9% in 1993) - supervisors (11.3% in 1999 compared with 16.5% in 1993) - those in the second lowest salary group (10.0% in 1999 compared with 15.9% in 1993) and those in the highest salary group (11.5% in 1999 compared with 25.4% in 1993) | <p>report internally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (58.4% in 1999 compared with 49.9% in 1993) - those in the public sector for 1 to less than 5 years (61.7% in 1999 compared with 47.4% in 1993) - non-supervisors (54.8% in 1999 compared with 45.7% in 1993) - supervisors (61.9% in 1999 compared with 55.1% in 1993) - those in the lowest salary group or the highest salary group (lowest salary group: 53.1% in 1999 compared with 44.6% in 1993; highest salary group: 73.8% in 1999 compared with 54.2% in 1993) <p>report externally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (10.3% in 1999 compared with 5.6% in 1993) - supervisors (10.1% in 1999 compared with 6.2% in 1993) |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | <p>do nothing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (26.8% in 1999 compared with 32.1% in 1993) - those in the public sector for 1-5 years (25.7% in 1999 compared with 37.0% in 1993) | <p>report internally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the public sector for 1 to less than 5 years (56.2% in 1999 compared with 42.6% in 1993) <p>report externally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the second highest salary group (6.2% in 1999 compared with 1.4% in 1993) |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | (No significant changes) | (No significant changes) |

Table 10 continued

| Scenario | Significant changes in responses between 1993 and 1999* | |
|--------------------------|--|--|
| | 1999 – Groups less likely to: | 1999 – Groups more likely to: |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | report externally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (21.9% in 1999 compared with 29.9% in 1993) - supervisors (16.0% in 1999 compared with 27.2% in 1993) - those in the second lowest salary group (15.9% in 1999 compared with 22.1% in 1993) and those in the highest salary group (16.4% in 1999 compared with 37.3% in 1993) | talk to the employee: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the public sector for 1-5 years (17.6% in 1999 compared with 9.1% in 1993) report internally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (60.3% in 1999 compared with 54.2% in 1993) - those in the public sector for 5 to 10 years (67.3% in 1999 compared with 55.9% in 1993) - supervisors (66.9% in 1999 compared with 58.4% in 1993) - those in the highest salary group (72.1% in 1999 compared with 49.2% in 1993) |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | do nothing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - non-supervisors (12.2% in 1999 compared with 17.7% in 1993) | report internally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - non-supervisors (55.2% in 1999 compared with 47.1% in 1993) (No significant changes) |
| CATERING BUSINESS | talk to the employee: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - female respondents (22.8% in 1999 compared with 30.2% in 1993) | |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | do nothing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - non-supervisors (12.0% in 1999 compared with 16.3% in 1993) talk to the employee: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - female respondents (17.2% in 1999 compared with 23.5% in 1993) - supervisors (14.3% in 1999 compared with 20.8% in 1993) - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (12.2% in 1999 compared with 17.4% in 1993) - those in the second lowest salary group (13.6% in 1999 compared with 21.1% in 1993) | report internally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - non-supervisors (64.4% in 1999 compared with 58.4% in 1993) report externally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the second lowest salary group (8.8% in 1999 compared with 4.6% in 1993) |

The relationships between individual background factors and responses to the scenarios are considered one at a time and discussed in more detail in the material which follows. Interrelationships between the different background factors are discussed in Appendix 3. For further information on what best distinguishes those who choose different types of action, refer also to Section 6.2 in Chapter 6.

Do men and women differ in how they say they would react to the scenarios?

In both 1993 and 1999, men were more likely than women to say that they would report the matter externally.

In 1993, gender was found to be related to action chosen in nine of the twelve scenarios. Women tended to be more likely than men to talk to the employee in three of the scenarios^{xxxvi}, report internally in three of the scenarios^{xxxvii} and to do nothing in one of the scenarios^{xxxviii}. On the other hand, men were more likely than women to state that

they would report the conduct externally in seven scenarios^{xxxix} and were more likely than women to talk to the employee in one of the scenarios^{xl}.

In 1999, women were more likely than men to say that they would do nothing in five of the scenarios^{xli}, talk to the employee in one of the scenarios^{xlii}, and report internally in two^{xliii}. On the other hand, in 1999, men were more likely than women to talk to the employee in one of the scenarios^{xliv}, report internally in one^{xlv} and report externally in five^{xlvi}.

One way of obtaining an overview of the differences between male and female respondents' choice of action in 1993 and 1999 is to examine how frequently male and female respondents select each of the available options (do nothing, talk to the employee, report internally or report externally) in both years. Figure 17 illustrates (separately for male and female respondents in the 1993 and 1999 surveys) the average number of scenarios (out of a possible twelve) that prompted each course of action.

From Figure 17 it can be seen that, overall, men and women were similar in their patterns of action chosen, with both men and women saying that they would report about half of the twelve scenarios internally. The key difference between them was that men tended to say that they would report externally more frequently than women in both 1993 and 1999^{xlvii}.

Have men and women changed the way they say they would react since 1993?


In 1999, both men and women were likely to say that they would report more behaviours within the organisation than in 1993.

Men less frequently chose do 'nothing' in 1999 than 1993.

From Figure 17 it can be seen that, overall:

- the average number of scenarios where respondents nominated that they would report internally increased between 1993 and 1999 at the same rate for both male and female respondents (from 5.6 scenarios for men and 5.7 for women in 1993 to 6.2 for both men and women in 1999^{xlviii})
- the average number of scenarios for which respondents said that they would do nothing has decreased for men but remained the same for women^{xlix}
- the average number of scenarios where respondents nominated that they would talk to the employee did not differ significantly for male and female respondents in either 1993 or 1999.

Figure 17: Comparison of action chosen by male and female respondents in 1993 and 1999



When considering the changes in responses to specific scenarios, from Table 10 it can be seen that, when compared to 1993, in 1999:

- men were more likely to report internally in five of the scenariosⁱ and less likely to do nothing in three of the scenariosⁱⁱ or report externally in two of the scenariosⁱⁱⁱ
- women were less likely to talk to the employee in two of the scenariosⁱⁱⁱⁱ.

There is no obvious pattern in the types of scenarios for which men and women changed the way they said that they would react since 1993.

Do supervisors and non-supervisors differ in their choice of action?

In both 1993 and 1999 non-supervisors were more likely than supervisors to say that they would do nothing.

Supervisors were more likely than non-supervisors to say that they would report internally or talk to the employee.

Previous research by Miceli and Near (1984) found that those who report misconduct through internal reporting channels 'were more likely to be highly educated supervisors and/or employees in positions for which whistle-blowing was role-prescribed' (p. 83). Zipparo (1999b) has suggested that non-supervisors are more likely to be deterred from reporting 'because they feel more vulnerable to negative consequences' than do supervisors (p. 285).


The ICAC surveys have confirmed that supervisors are more likely than non-supervisors to say that they would respond to misconduct. In the 1993 survey, significantly more non-supervisors than supervisors said that they would do nothing about all twelve scenarios. For most of the scenarios, more supervisors than non-supervisors said that they would talk to the employee or report internally about the conduct. There was no difference between supervisors and non-supervisors in the percentage who said that they would report externally.

In 1999, once again significantly more non-supervisors said that they would do nothing in response to the majority (nine of the twelve) of the scenarios^{lv}. Supervisors were more likely than non-supervisors to say that they would talk to the employee in two scenarios^{lv}, report internally in six scenarios^{lv}, and report externally in one scenario^{lvii}.

Figure 18 illustrates the differences between supervisors' and non-supervisors' choice of action in 1993 and 1999. It depicts the average number of scenarios (out of a possible twelve) for which each option was selected. From Figure 18 it can be seen that:

- supervisors tended to be more likely than non-supervisors to say that they would report internally in both 1993 and 1999^{lviii}, but the difference is smaller in 1999
- non-supervisors tended to say that they would do nothing more frequently than supervisors in both 1993 and 1999^{lix}
- supervisors tended to be more likely than non-supervisors to say that they would talk to the employee in both 1993 and 1999^{lx}
- the average number of scenarios where respondents nominated that they would report externally was not significantly different between supervisors and non-supervisors in 1993 and 1999.

Figure 18: Comparison of action chosen by supervisors and non-supervisors in 1993 and 1999



Have supervisors and non-supervisors changed the way they say they would react since 1993?

Both supervisors and non-supervisors said that they would report internally more frequently in 1999.

Both supervisors and non-supervisors increased the number of scenarios for which they said that they would report internally between 1993 and 1999^{lxi}. (See Figure 18.)

When considering the changes in responses to specific scenarios, from Table 10 it can be seen that, when compared to 1993, in 1999:

- non-supervisors were more likely to report internally in five of the scenarios^{lxii} and less likely to do nothing in six of the scenarios^{lxiii}
- supervisors were more likely to report internally in three of the scenarios^{lxiv} or report externally in two of the scenarios^{lxv}, and less likely to do nothing in two of the scenarios^{lxvi}, talk to the employee in three of the scenarios^{lxvii} or report externally in one scenario^{lxviii}.

There is no obvious pattern in the types of scenarios for which supervisors and non-supervisors changed the way they said that they would react since 1993.

Do those at different salary levels differ in how they say they would react to the scenarios?

Those on higher salaries are more likely to say that they would report internally, while those on lower salaries are more likely to say that they would do nothing.


In 1993, those in the lowest salary category or lowest two salary categories were more likely to say that they would do nothing in nine of the twelve scenarios. Those in higher salary categories tended to be more likely to say that they would report internally^{lxix}. For other possible reactions, the relationship between salary and choice of action was less straightforward.

In 1999, lower salaries were related to doing nothing in ten of the twelve scenarios^{lxx}. Those in the two highest of the four salary categories were more likely to talk to the employee in two scenarios^{lxxi} and were more likely to report the matter internally in nine of the scenarios^{lxxii}. Salary was not related to the proportion of respondents stating that they would report externally for any of the scenarios.

As can be seen from Figure 19:

- in both years, those in the lowest salary category said that they would do nothing in more scenarios, on average, than did those in the highest two salary categories^{lxxiii}
- there were no significant differences in average number of scenarios where the respondent chose 'talk to employee' between respondents in different salary categories or different years
- the average number of scenarios where respondents nominate reporting internally increases as salary increases^{lxxiv}
- there were no significant differences in average number of scenarios where respondent chose 'report externally' between respondents in different salary categories or different years.

Figure 19: Comparison of action chosen by respondents in different salary groups in 1993 and 1999



Have those on different salaries changed the way they say they would react since 1993?

In 1999, those in the highest salary category were more likely to say that they would report the behaviours within the organisation than in 1993.

Those in the highest salary category said that they would report internally more often in 1999 than in 1993^{boxv} (see Figure 19).

When considering the changes in responses to specific scenarios, from Table 10 it can be seen that, when compared to 1993, in 1999:

- those in the highest salary group were more likely to report internally for three scenarios^{boxvi} and less likely to do nothing in three scenarios^{boxvii}, talk to the employee in one scenario^{boxviii} or report externally in one scenario^{boxix}
- those in the second highest salary group were more likely to report internally for one scenario^{boxx} or report externally for one scenario^{boxxi} and less likely to talk to the employee in two scenarios^{boxxii}
- those in the second lowest salary group were more likely to report internally for one scenario^{boxxiii} or report externally for one scenario^{boxxiv} and less likely to do nothing in two scenarios^{boxxv}, talk to the employee in three scenarios^{boxxvi} or report externally in one scenario^{boxxvii}
- those in the lowest salary group were more likely to report internally for two scenarios^{boxxviii} and less likely to do nothing in one scenario^{boxxix}.

There is no obvious pattern in the types of scenarios for which those on different salaries changed the way they said that they would react since 1993.


Does length of service in the public sector affect reaction to the scenarios?

Those employed for more than 10 years are more likely to report internally than those employed for shorter periods.

In 1993, length of service in the public sector was not related to choice of action for any scenario.

In 1999, those employed in the public sector for more than 10 years were less likely to say that they would do nothing in four scenarios^{xc} and were more likely to say that they would report the matter internally in six of the scenarios^{xcl}. Those employed for less than 5 years were more likely to say that they would talk to the employee about the HOSPITAL BILLS scenario. Length of employment in the public sector was not related to proportion of respondents stating that they would report externally for any of the scenarios.

Figure 20: Comparison of action chosen by respondents employed for different lengths of time in 1993 and 1999



As can be seen from Figure 20:

- the average number of scenarios where respondents nominated doing nothing tends to decrease as the length of employment in the public sector increases, with those who had been employed in the public sector for the shortest periods being more likely to say that they would do nothing in more scenarios^{xclii}
- the average number of scenarios where respondents nominated reporting internally is greater for those who have been employed in the public sector for more than ten years^{xcliii}
- there were no significant differences between respondents who had been employed for different lengths of time in the average number of scenarios where respondents chose either 'talk to employee' or 'report externally'.

Have those employed for different lengths of time changed the way they react since 1993?

In 1999 those who had been employed for at least one year were more likely to say that they would report internally than were those employed for the same length of time in 1993^{xci} (refer to Figure 20).

When considering the changes in responses to specific scenarios, from Table 10 it can be seen that, when compared to 1993, in 1999:

- those who had been employed in the public sector for more than 10 years were more likely to report internally for two scenarios^{xci} or report externally for one scenario^{xci} and less likely to do nothing in one scenario^{xci} or talk to the employee in four scenarios^{xci}
- those who had been employed for 5 to 10 years were more likely to report internally for one scenario^{xci}
- those who had been employed for 1 to 5 years were more likely to report internally for two scenarios^c or talk to the employee for one scenario^d and less likely to do nothing in three scenarios^{ci}
- choice of action by those who had been employed for less than 1 year had not significantly changed for any of the individual scenarios.

There is no obvious pattern in the types of scenarios for which those who had been employed for different lengths of time had changed the way they said that they would react since 1993.

4. IMPACT OF EXPERIENCE

One feature of the 1999 survey, which had not been included in the 1993 survey, was an examination of the effect of experience in a particular area of work (such as recruitment or tender selection) on both understanding of corruption and action chosen in response to scenarios about that area of work.

Understanding the impact of experience is important because it is those who work in an area (that is, those who have some experience with the work) who are most likely to be in a position to observe any wrongdoing and take action about any wrongdoing they do observe. In order to minimise workplace corruption it is important that those who participate in an area of work should be able to identify inappropriate behaviour.

Some of the 1993 patterns of responses were consistent with employees experienced in a particular area of work being the ones most likely to consider the behaviour to be corrupt. For example, supervisors and those on higher salaries were more likely to consider the STEREO and HOSPITAL BILLS scenarios to be corrupt than were non-supervisors and those on lower salaries. However, for some other scenarios it was those least likely to have experience who were most likely to consider the behaviour to be corrupt. For example, those on lower salaries were more likely to consider the JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and COMPUTER TENDER scenarios to be corrupt than were those on higher salaries. (Similar patterns were observed in the 1999 results, see Section 2.4.)

In 1993 it was not possible to directly test the impact of experience because no information had been collected on the respondents' participation in such work areas.

In contrast, the 1999 survey sought to specifically explore the impact of particular types of work experience on respondents' understanding of corruption and on action chosen in response to the scenario.

Of the twelve scenarios used in the questionnaire, two concerned recruitment (JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and JOB FOR FRIEND), three concerned tendering (STEREO, HOSPITAL BILLS and COMPUTER TENDER) and one concerned overnight travel for work (BUSINESS TRIPS). In order to examine the effects of experience, 1999 respondents were asked to nominate how often in their current position they participate in: (a) recruitment selection, (b) tender selection, and (c) overnight travel for work. The options available for each of these questions were: 'never', 'occasionally' or 'regularly'.

4.1 Does experience in a particular area of work affect judgments of whether a behaviour is considered corrupt?

Do those who have experience in recruitment perceive recruitment scenarios differently?

Experience in recruitment does not affect perceptions of whether the recruitment scenarios are considered corrupt or unjustified, but does affect whether they are considered undesirable or harmful.

Experience in recruitment did not affect the percentages that considered the JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and JOB FOR FRIEND scenarios to be corrupt. From Table 11 it can be seen

that approximately two-thirds of respondents considered that it was corrupt to use one's position to get a friend a job, irrespective of the respondent's experience in recruitment selection. In other words, approximately one-third of the respondents considered that it was not corrupt to use one's position to get a friend a job irrespective of the respondent's experience in recruitment selection.

For both of the recruitment scenarios, those who *occasionally* or *regularly* participate in recruitment were more likely to consider the behaviours undesirable^{ciii} or harmful.^{cv} Experience in recruitment, however, was not related to perceptions of how justified the behaviour was considered to be for either of the two recruitment scenarios.

Table 11: Relationship between experience in recruitment and perception of recruitment scenarios in 1999

| Scenario | Experience in recruitment selection | Perception of behaviour | | | |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| | | % Corrupt | % Undesirable | % Harmful | % Unjustified |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | <i>Never</i> | 66.0 | 83.2 | 78.8 | 80.0 |
| | <i>Occasionally</i> | 64.9 | 88.3 | 85.8 | 84.1 |
| | <i>Regularly</i> | 64.7 | 94.2 | 88.5 | 86.5 |
| | Total | 65.5 | 85.9 | 82.2 | 82.0 |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | <i>Never</i> | 67.4 | 82.9 | 80.7 | 83.8 |
| | <i>Occasionally</i> | 68.1 | 91.7 | 87.8 | 88.9 |
| | <i>Regularly</i> | 76.0 | 86.5 | 82.7 | 84.6 |
| | Total | 68.2 | 86.4 | 83.5 | 85.8 |

Do those who have experience in tender selection perceive tendering scenarios differently?

Those with some experience in tender selection were more likely to perceive two of the three tendering scenarios as corrupt than were those who never participate in tender selection.

In the STEREO and HOSPITAL BILLS scenarios those who said that they *never* participate in tender selection were less likely to consider the behaviour to be corrupt than those who either occasionally or regularly participate in tender selection.^{cv} Another way of expressing this is that those who do have some experience in tendering were more likely to consider the behaviours in these two scenarios to be corrupt.

Experience in tender selection did not affect the percentages that considered the COMPUTER TENDER scenario to be corrupt. Approximately six in ten of the respondents considered that it was corrupt to bypass tendering procedures to select a company known for its excellence to provide a \$100,000 computer training package, irrespective of their experience in tender selection (see Table 12). Unlike the STEREO and HOSPITAL BILLS scenarios, the COMPUTER TENDER scenario did not involve direct financial gain, nor did it involve illegal behaviour.

For one of the three tendering scenarios (HOSPITAL BILLS – the tendering scenario with mitigating circumstances), respondents who *occasionally* or *regularly* participate in tender selection were more likely to consider the behaviour to be undesirable,^{cv}

harmful,^{cvi} or unjustified.^{cvi} This might suggest that those who said that they never participate in tender selection were more likely to consider the motivation for accepting the money (to cover his child's hospital bills) when judging the desirability, harmfulness and justification for the behaviour than were those who participate occasionally or regularly in tender selection.

For the other two tendering scenarios (STEREO and COMPUTER TENDER) experience in tendering was found not to be related to perceptions of desirability, harmfulness or justification.

Table 12: Relationship between experience in tender selection and perception of tendering scenarios in 1999

| Scenario | Experience in tender selection | Perception of behaviour | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------|--------------|------------------|
| | | % Corrupt | % Undesirable | % Harmful | % Unjustified |
| STEREO | <i>Never</i> | 97.7 | 97.3 | 97.7 | 98.1 |
| | <i>Occasionally</i> | 99.5 | 99.1 | 98.2 | 99.5 |
| | <i>Regularly</i> | 100.0 | 94.8 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 98.4 | 97.6 | 98.0 | 98.7 |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | <i>Never</i> | 96.0 | 95.7 | 95.3 | 94.9 |
| | <i>Occasionally</i> | 98.6 | 99.5 | 98.2 | 97.3 |
| | <i>Regularly</i> | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 97.1 | 97.2 | 96.5 | 96.0 |
| COMPUTER TENDER | <i>Never</i> | 65.4 | 87.7 | 86.6 | 86.0 |
| | <i>Occasionally</i> | 59.0 | 90.9 | 84.5 | 85.4 |
| | <i>Regularly</i> | 55.9 | 89.7 | 87.9 | 84.5 |
| | Total | 62.8 | 88.8 | 86.1 | 85.7 |

Do those who have experience in overnight travel for work perceive the travel scenario differently?

Experience in overnight travel does not affect perceptions of whether the travel scenario is considered corrupt, undesirable, harmful or unjustified.

Experience in overnight travel for work was found not to be related to perceptions of whether the BUSINESS TRIPS scenario was considered corrupt or whether it was considered undesirable, harmful or unjustified.

Irrespective of experience, almost all of the respondents (95%) believed that adding extra days to business trips to visit friends and claiming those extra days as business trips was corrupt.

Table 13: Relationship between experience in overnight travel for work and perception of travel scenario in 1999

| Scenario | Experience in overnight travel for work | Perception of behaviour | | | |
|----------------|---|-------------------------|------------------|--------------|------------------|
| | | % Corrupt | % Undesirable | % Harmful | % Unjustified |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | <i>Never</i> | 94.9 | 98.5 | 97.6 | 99.4 |
| | <i>Occasionally</i> | 95.7 | 98.5 | 99.1 | 98.8 |
| | <i>Regularly</i> | 95.0 | 99.0 | 99.0 | 99.0 |
| | Total | 95.2 | 98.5 | 98.4 | 99.1 |


In summary, whether experience in a particular area of work affects judgments of whether a behaviour is considered corrupt appears to depend upon the type of area of work. Those with some experience in tendering were more likely to perceive two of the three tendering scenarios as corrupt than were those who never participate in tender selection. On the other hand, experience in recruitment selection or in overnight travel for work does not affect perceptions of whether the behaviour in such scenarios is considered corrupt.

That experience in overnight travel for work had no effect on judgments about whether or not a behaviour is corrupt is of little concern. Almost all of the respondents believed that adding extra days to business trips to visit friends and claiming those extra days as business trips was corrupt, irrespective of their experience in overnight travel for work. Of greater concern is that more than one-third of those who regularly participate in recruitment selection considered that it was not corrupt to use one's position to get a friend a job.

4.2 Does having experience in a particular area of work affect action chosen in response to the scenarios?

Those with some experience in particular areas of work, and therefore more likely to be in a position to observe corruption in such work, are more likely to say that they would report the behaviour within their organisation than those without experience.

As can be seen from Figure 21, in 1999 those who do participate (either occasionally or regularly) in that area of work were less likely to say that they would do 'nothing' than those who never participate.

Figure 21: Effect of relevant experience on response to scenario, 1999

In most of the scenarios, those with some experience (that is, those who occasionally or regularly participate) were more likely to say they would report the matter internally. This was the case with both of the recruitment scenarios (JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and JOB FOR FRIEND, see Table 14) and in all three of the tendering scenarios (STEREO, HOSPITAL BILLS and COMPUTER TENDER - see Table 15). In addition, those with some experience were more likely to say that they would talk to the employee in the JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and COMPUTER TENDER scenarios, while those with no experience in tendering said that they would be more likely to report externally in the COMPUTER TENDER scenario.

Table 14: Relationship between experience in recruitment and response to recruitment scenarios in 1999

| Scenario | Experience in recruitment selection | Response to scenario* | | | |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | | % Do nothing | % Talk to employee | % Report internally | % Report externally |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | Never | 33.1 | 9.8 | 52.9 | 4.3 |
| | Occasionally | 19.4 | 14.5 | 61.6 | 4.5 |
| | Regularly | 11.8 | 15.7 | 66.7 | 5.9 |
| | Total | 26.4 | 12.0 | 57.1 | 4.5 |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | Never | 36.0 | 14.3 | 44.8 | 5.0 |
| | Occasionally | 22.6 | 15.5 | 57.6 | 4.2 |
| | Regularly | 12.2 | 20.4 | 59.2 | 8.2 |
| | Total | 29.4 | 15.2 | 50.5 | 4.9 |

* For more details of the statistical significance of these results, refer to Table A4.8 in Appendix 4.

Table 15: Relationship between experience in tender selection and response to tendering scenarios in 1999

| Scenario | Experience in tender selection | Response to scenario* | | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | | % Do nothing | % Talk to employee | % Report internally | % Report externally |
| STEREO | <i>Never</i> | 11.8 | 19.0 | 60.7 | 8.5 |
| | <i>Occasionally</i> | 3.6 | 19.1 | 70.5 | 6.8 |
| | <i>Regularly</i> | 5.1 | 13.6 | 69.5 | 11.9 |
| | Total | 8.9 | 18.6 | 66.3 | 8.2 |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | <i>Never</i> | 12.7 | 24.4 | 53.8 | 9.1 |
| | <i>Occasionally</i> | 6.4 | 20.9 | 65.9 | 6.8 |
| | <i>Regularly</i> | 5.1 | 13.6 | 72.9 | 8.5 |
| | Total | 10.3 | 22.5 | 58.9 | 8.4 |
| COMPUTER TENDER | <i>Never</i> | 25.1 | 9.6 | 55.0 | 10.4 |
| | <i>Occasionally</i> | 15.0 | 15.5 | 64.1 | 5.5 |
| | <i>Regularly</i> | 17.2 | 15.5 | 62.1 | 5.2 |
| | Total | 21.5 | 11.7 | 58.2 | 8.5 |

* For more details of the statistical significance of these results, refer to Table A4.8 in Appendix 4.

With regard to experience in overnight travel for work, while those who participate were more likely to say that they would report internally,^{dx} there was no statistically significant relationship between experience and likelihood of saying that they would do 'nothing'.

Table 16: Relationship between experience in overnight travel for work and response to travel scenario in 1999

| Scenario | Experience in overnight travel for work | Response to scenario* | | | |
|-----------------------|---|-----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | | % Do nothing | % Talk to employee | % Report internally | % Report externally |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | <i>Never</i> | 11.4 | 14.4 | 64.4 | 9.9 |
| | <i>Occasionally</i> | 10.2 | 14.6 | 68.1 | 7.1 |
| | <i>Regularly</i> | 5.0 | 13.9 | 76.2 | 5.0 |
| | Total | 10.0 | 14.4 | 65.7 | 8.0 |

* For more details of the statistical significance of these results, refer to Table A4.8 in Appendix 4.

5. MEASURING ATTITUDES

Respondents were asked to indicate whether they strongly disagreed, disagreed, agreed or strongly agreed with each of twelve attitude statements (Questions 66 to 77 of the survey). These attitude statements, which are listed below in Table 17, were included in the survey to explore more general attitudes to corruption than could be elicited from responses to the individual scenarios. Three of the attitude statements concerned defining corruption, three concerned the range of behaviours which are considered acceptable, and six concerned reporting corruption.

Table 17: Attitude statements incorporated in survey

| Attitude Statement | | Qn no. |
|--|--|--------|
| Defining corruption | Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt. | Q66 |
| | If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt. | Q68 |
| | You can't call something corrupt if everybody does it. | Q70 |
| Range of behaviours which are considered acceptable | Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape. | Q67 |
| | The Government can afford to sustain minor theft without worrying about it. | Q69 |
| | There is nothing wrong with private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business. | Q71 |
| Reporting corruption | There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful <i>will</i> be done about it. | Q72 |
| | There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful <i>can</i> be done about it. | Q73 |
| | People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it. | Q74 |
| | Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting. | Q75 |
| | I would not know where to go to report corruption. | Q76 |
| | People who report corruption are just troublemakers. | Q77 |

The percentages of respondents who agreed/disagreed with these attitude items in 1993 and 1999 are discussed in this chapter of the report. Also discussed are any differences in attitudes which were related to background characteristics of the respondents.

Some of these attitude items have also been included in one or more of the ICAC's community attitude surveys (Independent Commission Against Corruption 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1999a). Where the information is available, public sector employees' attitudes are compared to the attitudes of the broader community.

5.1 Attitudes to what is corrupt

The majority of public sector employees believe that behaviour can be corrupt even if:

- it is not specifically prohibited by law
- the ends justify the means
- everybody does it.

The three attitude statements which concerned defining corruption and the percentage of the sample who disagreed or strongly disagreed^{cx} with each of these items is presented in Table 18.

These statements were included to test public sector employees' attitudes to three types of justifications which are sometimes offered by those who have been accused of engaging in corrupt conduct. More specifically, these justifications are that the conduct under investigation should not be considered to be corrupt when:

- i. it is not specifically prohibited by law (in other words, that which is not specifically prohibited should be allowed - see Q66)
- ii. the ends justify the means (see Q68)
- iii. everybody does it (see Q70).

Those who 'agree' with these attitude statements are saying that they consider such justifications to be legitimate. A belief that such justifications are not acceptable, as indicated by disagreeing with these attitude statements, assists in minimising corruption.

Table 18: Summary of changes over time to attitudes about what is corrupt

| Statements about defining corruption | | % who disagreed or strongly disagreed | |
|--------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|------|
| | | 1993 | 1999 |
| Q66 | Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt. | 71.4 | 73.2 |
| Q68 | If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt.* | 72.8 | 78.8 |
| Q70 | You can't call something corrupt if everybody does it.* | 91.7 | 94.1 |

* Significantly more respondents disagreed with this attitude statement in 1999 than in 1993. For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.9 in Appendix 4.

As can be seen from Table 18, the majority of respondents did disagree with each of these statements in both 1993 and 1999. These results suggest that the majority of public sector employees do not restrict their definition of what may be corrupt to that which is prohibited by law. Similarly, whether the ends justify the means or because something is common practice is not sufficient to exempt it from the possibility of being corrupt. Furthermore, justifications for behaviour such as the ends justify the means or 'everybody does it' were considered even less acceptable in 1999 than they had been in 1993.

The subgroups most likely to disagree with these attitude statements are presented in Table 19. From this table it can be seen that those in the higher two salary categories

were more likely than those in the lower two salary categories to *disagree* with each of these statements, that is, they were more likely to reject such justifications.

Table 19: Attitudes to what is corrupt - 1999 subgroups most likely to reject justifications

| Statements about defining corruption | 1999 subgroups most likely to disagree*: |
|---|---|
| Q66. Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> were in the two higher salary categories (80.3%) rather than those in the two lower salary categories (68.8%) had been in the public sector for 1-5 years (84.0%) rather than those employed for less than one year or for more than five years (71.7%) were supervisors (77.0%) rather than non-supervisors (70.0%); occasionally or regularly participated in recruitment (77.6%) rather than those who never participated in recruitment (70.0%) occasionally or regularly participated in overnight travel for work (76.8%) rather than those who never participated in overnight travel (69.3%) |
| Q68. If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> were in the two highest salary categories (85.0%) rather than those in the two lower salary categories (75.1%) occasionally or regularly participated in recruitment (84.3%) rather than those who never participated in recruitment (74.6%) |
| Q70. You can't call something corrupt if everybody does it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> were in the two highest salary categories (96.9%) rather than those in the two lower salary categories (92.6%) |

* For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.10 in Appendix 4.

When responses for 1999 are compared with those from 1993 for each demographic subgroup, it was found that attitudes of most of the subgroups remained consistent across the two surveys. In each case where responses were different, those subgroups which had changed were more likely to disagree with the statement in 1999 than they had been in 1993. None were more likely to agree.

Those employed in the public sector for 1-5 years, male respondents and non-supervisors were the subgroups who were more likely to disagree with these statements in 1999 than they had been in 1993 (see Table 20). From Table 20 it can be seen that men and non-supervisors were more likely in 1999 than in 1993 to disagree that *If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt* and *You can't call something corrupt if everybody does it*. Those who had been working in the public sector for between 1-5 years were more likely to disagree in 1999 than they had been in 1993 that *Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt* and *If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt*.

Table 20: Attitudes to what is corrupt - subgroups whose perceptions changed between 1993 and 1999

| Statements about defining corruption | Changes between 1993 and 1999 |
|---|--|
| Q66. Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> those employed in the public sector for between 1-5 years (84.0% in 1999 compared with 69.3% in 1993) |
| Q68. If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> men (78.3% in 1999 compared with 68.9% in 1993) those who were not supervisors (81.0% in 1999 compared with 77.0% in 1993) those who had been employed from 1-5 years (85.0% in 1999 compared with 71.6% in 1993) or for more than 10 years (78.0% in 1999 compared with 72.6% in 1993) was in the lowest salary group (74.8% in 1999 compared with 64.1% in 1993) or in the highest salary group (94.9% in 1999 compared with 82.8% in 1993) |
| Q70. You can't call something corrupt if everybody does it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> men (94.5% in 1999 compared with 90.5% in 1993) those who were not supervisors (94.1% in 1999 compared with 89.7% in 1993) |

For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.11 in Appendix 4.

5.2 Attitudes about what is acceptable behaviour

The majority of public sector employees (92%) do not condone petty theft from government.

The majority of public sector employees (81%) have concerns about private sector companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business.

Opinion was fairly evenly divided (50% disagreeing) in terms of whether avoiding procedure is sometimes justified to get past bureaucratic red tape.

Some of the literature about workplace crime suggests that people may rationalise or excuse activities otherwise defined as corrupt (for example, Horning 1970). In some environments, behaviour which might be labelled as corrupt is simply 'taken for granted' by the community (Malec & Gardiner 1987, p. 277). For example, Gronbeck (1990) described behaviours such as 'graft, kickbacks, overzealous promotion through meritocracy, slush funds which have public effects without public accountability [and] favors which bypass normal channels' as 'behaviours which many people take as part of the everyday cost of government' (p. 174). Others (for example, Deakin University 1994, p. 35) have suggested that there is general community acceptance that 'petty pilfering of stock and equipment from employers is fair game – almost a fringe benefit for employees'.

The three items concerning acceptable behaviour which were included in the current survey and the percentage of the sample who disagreed with each of these in 1993 and 1999 are presented in Table 21. For each of these items, those who agreed were expressing a broader range of what they considered to be acceptable behaviour, (that is, a narrower definition of unacceptable behaviour). Disagreement suggested a narrower range of what is considered acceptable.

Table 21: Summary of changes over time to attitudes about acceptable behaviour

| Statements about acceptable behaviour | | % who disagreed or strongly disagreed | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|------|
| | | 1993 | 1999 |
| Q67 | Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape.* | 45.1 | 50.3 |
| Q69 | The Government can afford to sustain minor theft without worrying about it. | 89.5 | 92.1 |
| Q71 | There is nothing wrong with private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business.* | 75.0 | 80.8 |

* Significantly more respondents disagreed with this attitude statement in 1999 than in 1993. For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.12 in Appendix 4.

As can be seen from Table 21, while the attitudes to these statements were similar between 1993 and 1999, more respondents disagreed with these statements in 1999 than in 1993. It is clear that the majority do not condone petty theft from the Government (contrary to the general acceptance of such behaviour which is suggested in a report on fraud by Deakin University, 1994). Similarly the majority of public sector employees do have concerns about private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business. On the other hand, opinion was fairly evenly divided in terms of whether avoiding procedure is sometimes justified to get past bureaucratic red tape.

The subgroups most likely to disagree with these attitude statements, that is those with a narrower range of what they perceive to be acceptable, are presented in Table 22. From this table it can be seen that there is no obvious pattern: the subgroups most likely to disagree differed depending on the attitude statement.

Table 22: Attitudes to what is acceptable - 1999 subgroups most likely to disagree

| Statements about acceptable behaviour | 1999 subgroups most likely to disagree |
|---|---|
| Q67. Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> those who were in the highest salary category (63.3%) or the lowest salary category (54.8%) rather than those in the middle two salary categories (46.8%) |
| Q69. The Government can afford to sustain minor theft without worrying about it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> those who occasionally or regularly participated in tender selection (94.9%) rather than those who never participated in tender selection (90.9%) |
| Q71. There is nothing wrong with private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> have worked for more than 10 years in the public sector (83.4%) rather than those who have worked for less than 10 years in the public sector (76.0%) are supervisors (85.3%) rather than non-supervisors (77.4%) are in the highest two salary categories (87.5%) rather than those earning less than this (77.1%) are men (83.8%) rather than women (74.7%) regularly participated in recruitment (96.2%) rather than those who are never or only occasionally involved in recruitment (79.5%) |

For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.13 in Appendix 4.

When responses for 1999 are compared with those from 1993 for each demographic subgroup, it was found that in each case where responses were different, those subgroups which had changed were more likely to disagree with the statement in 1999 than they had been in 1993. None were more likely to agree.

Attitudes of most of the subgroups remained consistent across the two surveys. Noteworthy changes between the two surveys are:

- male respondents were less likely to find all three of these behaviours acceptable in 1999
- non-supervisors were less likely to find avoiding procedure and minor theft from government as acceptable while supervisors were less likely to find private companies offering gifts as acceptable
- those who had been employed in the public sector for more than 10 years were less likely to find avoiding procedure and private companies offering gifts as acceptable (see Table 23).

Table 23: Attitudes to what is acceptable - subgroups whose perceptions changed between 1993 and 1999

| Statements about acceptable behaviour | Changes between 1993 and 1999 |
|---|--|
| Q67. Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • men (49.6% in 1999 compared with 40.4% in 1993) • those who were not supervisors (50.7% in 1999 compared with 44.5% in 1993) • those who had been employed for more than 10 years (49.6% in 1999 compared with 41.8% in 1993) • those in the highest salary category (63.3% in 1999 compared with 39.7% in 1993) |
| Q69. The Government can afford to sustain minor theft without worrying about it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • men (91.4% in 1999 compared with 87.2% in 1993) • those who were not supervisors (91.3% in 1999 compared with 87.2% in 1993) |
| Q71. There is nothing wrong with private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • men (83.8% in 1999 compared with 76.2% in 1993) • those who were supervisors (85.3% in 1999 compared with 78.2% in 1993) • those who were employed for more than 10 years (83.4% in 1999 compared with 77.7% in 1993) • those who were in the lowest salary group (76.3% in 1999 compared with 68.3% in 1993) or those who were in the highest salary group (91.7% in 1999 compared with 72.4% in 1993). |

For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.14 in Appendix 4.

5.3 Attitudes to reporting corruption

The six attitude statements which concerned reporting corruption and the percentage of the sample who disagreed with each of these items in 1993 and 1999 are presented in Table 24. These attitude statements covered opinions about:

- people who report corruption (Q77)
- the value of reporting corruption (Q72, Q73, Q75)
- awareness of how to report corruption (Q76)
- consequences of reporting corruption (Q74).

Table 24: Attitudes to reporting corruption - summary of changes over time

| Statements about reporting corruption | | % who disagreed or strongly disagreed | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|------|
| | | 1993 | 1999 |
| Q72 | There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful <i>will</i> be done about it.* | 73.6 | 78.8 |
| Q73 | There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful <i>can</i> be done about it.* | 85.8 | 90.0 |
| Q74 | People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it.* | 25.9 | 31.2 |
| Q75 | Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting. | 73.7 | 73.8 |
| Q76 | I would not know where to go to report corruption.* | 72.4 | 78.9 |
| Q77 | People who report corruption are just troublemakers. | 95.6 | 96.9 |

* Significantly more respondents disagreed with this attitude statement in 1999 than in 1993. For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.15 in Appendix 4.

Opinions about people who report corruption

There is remarkable consistency across different surveys and different respondent subgroups in the belief that people who report corruption are *not* troublemakers.

As can be seen from Table 24, almost all of the respondents to both the 1993 and 1999 surveys disagreed with the statement that *People who report corruption are just troublemakers*. This and other ICAC research (see Zipparo 1997, p. 120) strongly refute the notion that any reluctance to report corruption is due to peer pressure or that Australian culture is opposed to reporting corruption.

Opinions about the value of reporting corruption

In 1999, respondents were even more likely than in 1993 to believe that it was worth reporting corruption both because something *can* and *will* be done about it.

As can be seen from Table 24, in both 1993 and 1999 the majority of respondents disagreed with the each of the following statements:

- *There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful can be done about it*
- *There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful will be done about it*
- *Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting.*

As one would expect, more respondents considered that something *could* be done about corruption (90% in 1999) than considered that something *would* be done about corruption (79% in 1999).

In 1999, respondents were even more likely than in 1993 to believe that it was worth reporting corruption both because something *can* and something *will* be done about it. Male respondents and non-supervisors, in particular, were even more likely in 1999 than

they had been in 1993 to believe that something *can* and something *will* be done about corruption that is reported (see Table 25).


Table 25: Opinions about the value of reporting corruption - subgroups whose opinions changed between 1993 and 1999

| Statements about reporting corruption | Changes between 1993 and 1999 |
|--|---|
| Q72. There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful <i>will</i> be done about it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> men (79.3% in 1999 compared with 71.1% in 1993) those who were not supervisors (75.7% in 1999 compared with 70.3% in 1993) those who had been employed for less than 1 year (95.6% in 1999 compared with 81.7% in 1993) |
| Q73. There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful <i>can</i> be done about it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> men (90.4% in 1999 compared with 84.0% in 1993) those who were not supervisors (88.4% in 1999 compared with 83.3% in 1993) those who had been employed for more than 10 years (90.8% in 1999 compared with 86.4% in 1993) |
| Q75. Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting. | None of the demographic groups had changed their attitudes significantly |

For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.17 in Appendix 4.

Figure 22 reveals interesting differences between public sector employees and members of the community in terms of their opinions of whether something useful will be done about reports of corruption. Firstly, this graph illustrates that public sector employees tend to be more likely than community members to consider that something useful *will* be done about reports of corruption. Secondly it shows that over time the percentage of public sector employees who think that something useful will be done has increased, whereas the percentage of members of the community who believe this has decreased.

Figure 22: There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful *will* be done about it



The subgroups of public sector employees most like to disagree with these attitude statements in 1999 are presented in Table 26. From this table it can be seen that there is tendency for those in a position where they might be able to take action (that is, supervisors, those in the higher salary categories, those who participate in recruitment and tender selection) are the ones who are most likely to believe that something *can* and *will* be done about reports of corruption.

Table 26: Opinions about the value of reporting corruption - 1999 subgroups

| Statements about reporting corruption | 1999 subgroups most likely to disagree |
|--|---|
| Q72. There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful <i>will</i> be done about it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • had been employed in the public sector for less than 1 year (95.6%) rather than those employed in the public sector for longer periods (77.8%) • were supervisors (82.9%) rather than non-supervisors (75.7%) • were in the highest two salary categories (86.5%) rather than those earning less than this (74.4%) • occasionally or regularly participated in recruitment (83.8%) rather than those who never participated in recruitment (75.5%) • occasionally or regularly participated in tender selection (85.9%) rather than those who never participated in tender selection (75.0%) • occasionally or regularly participated in overnight travel (81.9%) rather than those who never participated in overnight travel (75.2%) |
| Q73. There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful <i>can</i> be done about it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • were in the highest two salary groups (96.5%) rather than those earning less than this (86.4%) • occasionally or regularly participated in tender selection (95.3%) rather than those who never participated in tender selection (87.1%) • occasionally or regularly participated in overnight travel (92.4%) rather than those who never participated in overnight travel (86.9%) |
| Q75. Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have been employed in the public sector for more than 10 years (77.3%) rather than those employed in the public sector for less than that time (67.3%) • in the two highest salary categories (79.2%) rather than those earning in the two lowest of the four salary categories (70.9%) • regularly participated in recruitment (86.5%) rather than those who never or only occasionally participated in recruitment (73.0%) |

For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.16 in Appendix 4.

Awareness of how to report corruption

In 1999, more respondents said that they knew where to go to report corruption than in 1993.

Subgroups who require further assistance are those who are not supervisors, those on lower salaries and those who have been employed in the public sector for shorter periods.

In 1999, respondents were more likely to say that they knew where to report corruption than they had been in 1993 (see Table 24). Male respondents, supervisors, non-supervisors, those employed for more than 10 years and those in the second lowest of

the four salary groups were the ones who reported being more aware of how to report corruption in 1999 than they had been in 1993 (see Table A4.17 in Appendix 4).

From Table 27 it can be seen that it is those who are not supervisors, who are on lower salaries and who have been employed for shorter periods who are the ones who consider that they are most in need of information about where to go to report corruption.

Table 27: 1999 differences between subgroups in percentage who disagreed with statement *I would not know where to go to report corruption*


| Differences in percentages who disagree or strongly disagree | | | | |
|--|-------------------------|-------|------------------------|-------|
| Length of employment in the public sector | More than 10 years | 82.5% | 10 years or less | 71.5% |
| Salary | Highest 2 salary groups | 88.9% | Lowest 2 salary groups | 72.8% |
| Supervisory role | Supervisor | 84.5% | Non-supervisor | 74.5% |
| Participation in recruitment | Regularly | 94.2% | Never | 71.5% |
| Participation in tender selection | Occasionally/regularly | 83.8% | Never | 75.5% |

For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A4.16 in Appendix 4.

Opinions about the consequences of reporting corruption

Fewer respondents believed that people who report corruption are likely to suffer for it in 1999 than in 1993.

Figure 23: People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it



From Figure 23 it can be seen that in each of the public sector and community surveys which have been conducted by the ICAC, the majority of respondents have agreed that *people who report corruption are likely to suffer for it*.

In 1993 almost three-quarters of the public sector employee respondents *agreed* that *People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it*. It is a positive sign that significantly fewer agreed with this statement in 1999 (see Table 24.) Female respondents, supervisors and those employed in the public sector for between 5 to 10 years were the ones who were significantly less likely to agree with this statement in 1999 than in 1993 (see Table A4.17 in Appendix 4). It is also encouraging that in 1999 those with the most experience in the public sector (those who had been employed in the public sector for more than 10 years) and those involved in recruitment and promotion decisions were the least likely agree that people who report corruption are likely to suffer for it (see Table A4.16 in Appendix 4).

Despite these encouraging trends, however, the substantial number still agreeing with this statement suggests that significant work remains for public sector managers to create organisational cultures in which employees feel safe to report corruption (see also Zipparo 1997).

6. FURTHER EXPLORATION OF FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS

This chapter, which builds upon the analysis described in earlier chapters, focuses on identifying the factors which best distinguish:

- i. those who consider the scenarios to be corrupt from those who do not, and
- ii. those who choose different types of action in response to the scenarios.

In order to further explore which of the many possible factors *best* distinguish those who consider scenarios to be corrupt from those who do not, a statistical technique known as 'logistic regression' was used. A logistic regression analysis is a method of determining which of a set of variables (for example, gender, supervisory role, salary level) can be used to predict an outcome which has two possibilities (such as, consider scenario corrupt versus not corrupt).

Unlike the previous chapters in which the effects of individual factors were examined one at a time, the logistic regression analysis takes into consideration any interrelationships between the variables (such as men being more likely to be supervisors than women) by identifying the most closely related variable first and then determining whether other variables make a contribution over and above that made by the initial variable. For further information about logistic regression refer to Appendix 5.

6.1 What best distinguishes those who consider the scenarios to be corrupt from those who do not?

Factors which best distinguish people who consider the scenarios to be corrupt from those who do not are:

- **how justified they consider the behaviour to be, and**
 - **the perceived consequences or harmfulness of the behaviour.**
-

We have already seen that many factors affect whether a scenario is considered to be corrupt or not. For example, in some scenarios whether the behaviour is considered to be corrupt is related to the respondent's salary, gender and/or supervisory role (see Section 2.4). The perception of whether the scenario is corrupt is also related to how undesirable, harmful and/or unjustified that behaviour is considered to be (see Section 2.6). More general attitudes about what is corrupt and about which types of workplace behaviour are acceptable (see Chapter 5) also affect which scenarios respondents consider to be corrupt.

Sixteen different survey variables were included in the logistic regression to see whether they assisted in differentiating people who consider the behaviour corrupt from those who do not:

- seven respondent background variables^{cxii}
- three perceptions of the behaviour^{cxiii}
- six measures of attitudes to what is corrupt and to what is acceptable^{cxiii}

Table 28 summarises, for each scenario, which of these sixteen variables were found to be significant in distinguishing those who consider the scenario to be corrupt from those who do not. The general conclusions which can be drawn from Table 28 are:

- characteristics which best distinguish those who consider the scenarios to be corrupt from those who thought they were not corrupt differed among the scenarios
- perceptions of other aspects of the behaviour (for example, perceived justification and perceived harmfulness – but not perceived desirability) better differentiate those who consider the behaviour to be corrupt from those who consider it not corrupt than do background characteristics of the respondents
- perceived justification and perceived harmfulness of the behaviour were the variables which most frequently best distinguished between those who consider the behaviour to be corrupt and those who do not.

These findings have implications for those involved in educational and corruption prevention strategies. Firstly, the relative unimportance of background characteristics of respondents suggests that educational messages and corruption prevention strategies should be directed across all subgroups of public sector employees. Secondly, the results point to the importance of challenging the rationalisations used to excuse or ignore corrupt behaviour. Thirdly, they also suggest that in order to communicate messages about the 'grey areas' of corruption it is useful to focus on the potential harmfulness of behaviour and other consequences. For further discussion of the implications of these findings refer to Chapter 7.

Table 28: Summary of variables found to be related to judging behaviour as corrupt*

| Scenario | Step | Variables most closely related to judging behaviour to be corrupt |
|---------------------|------|---|
| STEREO | 1 | Unjustified |
| | 2 | Q71 (Disagree) |
| TAKE NOTE | 1 | Unjustified** |
| PADS | 2 | Harmful |
| | 3 | Q68 (Disagree) |
| | 4 | Q66 (Disagree) |
| | 5 | Q71 (Disagree) |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 1 | Unjustified |
| | 2 | Harmfulness |
| | 3 | Salary (Groups 1, 2 & 3) |
| | 4 | Q67 (Disagree) |
| LEATHER DIARY | 1 | Harmful |
| | 2 | Unjustified |
| | 3 | Undesirable |
| | 4 | Salary (Groups 1 & 2) |
| 2 ND JOB | 1 | Unjustified |
| | 2 | Harmful |
| COMPUTER TENDER | 1 | Harmful |
| | 2 | Salary (Group 1) |
| | 3 | Unjustified |
| | 4 | Q67 (Disagree) |

| Scenario | Step | Variables most closely related to judging behaviour to be corrupt |
|--------------------------|------|---|
| JOB FOR FRIEND | 1 | Unjustified** |
| | 2 | Undesirable |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | 1 | Undesirable |
| | 2 | Q70 (Disagree) |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 1 | Unjustified |
| | 2 | Q67 (Disagree) |
| | 3 | Harmful |
| | 4 | Q66 (Disagree) |
| | 5 | Never recruit |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | 1 | Unjustified |
| | 2 | Q70 (Disagree) |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 1 | Harmful |
| | 2 | Undesirable |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 1 | Unjustified |
| | 2 | Q68 (Disagree) |
| | 3 | Harmful |

* For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A5.2 in Appendix 5.

Within each cell of the table, variables are presented in order: those listed first are the ones which most strongly differentiate between those who consider the behaviour to be corrupt versus those who consider the behaviour to be not corrupt.

** Variables which appear in bold typeface are those which most increase the percentage which could be correctly classified (refer to Appendix 5 for more information).

6.2 What best distinguishes those who choose different types of action?

Factors which best distinguish between those who choose different types of action are:

- agreement/disagreement with the statement that *there is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful will be done about it*
 - belief about whether or not the behaviour is justified in the circumstances
 - perception of whether or not the behaviour is harmful
 - judgment of whether or not the behaviour is corrupt.
-

From Chapter 3, we have seen that many factors affect the type of action which is chosen. For example, for some scenarios the action chosen is related to the respondents' salary, gender, length of service and/or supervisory role (see Section 3.3). As would be expected the action chosen is also related to perceptions of whether the behaviour is corrupt (see Section 3.2). Attitudes to reporting corruption (see Chapter 5) also affect choice of action.

For each scenario, four logistic regressions were carried out to examine factors which may differentiate respondents who said they would:

- i. do nothing (versus do anything at all)
- ii. talk to the employee (versus do anything else including nothing)
- iii. report internally (versus do anything else including nothing)
- iv. report externally (versus do anything else including nothing).

Twenty-three different survey variables were included in each of these logistic regressions. In addition to the sixteen variables considered in Section 6.1, whether the behaviour was considered to be corrupt and the six measures of attitudes to reporting corruption^{cxiv} were included.

Table 29 provides a summary of the variables which were found to be useful in differentiating those who said that they would take one option versus those who said that they would take any other option.

Those who said that they would do nothing

Those most likely to say that they would do nothing are those who:

- consider the behaviour to be justified, desirable and not harmful, and
 - agree with the statement that *there is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful will be done about it.*
-

One aim of the study was to identify factors which may hinder people taking action about potentially corrupt behaviour they witness at work. For this reason respondents were compared as two groups: those who said that they would do nothing versus those who chose any of the other three more active options (talk to the employee, report internally or report externally). Of the twenty-three variables considered, from Table 29 it can be seen that the following four factors were found to be most closely related to the choice to do nothing about the scenarios:

1. *A belief by the public sector employee that the behaviour was justified in the circumstances.* The study found that if the person believed that the employee's behaviour was justified, then they would say that they would do nothing in seven of the scenarios. In four of the scenarios the belief that the behaviour was justified was the factor which most strongly separated those who said that they would do nothing and other respondents.
2. *The attitude that 'there is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful will be done about it' (Q72).* This differentiated those who said that they would do nothing from other respondents in every scenario. It was the most discriminating factor in two scenarios and second most discriminating factor in eight scenarios. This suggests that if people do not believe that effective action will result from reporting corruption, they will be less inclined to take any form of action about the conduct.
3. *A belief by the public sector employee that the behaviour was not harmful in the circumstances.* The study found that the belief that the behaviour was not harmful differentiated those who said they would do nothing in six of the scenarios.
4. *A belief by the public sector employee that the behaviour was desirable in the circumstances.* The study found that the belief that the behaviour was desirable differentiated those who chose to do nothing from others in five of the scenarios.

Also related, though less closely^{ov} than the factors described above, were:

5. *The belief that the scenario was not corrupt.*
6. *The attitude that 'avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape' (Q67).*
7. *Working in a position which does not involve participation in recruitment selection.*

The factors which differentiated those who said that they would do nothing from those who said that they would do something were very similar to, though in the opposite direction from, the factors which differentiate respondents who said they would report internally (versus do anything else including nothing). (See below.)

Those who said that they would report internally

Those most likely to say that they would report internally are those who:

- consider the behaviour to be unjustified, harmful and corrupt, and
- disagree with the statement that *there is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful will be done about it*.

Those who said that they would report internally can be distinguished from those who chose other options for responding to the scenarios in the following ways:

1. A belief by the public sector employee that the behaviour was unjustified in the circumstances was related to the choice to report internally in nine of the scenarios. It was the most differentiating factor in seven of the scenarios.
2. Disagreement with the attitude that 'there is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful will be done about it' (Q72). A belief that there is a point in reporting corruption as something will be done about it was related to the choice to report internally in nine scenarios.
3. A belief that the behaviour was harmful. The study found that the belief that the behaviour was harmful was related to the choice to report internally in six of the scenarios.
4. The belief that the scenario was corrupt was related to the choice to report internally in six of the scenarios.

Those who said that they would talk to the employee

In eleven of the scenarios, the identified variables did not increase the percentage which would be correctly classified substantially beyond that which would be classified by chance. The exception was in the TAKE NOTE PADS scenario, where those who were in positions where they occasionally or regularly participate in recruitment selection were more likely than others to say that they would talk to the employee.

Overall, the factors which differentiated those who said that they would talk to the employee from those who chose other options were not clear cut. One reason for this might be the number of respondents who said that they would try talking to the employee first, but if that did not work they would then report the behaviour within the organisation.

Those who said that they would report externally

Due to the small number of respondents who said that they would report any of the scenarios outside their organisations, none of the models differentiated well between those who said that they would report externally from those who chose other actions.

Table 29: Summary of variables found to be related to different responses to the situations in 1999

| Scenario | Step | Do nothing ^{cxvi} | Talk to employee ^{cxvii} | Report internally ^{cxviii} | Report externally ^{cxix} |
|---------------------|------|----------------------------|---|---|---|
| STEREO | 1 | Q73 (Agree) | Q75 (Agree) | Q73 (Disagree) Not justified Salary (3&4) Q75 (Disagree) | Travel (occ./reg.) Q67 (Disagree) Q75 (Disagree) Q72 (Agree) Q74 (Disagree) Q76 (Disagree) |
| | 2 | Not harmful | | | |
| | 3 | Q76 (Agree) | | | |
| | 4 | Q77 (Agree) | | | |
| | 5 | Q72 (Agree) | | | |
| | 6 | Never recruit | | | |
| | 7 | Q75 (Agree) | | | |
| | 8 | Q66 (Agree) | | | |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | 1 | Desirable | Recruit (occ./reg)** Q72 (Disagree) Q75 (Disagree) Undesirable | Undesirable Harmful Q67 (Disagree) Corrupt | No predictors |
| | 2 | Q72 (Agree) | | | |
| | 3 | Q75 (Agree) | | | |
| | 4 | Justified | | | |
| | 5 | Never recruit | | | |
| | 6 | Not corrupt | | | |
| | 7 | Q67 (Agree) | | | |
| | 8 | Not harmful | | | |
| | 9 | Salary (1&2) | | | |
| | 10 | Q74 (Agree) | | | |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 1 | Justified** | Q69 (Agree) Not corrupt Q74 (Disagree) Tender (occas.) Q66 (Disagree) Salary (4) Q70 (Agree) Q67 (Agree) | Not justified Q72 (Disagree) Corrupt Q75 (Disagree) Salary (4) Harmful | Corrupt Not justified Q72 (Agree) |
| | 2 | Q72 (Agree) | | | |
| | 3 | Not harmful | | | |
| | 4 | Not corrupt | | | |
| | 5 | Never recruit | | | |
| | 6 | Desirable | | | |
| | 7 | Q75 (Agree) | | | |
| | 8 | Q69 (Agree) | | | |
| | 9 | Q77 (Agree) | | | |
| LEATHER DIARY | 1 | Not harmful | Not harmful Salary (4) Q76 (Disagree) Not justified | Corrupt Harmful Not justified Q72 (Disagree) | Corrupt Salary (1) |
| | 2 | Not corrupt | | | |
| | 3 | Justified | | | |
| | 4 | Q72 (Agree) | | | |
| | 5 | Non-supervisor | | | |
| 2 ND JOB | 1 | Justified | Corrupt Regularly tender | Not justified Q72 (Disagree) Corrupt Salary (3&4) Recruit (occ/reg) Q66 (Disagree) | Corrupt Male Regularly recruit |
| | 2 | Q72 (Agree) | | | |
| | 3 | Not corrupt | | | |
| | 4 | Never recruit | | | |
| | 5 | Q67 (Agree) | | | |
| | 6 | Salary (1&2) | | | |
| | 7 | Q66 (Agree) | | | |
| COMPUTER TENDER | 1 | Desirable | Not corrupt Tender (occ./reg.) Q71 (Agree) Q72 (Disagree) Q70 (Agree) | Not justified Q72 (Disagree) Q77 (Disagree) Q66 (Disagree) Q70 (Disagree) Harmful Salary (3&4) | Corrupt Q66 (Agree) Harmful |
| | 2 | Q72 (Agree) | | | |
| | 3 | Q75 (Agree) | | | |
| | 4 | Justified | | | |
| | 5 | Q77 (Agree) | | | |
| | 6 | Never tender | | | |
| | 7 | Not corrupt | | | |
| | 8 | Never recruit | | | |
| | 9 | Q74 (Agree) | | | |
| | 10 | Q73 (Agree) | | | |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | 1 | Justified | Not harmful Q74 (Disagree) | Not justified Q72 (Disagree) Corrupt Supervisor Time in PS (>10yrs) Harmful | Harmful |
| | 2 | Q72 (Agree) | | | |
| | 3 | Not corrupt | | | |
| | 4 | Salary (1&2) | | | |
| | 5 | Q67 (Agree) | | | |
| | 6 | Q74 (Agree) | | | |
| | 7 | Time in PS (<1yr) | | | |
| | 8 | Never travel | | | |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | 1 | Q73 (Agree) | Not harmful Q69 (Agree) Q75 (Agree) Male | Q72 (Disagree) Q69 (Disagree) | Undesirable Travel (occ./ reg.) |
| | 2 | Q72 (Agree) | | | |
| | 3 | Q68 (Agree) | | | |
| | 4 | | | | |

| Scenario | Step | Do nothing ^{cxvi} | Talk to employee ^{cxvii} | Report internally ^{cxviii} | Report externally ^{cxix} |
|--------------------------|------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 1 | Justified | Harmful | Not justified | Corrupt |
| | 2 | Q72 (Agree) | Q69 (Agree) | Q73 (Disagree) | Male |
| | 3 | Not corrupt | Q77 (Disagree) | Q75 (Disagree) | Harmful |
| | 4 | Q77 (Agree) | Salary (1&2) | Q70 (Disagree) | Not justified |
| | 5 | Q67 (Agree) | | | Q70 (Disagree) |
| | 6 | Q71 (Agree) | | | |
| | 7 | Never recruit | | | |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | 1 | Q72 (Agree) | Justified | Not justified | Regularly recruit |
| | 2 | Q77 (Agree) | Q75 (Agree) | Q72 (Disagree) | Harmful |
| | 3 | Q68 (Agree) | Q77 (Disagree) | Q75 (Disagree) | Q74 (Disagree) |
| | 4 | Not harmful | Q73 (Disagree) | Q68 (Disagree) | |
| | 5 | Never recruit | Q68 (Agree) | Reg. tender | |
| | 6 | Q67 (Agree) | Time in PS (<5 yrs) | | |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 1 | Desirable | Not corrupt | Harmful | Harmful |
| | 2 | Q72 (Agree) | Harmful | Corrupt | Salary (1&2) |
| | 3 | Salary (1&2) | Reg. tender | Q72 (Disagree) | Regularly recruit |
| | 4 | Q67 (Agree) | Q75 (Disagree) | Recruit (occas.) | |
| | 5 | Not harmful | | Q74 (Disagree) | |
| | 6 | Q75 (Agree) | | Tender (occas.) | |
| | 7 | Regularly tender | | Salary (3&4) | |
| | 8 | Q74 (Agree) | | Desirability | |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 1 | Q72 (Agree) | Not harmful | Not justified | Male |
| | 2 | Desirable | | Q72 (Disagree) | Salary (1&2) |
| | 3 | Q68 (Agree) | | Q68 (Disagree) | Never travel |
| | 4 | Q67 (Agree) | | Q76 (Disagree) | |
| | 5 | Q74 (Agree) | | Undesirable | |
| | 6 | | | Reg. travel | |

* For more details of the statistical significance of these results refer to Table A5.3-A5.6 in Appendix 5.

Within each cell of the table, variables are presented in order: those listed first are the ones which most strongly differentiate between those who chose that response versus those who chose other responses.

** Those variables which are most strongly related (in terms of those which most increase the percentage which could be correctly classified by chance) appear in bold typeface.

7. DISCUSSION

The primary aim of this research is to examine public sector employees' perceptions of workplace behaviours and their attitudes to taking action about potentially corrupt activities that they may witness at work. Both the changes in perceptions between 1993 and 1999, as well as the 1999 perceptions themselves are of interest. The results of the 1999 survey assist in identifying both available strengths to build upon and areas where further attention would assist in minimising public sector corruption.

7.1 Overview of changes in public sector perceptions

This report provides evidence of a number of changes in public sector perceptions of workplace behaviours and attitudes to reporting corruption. Most notably, when compared to responses in 1993, public sector employees in 1999:

- more frequently identified conduct to be corrupt, that is, they expressed broader social definitions of corruption
- perceived behaviours in the scenarios as more undesirable, more harmful and/or more unjustified
- were more likely to say that they would report the behaviour within their organisation
- were more likely to believe that it was worth reporting corruption because they believe something *can* and *will* be done about it
- were less likely to consider justifications for behaviour, such as the ends justify the means or 'everybody does it', to be acceptable
- were more concerned about private sector organisations offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business
- were more likely to believe that they knew where to report corruption
- were less likely to agree that *people who report corruption are likely to suffer for it*.

Each of these changes is indicative of the NSW public sector becoming more corruption-resistant than it was in 1993.

It is also interesting that the views of male and female respondents, which were quite divergent in 1993, are now much closer. Similarly there is less difference between the views of supervisors and non-supervisors than there was in 1993.

These changes in perceptions should be considered in the context of changes to the public sector over the same period. The NSW public sector has continued to evolve in many ways during the last six years. Some areas of work have been privatised, some areas have been corporatised. Some areas have flatter, less hierarchical structures. Corporate service efficiencies have been examined. Local negotiation of working conditions has become more common through enterprise bargaining and award negotiation processes. Work practices are changing as a consequence of the increasing reliance on emerging electronic technologies such as the intranet/internet, e-commerce and e-procurement. There has been a greater emphasis upon performance management and on service quality and customer responsiveness. We cannot know whether the type of person recruited into the public sector has changed.

What we do know is that many initiatives have been introduced to further promote probity in the NSW public sector since 1993. The ICAC has had a key role in increasing awareness among public sector employees of the need for probity and high ethical standards in all public sector activities. During this period the ICAC has:

- worked with individual government agencies to assist these agencies develop their own corruption prevention strategies, codes of conduct and staff training programs
- responded to a wide range of specific requests for advice and assistance from numerous public sector agencies and private sector businesses dealing with the public sector
- produced a *Practical Guide to Corruption Prevention* in which it provided case studies and guidelines for developing policies and procedures in different areas of public administration where corruption has been found to occur
- released specialised publications outlining suggestions for minimising risks in specific areas, such as preventing corruption in government regulatory functions and managing post-separation employment
- run workshops to assist public sector employees understand their public duty responsibilities and to develop skills in conducting internal investigations
- conducted a range of investigations with their associated public hearings and investigation reports, exposing corruption in a wide range of public sector activities – 33 investigation reports were made public during the period between the two surveys
- disseminated a *Corruption Matters* newspaper to raise awareness and increase support for corruption minimisation amongst public sector employees – three issues per year have been produced since 1995/96 with 15,000 copies of each issue being disseminated.

The ICAC has not been alone in this work. Other agencies have also been working with the same aims. Other central agency initiatives have included:

- the *Protected Disclosures Act 1994* and encouragement given to agencies by the interagency Protected Disclosures Steering Committee to establish internal reporting systems for staff to report corruption, maladministration and waste in public administration
- the Premier's introduction of a Model Code of Conduct for public sector agencies
- the Department of Public Works and Services ensuring that probity issues are addressed in its guidelines on procurement
- the Premier introducing an 'Ethics' category into the Premier's Public Sector Awards scheme
- the increasing adoption of requirements for high ethical standards in candidates for public sector positions, flowing from the Premier's insistence on such requirements for CEOs and SES candidates, with an ability to 'show an understanding of ... ethical practice' now being one of the common selection criteria for all NSW public sector positions
- initiatives from The Audit Office, The Treasury and the Office of the Ombudsman highlighting the requirement for good fraud control and an ethical risk management approach to financial and other management.

While each of these, together with initiatives instigated by individual public authorities, is likely to have contributed to the changes in responses to the survey between 1993 and 1999, it is not possible to isolate the effects of individual initiatives.

In addition to revealing the positive changes, this research identifies available strengths to build upon as well as areas in need of further attention to minimise corruption in the NSW public sector.

7.2 Recognising corruption

As stated earlier in the report, individual public sector employees' perceptions of what is considered to be corrupt impact upon the perpetuation of corrupt practices. If people do not recognise the activity which they may be witnessing, or in which they may be participating as 'corrupt' or at least as 'undesirable' or 'harmful', then they are not likely to react to it as such. If they do recognise the behaviour as corrupt, but believe that, for example, such behaviour is appropriate given the circumstances, they are also unlikely to attempt to change the behaviour.

Identified strengths of the NSW Public sector

The surveys have identified the following strengths available for the public sector to build upon when communicating about corruption:

- the majority of respondents considered the scenarios which involved direct financial gain and/or where the behaviour was illegal to be corrupt (95%-99% for the three scenarios in 1999)
- there was also high consensus that the scenario describing threats to a whistleblower (97% in 1999) and the scenario describing the provision of confidential information, even where there was no personal gain by the person supplying the information (93% in 1999) were corrupt
- almost all of the respondents (95% in 1999) believed that adding extra days to business trips to visit friends and claiming those extra days as part of the business trip was corrupt, irrespective of their experience in overnight travel for work
- the majority of public sector employees do not restrict their definition of what may be corrupt to that which is prohibited by law (73% in 1999)
- the majority do not accept rationalisations that something cannot be called corrupt if everyone does it (94% in 1999) nor do they accept that the ends justify the means (79% in 1999)
- the majority of public sector employees do not condone petty theft from Government (92% in 1999)
- the majority of public sector employees have concerns about private sector companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business (81% in 1999).

Identified risk areas and suggestions for further work to facilitate corruption minimisation

The surveys have also identified the following risk areas which need to be addressed:

- a lack of common understanding about what is meant by 'corrupt conduct' adds to the difficulty in communicating about corruption and minimising corruption
- there is a range of behaviours where respondents were not clear whether or not the behaviour should be labelled as 'corrupt'. For example, opinion was divided in the case of theft with mitigating circumstances (TAKE NOTEPADS) and for the scenarios in which rules were not followed, yet a 'reasonable' outcome was reached (JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and COMPUTER TENDER)
- more than one-third of those who regularly participate in recruitment selection considered that it was *not* corrupt to use one's position to get a friend a job.

Each of these three risk areas is discussed in more detail below.

Lack of shared understanding of what is corrupt

Respondents appeared to have no difficulty labelling some of the scenarios as 'corrupt'. They showed that they did differentiate labels such as 'undesirable' from 'corrupt'. However, findings from both the 1993 and 1999 surveys draw attention to the idiosyncratic nature of deciding what is corrupt and what is not corrupt. While there was broad consensus that specific scenarios were corrupt, there was considerable disagreement about what made up a 'set' of corrupt behaviours. The fact that so many different combinations of scenarios were judged to be corrupt suggests that there is not a common understanding of what is meant by 'corrupt conduct' amongst different public sector employees.

Hence it is not simply a matter of looking at the difference between a legal definition of corruption (such as sections 7, 8 and 9 of the *Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988*) and a social definition which is held by NSW public sector employees. Rather than there being only one social definition of corruption, there would appear to be many such definitions. Thus, any one public sector employee's understanding of what is meant by the term 'corrupt' conduct may not be shared by his or her colleagues or the wider community. Two people might have a discussion about corruption, with each having a very different understanding of what is meant by the term. This lack of commonality of understanding adds to the difficulty of combating corruption.

These results suggest that when communicating to employees, it is not sufficient to have messages such as 'This organisation does not tolerate corruption' or 'Report corruption'. Such messages leave open the response: 'I agree corruption is wrong and should be reported – but this activity I am engaged in is not corrupt'. A prior step to using these messages is to foster a common understanding throughout the organisation of what 'corruption' is, or what behaviours the definition includes.

Uncertainty of when the label 'corrupt' should be applied

This research identifies some behaviours where respondents' opinions were divided as to whether or not the behaviour should be classified as 'corrupt' (for example, in the case of theft with mitigating circumstances and for the scenarios in which rules were not followed yet a 'reasonable' outcome was reached). This uncertainty as to when the label 'corrupt' should be applied was not confined to any specific subgroups of public

sector employees. Opinion was divided equally for the groups with different backgrounds.

These would not be the only areas where opinion was divided. Individual agencies should consider identifying the specific risk areas intrinsic to the nature of their core business (for example, management of correctional centres entails very different risk areas from those encountered in local government), work with their staff to identify the grey areas and then clarify what is acceptable.

The results of the 1993 and 1999 surveys suggest that concentrating on the consequences of the behaviour in order to communicate messages about corruption may be a useful educational strategy. Corruption as an abstract term, is understood when translated into the more tangible context of the consequences of behaviour.

Risks in recruitment selection and other areas of discretion

In order to minimise workplace corruption it is necessary that those who participate in an area of work (such as recruitment or tender selection) should be able to identify inappropriate conduct and be willing to take action about it.

The 1999 survey results revealed that experience in recruitment did *not* affect the percentages that considered the behaviour in the recruitment scenarios to be corrupt. Approximately one-third of the respondents considered that it was not corrupt to use one's position to get a friend a job, irrespective of the respondent's experience in recruitment. This perception is inconsistent with a public sector recruitment system which goes fairly to the market, gets the best person available and leaves no room for corruption or unfair advantage. Hence it needs to be addressed in both agency policy and training provided for those who participate in recruitment panels.

While the description of the scenario used in the survey was deliberately left open for interpretation, it should be noted that the improper conduct of recruitment and selection, such as showing bias for or against one applicant for a position constitutes corrupt conduct as defined by the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988. (For further assistance in this area readers are referred to the 1999 ICAC publication *Best practice, best person: Integrity in public sector recruitment and selection*.)

From the scenarios used in the survey, recruitment stood out as an area of decision making in need of further attention in order to minimise corruption risks. Individual agencies should consider whether there other areas of discretion within their operations, not canvassed amongst the scenarios used in the survey, which may pose corruption risks.

7.3 Taking action about workplace corruption

In order to build a corruption-resistant public sector, public sector employees must be aware of the available options for taking action, and be prepared to take such action, if they witness workplace misconduct.

Identified strengths of the NSW Public sector

The surveys have identified the following strengths available for the public sector to build upon when responding to potential workplace misconduct:

- both the 1993 and 1999 survey results strongly refute the notion that any reluctance to report corruption is due to peer pressure or that the Australian culture is opposed to reporting corruption. Almost all of the respondents in both surveys disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement *People who report corruption are just troublemakers* (97% in 1999)
- the majority of public sector employees believe that it is worth reporting corruption both because something *can* (90% in 1999) and something *will* (79% in 1999) be done about it
- those in a position where they might be able to take action (that is, supervisors, those in the higher salary categories, those who participate in recruitment and tender selection) are the ones who are most likely to believe that something *can* and *will* be done about reports of corruption
- over time, the percentage of public sector employees who think that something useful *will* be done about reports of corruption has increased. This is in contrast with the general community where the percentage who believe this has decreased
- public sector employees tend to be more likely than community members to consider that something useful *will* be done about reports of corruption
- the proportion of public sector employees who said that they knew where to go to report corruption has increased (79% in 1999)
- rather than becoming cynical, those with the longest experience of working in the public sector (those employed for 10 years or more) were more likely to say they would choose to report the behaviours in the scenarios within their organisations and less likely to say that they would do nothing than were those who had been employed for shorter periods
- those with some experience in particular areas of work (such as recruitment and tendering), and therefore more likely to be in a position to observe corruption in such work, are more likely to say that they would report the behaviour within their organisation than those without such experience
- public sector employees are less likely to believe that people who report corruption are likely to suffer for it than they were in the past
- those with the most experience in the public sector (those who had been employed in the public sector for more than 10 years) and those involved in recruitment and promotion decisions were the least likely to agree that people who report corruption are likely to suffer for it.

Identified risk areas and suggestions for further work to facilitate corruption minimisation

When considering survey results about choice of action, it should be kept in mind that respondents were asked to say what they *thought they would do* in each of twelve specific scenarios. We have no evidence to suggest that, if actually faced with these scenarios, their actions would mirror their responses. In spite of this, responses to these scenarios do provide insight into some of the factors which affect action chosen in response to corruption.

Factors identified from this research as potential barriers that might stop people from taking action about workplace misconduct are:

- the conduct being considered justified when it should not be
- the attitude that *There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful will be done about it*
- concern about personal and professional retaliation
- not knowing how and where to report corruption.

Each of these four risk areas is discussed below.

Conduct being considered justified when it should not be

Both surveys found a clear link between considering the behaviour as justified and the choice to do nothing about that behaviour. This finding highlights the importance of identifying the justifications that public sector employees use to excuse or ignore corrupt behaviour and then challenging these justifications.

The idea that people may rationalise criminal behaviour and corrupt conduct has been advanced elsewhere (see, for example, Sykes & Matza 1957, Minor 1981, Gabor 1994, Gorta 1998b). The current survey provides insight into the criteria and justifications some public sector employees use when considering which behaviours are corrupt (see for example, Table 4).

Belief that there is no point in reporting corruption

The results of both the 1993 and 1999 surveys strongly suggest that one of the greatest barriers to taking action about corruption is the belief that there is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful will be done about it. Thus, if people are to be encouraged to take action about corruption, they must feel that their contribution *will* make a difference to the situation. While safe reporting channels are necessary, they are not sufficient.

Concern about personal and professional retaliation

Nearly three-quarters of respondents in 1993 agreed or strongly agreed that *People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it*. Perhaps surprisingly, the statistical analysis in both 1993 and 1999 found that this statement was not as closely related to the choice to do nothing about potential misconduct as were a number of other factors, for example, the belief that the conduct was justified, not harmful and that *There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful will be done about it*. In spite of this, a number of respondents made spontaneous comments on the 1993 and 1999 questionnaires, suggesting they were not just concerned that they may become unpopular if they reported misconduct, but that they would be actively jeopardising their careers by taking such action. While there were relatively few such comments on the 1999 questionnaire, examples of some of the reasons given for choosing to do 'nothing' were:

Otherwise life is 'made' hard. (Respondent Number 468)

I have been subjected to being 'singled out' for reporting ... Management like to sweep their dirt under the table or don't want to hear of it. Then they get rid of you in the new organisation restructure. I've been deployed because of this. They said I was surplus to requirements and my position wasn't needed any more. (Respondent Number 675)

On the other hand one respondent reported greater success:

I have witnessed corruption in my 37 years of service. I have reported serious matters only to be told I was wrong or to mind my own business. I persevered with one matter and a manager received a gaol sentence for corrupt behaviour. (Respondent Number 397)

It is a positive sign that in 1999 significantly fewer agreed that with the statement that *People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it*. However, the substantial number still agreeing with this statement suggests that significant work remains for public sector managers to create organisational cultures in which employees feel and are safe to report corruption (see also Zipparo 1997).

Public sector employees not knowing how or where to report corruption

In 1999 respondents were more likely to say that they know where to go to report corruption than respondents had been in 1993. However, the 1999 survey identified groups of public sector employees who required more information about how and where to report corruption. In particular, it is those who are not supervisors (26%), on lower salaries (27%) and who have been employed for shorter periods (28%) who consider that they are most in need of information about where to go to report corruption.

7.4 What should public sector agencies do to increase their corruption-resistance?

Foster a common definition of what is corrupt in order to address the current lack of shared understanding by:

- identifying and addressing 'grey' areas where employees are unsure of the appropriate behaviour
 - focussing on the consequences or harmfulness of behaviour as a useful strategy of communicating messages about corruption
 - identifying, then challenging, explanations used to excuse or ignore corrupt behaviour
 - providing specific training to address the needs of those participating in selection panels
 - focussing on public duty principles
 - addressing educational messages across all subgroups of public sector employees.
-

This research has identified further work that is needed in order to better equip public sector employees to recognise corruption or more generally to be able to recognise inappropriate workplace behaviour.

The survey has identified distinct information needs for those who participate in selection panels. Agencies should review the nature of the training given to those who participate in selection panels within their agency. For further information about the ethical dilemmas that occur in public sector recruitment and suggested ways to deal with these dilemmas refer to the 1999 ICAC publication *Best practice, best person: Integrity in public sector recruitment and selection*.

It is important to foster a common definition of what is corrupt in order to address the current lack of shared understanding. One way of doing this is by identifying and addressing 'grey' areas. The 1999 survey, for example, has identified several grey areas

where public sector employees are uncertain of whether or not the label 'corrupt' should be applied. As discussed above, these include the case of theft with mitigating circumstances and the scenarios in which rules were not followed yet a 'reasonable' outcome was reached.

These would not be the only areas where clarification is required. The scenarios included in the questionnaire were restricted to workplace behaviours (such as recruitment, purchasing, tendering, use of resources) that are common to a wide range public sector agencies. Hence areas of operation which are more specific to individual workplaces were not examined in the research (for example, allocation of resources to people on waiting lists, issuing of licences and certificates, management of individuals in public care). Individual agencies should work with their staff to identify the grey areas that are specific to their operations and then clarify what is acceptable.

These grey areas, together with the insight provided by the survey responses into the criteria and justifications some public sector employees use when considering which behaviours are corrupt, can be used to form the basis of a range of discussion topics, such as:

- Are there circumstances where, although the procedures are being followed, behaviour can still be considered corrupt?
- Are 'corruption' and 'dishonesty' non-overlapping categories of behaviour?
- Public sector employees have many demands placed on them, including for example, efficient use of money, public accountability and integrity. How should behaviour be resolved where some of these demands are seen as being in competition with others, for example, where ethical practice is thought to be in conflict with efficiency?

In order to communicate messages about the 'grey areas' of corruption it is useful to focus on the potential harmfulness of behaviour and other consequences.

A complementary method of fostering a shared understanding is by focussing on public duty. While undertaking their work, public sector employees should act in the public interest at all times. When faced with work decisions that are not clearly covered by policy, procedure or codes of conduct, employees should draw on public duty principles to decide what is appropriate. (For more information on public duty principles refer to Independent Commission Against Corruption 1999c and 1999d.)

The relative unimportance of background characteristics of respondents in influencing perceptions of the scenarios and attitudes to what is corrupt suggests that educational messages and corruption prevention strategies should be directed across all subgroups of public sector employees.

Educate employees about what they should do if they witness corruption or other forms of workplace misconduct.

Management needs to take, and be seen to take, effective action against corrupt behaviour in order to convince employees of the value of reporting corruption.

Create an organisational culture in which employees feel safe to report corruption.

This research has also identified further work needed to ensure that public sector employees are aware of the actions available to them, and are willing to take such action if they witness workplace misconduct. An internal reporting system is an essential part of an agency's mechanism for ensuring that people are able to bring matters of concern to the agency's attention. A good internal reporting system assists in the implementation continuous organisational improvement.

The basic steps to equipping employees with a capacity to act if they witness workplace misconduct is for individual agencies to ensure that:

- they have reporting mechanisms in place
- these reporting mechanisms include protection for those who use them
- they inform all employees:
 - of the existence of these internal mechanisms and how they work,
 - about external channels available to the employees, and
 - about the Protected Disclosures Act 1994.

This research has identified that it is those who are not supervisors, on lower salaries and who have been employed for shorter periods who consider that they are most in need of information about how and where to go to report corruption. Those who had been employed in the public sector for less than a year were also the respondents who were least likely to consider the STEREO scenario (one of the potentially most negative scenarios) to be corrupt. While information about the internal reporting system should be included in training sessions for all staff, incorporating information into induction training about what employees can and should do if they witness workplace misconduct would provide one means of ensuring that all new employees receive this information. Given that new employees often face an information overload during their induction period, further follow up is also required.

The research has indicated that the establishment of reporting mechanisms and communicating their existence to staff are the initial steps. More is required. Safe and effective reporting channels will be of little value if people do not believe that there is any point in using them. This research recognises the importance of organisations communicating what effective action (including systemic changes) can be and have been taken by the organisation in response to reports of corruption from employees.

Employees need to believe that their managers encourage and support the use the internal reporting mechanisms. For further information on internal reporting systems and on creating organisational cultures in which employees feel and are safe to report corruption refer to the ICAC's website: www.icac.nsw.gov.au and to Zipparo (1997) and Independent Commission Against Corruption (2000).

For further information:

If you require further assistance to identify and address corruption risk areas within your agency:

- the ICAC's website provides a range of self-help information, list of available publications, training and seminars.
- corruption prevention advice on a wide range of issues is available by phoning the ICAC or by requesting the advice in writing.
- training is provided for individuals and for agencies interested in developing their corruption resistance. Initial inquiries can be directed to the ICAC by phone.

Website: www.icac.nsw.gov.au

Address: 191 Cleveland St, Redfern NSW 2016
GPO Box 500, Sydney NSW 2001

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APPENDIX 1: SAMPLING AND QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN DETAILS

The data discussed in this report were collected through two surveys of random samples of NSW public sector employees. In this appendix, the methodology for selecting the sample and the rationale behind the design for the questionnaire are described^{xxx}.

Sampling

In 1999, as had been the case in 1993, a decision was made to sample staff *units* rather than individuals within the State public service. It was considered that it would be less threatening if all members of a staff unit received a questionnaire than, for example, having questionnaires from the ICAC arrive on individuals' desks around the state. This approach of sampling staff units was also seen as a more simple process which could better preserve anonymity.

With the benefit of what had been learnt from the 1993 survey, a smaller sample was sought in 1999 (approximately 1500 public sector employees) than was sought in 1993 (approximately 2000 public sector employees). Despite the difference in numbers approached, the sampling methodology used was identical for the two surveys. On both occasions a two-stage cluster sampling strategy was used. The first stage involved selecting the public sector organisations and the second stage involved selecting the staff units within those organisations which would be included. More specifically, the following process was used to draw the sample:

- i. ten government agencies were drawn, at random, from the complete list of government agencies (compiled from Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the Public Sector Management Act, 1988, and other sources)
- ii. in order to develop a sampling frame of staff units, the larger of those agencies (those with over 200 staff) were asked to provide the ICAC Research Section with organisational charts, indicating the number of staff in each unit. Information about the smaller agencies was obtained from their most recent annual reports or from them directly when they were approached to participate in the survey
- iii. units were then grouped into 'lots' of about 50 staff in 1999 (100 staff in 1993) and a list (sampling frame) made of the lots. A simple random sample of thirty lots of 50 staff in 1999 (twenty lots of 100 staff in 1993) was drawn from the list, to form the final sample of about 1500 public sector employees in 1999 (2,000 in 1993). Most lots were comprised of a number of smaller, quite autonomous, working units. The actual final number of public sector employees in the 1999 sample was 1503 drawn from over 40 sites with a number of separate divisions at most of these sites.

The resulting sample encompassed a broad range of public sector employees: some worked in large agencies, while others worked in small agencies; some worked in centralised agencies, while others worked in regionalised agencies; some worked in the city, while others worked in country areas; some were office workers while others directly delivered services to the public. The sample also included public servants from a wide range of occupations.

Questionnaire design

The questionnaire sought information on a range of individual attitudes to corruption. It did *not* ask how prevalent corruption was, or was perceived to be, in the public sector or whether corruption had been observed by the respondent in his or her organisation.

Questions were asked in a way that gave no opportunity for respondents to implicate their colleagues or their organisations in corrupt conduct.

The questionnaire used in both surveys was made up of three parts.

Part 1 – Background characteristics

Details of respondents' positions in the public sector and other background characteristics were sought:

- total length of employment in the NSW Public Sector
- supervisory role
- gross salary/wage of current position (excluding overtime or other allowances)
- frequency of participation in recruitment selection
- frequency of participation in tender selection
- frequency of participation in overnight travel for work
- gender.

This information was collected in order to explore the possible existence of differences in views about corruption between these groups of respondents. Each of these characteristics was selected to further explore patterns of responses which have been debated in the literature (see Gorta & Forell 1994, pp. 20-21 and pp. 82-84). Length of service, supervisory role and public sector grading (as indicated by salary) were specifically included to enable a more targeted approach to be taken for any educational or corruption prevention strategies which result from this study.

Information sought was kept to a minimum in order to keep the questionnaire as simple as possible for both respondents and researchers and so that respondents would not have reason to think that their anonymity could be compromised.

Part 2 – Responses to scenarios

The second section formed the major part of the questionnaire, and for this reason is discussed in greatest detail.

This part of the questionnaire included brief descriptions of twelve scenarios depicting different types of conduct which could potentially occur in any public sector organisation. For each scenario respondents were asked the same questions. They were requested to rate, on a six point scale, how *desirable* they believed the behaviour to be, how *harmful*, and how *justified* they considered it to be, where a rating of '1' was least desirable, most harmful and least justified. They were also asked to judge whether the conduct was corrupt or not corrupt. They were then asked what they would do about it: possible responses were 'nothing', 'talk to the employee', 'talk to the employee's supervisor, or other appropriate person within the organisation' or 'report it outside my organisation (e.g., Police, ICAC)'.

Selection of scenarios

Like other studies (for example, Peters & Welch, 1978; Atkinson & Mancuso, 1985; Gibbons, 1985; and Mancuso, 1993), brief scenarios were used in the questionnaire.

These brief descriptions, while much more specific than merely stating a class of behaviour (such as 'bribery', 'fraud', 'misuse of public resources', etc), remain open to interpretation. As in any observed behaviour not all details are depicted, thus the act is subject to the definition of the observer.

Scenarios are useful as they may easily be manipulated to test hypotheses of interest. The descriptions of scenarios can differ in a number of ways, including variation in terms of:

- the perpetrator (gender, position in organisation, age, other measures of status, etc.)
- the activity (purchasing, recruitment, tendering, etc.)
- the extent of involvement in the activity (initiator of the activity, someone following instructions, etc.)
- the size of any amount of money involved
- whether the benefits received were direct or indirect
- the frequency that the activity takes place
- other circumstances surrounding the activity (perpetrator's motivation, the consequences of the actions, any rationalisations, etc.).

Some studies have varied the perpetrators in their scenarios. Johnston (1986), for example, used 14 different perpetrators within his 20 scenarios. These perpetrators included individuals in public positions such as 'a police officer', 'a city council member', 'a government official', 'a county treasurer', as well as other individuals such as 'a homeowner', 'a motorist', 'your neighbour' and one perpetrator, 'a supermarket', which did not refer to an individual. Peters and Welch (1978) used eight different perpetrators in their ten scenarios.

When there are a number of variable factors such as the nature of the perpetrator, the type of behaviour, the size of any amount of money involved and the directness of the benefits received, it is not possible to isolate one feature or to confirm which combination of features has determined the respondent's assessment of the scenario.

For this reason, in the 1993 and 1999 surveys the basic description of the perpetrator was kept constant so that attention could be focussed on the behaviours and the circumstances surrounding the behaviours which were described. In these scenarios the perpetrator was stated to be 'a government employee'. The gender of the perpetrator was varied among the scenarios. The position in the organisation was only stated in one of the scenarios, 'a government employee responsible for buying office equipment' (2ND JOB scenario). However, in the other scenarios the government employee would need to be of sufficient seniority to carry out the duties being described: for example, accepting a tender (in STEREO, COMPUTER TENDER and HOSPITAL BILLS), recruitment (in JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and JOB FOR FRIEND), have the power of dismissal (in WHISTLEBLOWER) and be able to go on business trips (in BUSINESS TRIPS).

Scenarios were designed around activities which are common to a wide range of public sector agencies: recruitment, purchasing, tendering, use of consultants, use of office resources and provision of information. Each of the scenarios contained one or more potentially undesirable elements. The types of conduct were chosen:

- for their interest to the ICAC (for example, prior to the 1993 survey the ICAC had completed major projects on misuse of confidential information and on secondary employment)
- to represent a broad spread of types of conduct, from the well-defined (accepting a bribe) to the poorly defined (secondary employment)
- to represent a range of legality from plainly illegal (for example, bribery in the STEREO scenario), to the unclear (for example, misuse of resources in the CATERING BUSINESS scenario) and 'legal', though perhaps an infringement of guidelines or practices (e.g., favouritism in JOB FOR FRIEND scenario).

The scenarios described varied in the frequency of the activity. Some were 'one off' (STEREO, JOB FOR COLLEAGUE, COMPUTER TENDER, JOB FOR FRIEND, WHISTLEBLOWER and HOSPITAL BILLS) while others were ongoing (TAKE NOTE PADS, LEATHER DIARY, 2ND JOB, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, CATERING BUSINESS and BUSINESS TRIPS).

Paired sets of scenarios described similar situations or behaviours which were distinguished by the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances. Two of the scenarios described the same behaviour *A government employee is offered \$300 from a company to accept a tender which is before him.* However, the money is used for different purposes in the two scenarios. In STEREO *He takes the money to put towards a new stereo system*, while in HOSPITAL BILLS *He only takes the money to cover his child's hospital bills.*

Another of the paired sets of scenarios described the same behaviour of recruiting a new employee without following the formal process. In JOB FOR COLLEAGUE the process is described as *To avoid the hassle of advertising, a government employee appoints a colleague to a vacant position. She has the reputation for being the best person for the job.* The description of the other scenario (JOB FOR FRIEND) did not provide information on the calibre of the person being appointed: *A government employee uses her position to get a friend a public sector job.*

These pairs of scenarios were included in order to examine the effect of mitigating circumstances on the perception of the situation. Of the twelve scenarios, four had some type of mitigating circumstance: need (HOSPITAL BILLS), TAKE NOTE PADS) and the idea that the ends justify the means (COMPUTER TENDER and JOB FOR COLLEAGUE).

For a description of the features of each of the scenarios, see Table A1.1.

Table A1.1: Analysis of features of scenarios

| Scenario | Function | Mitigation | Gender of perpetrator | Frequency | Misuse of resources | Financial gain | Organisational gain |
|--------------------------|----------------------|------------|-----------------------|--------------|---------------------------|----------------|---------------------|
| STEREO | Tendering | - | Male | Once | - | Direct | - |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | Use of resources | Altruism | Not stated | Occasionally | For community centre | - | - |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | Recruitment | Expedience | Not stated | Once | - | - | Efficiency |
| LEATHER DIARY | Use of consultants | - | Female | Annually | - | - | - |
| 2 nd JOB | Purchasing | - | Male | Ongoing | - | Indirect | - |
| COMPUTER TENDER | Tendering | Expedience | Not stated | Once | - | - | Efficiency |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | Recruitment | - | Female | Once | - | - | Possible efficiency |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | Reporting misconduct | - | Not stated | Once | - | - | - |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | Use of information | - | Not stated | Often | - | - | - |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | Tendering | Need | Male | Once | - | Direct | - |
| CATERING BUSINESS | Use of resources | - | Male | Ongoing | Private catering business | Indirect | - |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | Work-related travel | - | Female | Regularly | - | Direct | - |

Selection of scales

Some previous research (for example, Peters & Welch, 1978; Johnston, 1986) has focussed simply on judgments of whether or not scenarios are corrupt. However, given that we were trying to explore under what circumstances the label 'corrupt' is applied, such approaches are inadequate. To *only* ask respondents whether they believe a scenario is 'corrupt' is potentially confusing the respondent's desire to express a generalised positive or negative feeling about the scenario and a real belief that the adjective 'corrupt', rather than some other descriptor, is appropriate. Hence it was considered important to give respondents the capacity to inform us that they saw the behaviour in a particular scenario as undesirable in a way which was independent of any request for judgments of whether the behaviour was seen as corrupt. For this reason, the first judgment respondents were asked to make about each of the scenarios was how desirable they considered the behaviour to be on a scale of 'very undesirable' (1) to 'very desirable' (6).

Much of the literature on attitudes to crime, reviewed prior to the development of the 1993 survey, had focused on the perceived *seriousness* of crime. However, as Walker (1978) states:

The concept of the seriousness of an offence is vague and ill-defined ... (p. 360).

Hoffman and Hardyman (1986) consider that the seriousness of an offence is:

generally considered to be composed of two dimensions: (1) the harm done, and (2) the culpability of the offender ... to be most useful, future studies of public opinion regarding the comparative seriousness of offenses need to address separately the concepts of harm done and punishment deserved (pp. 416, 417).

'Seriousness' may be used to describe the size or the extent of the conduct as well as to describe an opinion (serious as an expression of a negative feeling). To offer 'seriousness' as a scale on which to rate scenarios would, therefore, leave both the scale offered and the responses given open to dual interpretation, potentially reducing the value of any information obtained.

When designing the questionnaire, we had no conclusive evidence to tell us on which aspects of the conduct people most often focus when making judgments about corruption. To test this we would have to have supplied an exhaustive list of possibilities and allowed respondents to add their own. This was not a feasible option for this study.

Instead, three descriptors were selected:

- desirability
- harmfulness
- justifiability.

The survey was designed to enable the exploration of the relationships between these three perceived characteristics of the behaviour and judgments of corruption.

A scale of *very undesirable* - *very desirable* was included to allow respondents to express a positive or negative view about the conduct, independent of any judgment of corruption.

A scale of *very harmful* - *not harmful* was included to assist in ascertaining if people attend to the perceived consequences of the activity when forming judgments about the scenario's corruptness or undesirability. This is consistent with one of Hoffman and Hardyman's (1986) dimensions of seriousness, as discussed above. It is also consistent with Gardiner (1993) who has pointed out that when considering definitions of corruption 'the limitations built into the statutory or legalistic definition have led some scholars to focus on the effects of an act rather than its legal status. Simply stated, this definition says: if an act is *harmful* to the public interest, it is corrupt even if it is legal; if it is *beneficial* to the public, it is not corrupt even if it violates the law' (p. 117). Malec and Gardiner (1987) also refer to scholars having argued for more than twenty years about the merits of defining corruption according to its consequences (p. 268).

A scale of *not justified* - *well justified* was included to allow exploration of a frequently advanced idea that people may rationalise corrupt conduct (see, for example, Sykes & Matza 1957; Thurman, St John & Riggs 1984; Grabosky 1990; Gabor 1994; and Gorta 1998b).

It would have been preferable to have respondents rate a larger number of scenarios, repeating different examples of the same kind of corrupt conduct on a large number of rating scales, in order to see how different types of conduct are perceived. However, to maximise the response rate and minimise respondent fatigue, the number of scenarios and rating scales was limited.

In order to allow respondents to anchor their use of these scales, the scenarios were ordered within the questionnaire so that the first scenario was one of the potentially most negative of the scenarios (STEREO) and the second was one of the potentially least negative (TAKE NOTE PADS).

Measuring whether the behaviours were perceived as corrupt

Some previous studies have required their respondents to rate 'how corrupt' they perceive the behaviour to be on, say, a scale from 1 (not corrupt) to 5 (very corrupt) (for example, Peters & Welch, 1978) or a seven-point scale (for example, Atkinson & Mancuso, 1985; and Mancuso, 1993). This leads to a problem when the researcher(s) wishes to dichotomise responses into 'corrupt' versus 'not corrupt'. Atkinson and Mancuso (1985), for example, have stated that they counted the respondent as considering 'an act corrupt if they selected scores of 1, 2, or 3 on the seven-point Likert scale, where low scores denoted the 'more corrupt' option' (p. 468). It might be that respondents who rated acts as a 4, 5 and/or 6 on this scale may also have considered the acts to be corrupt. Peters and Welch also appeared only to count two of the points on their five-point scale as 'corrupt'.

In order to avoid the problem of misunderstanding how respondents were using such a scale to rate whether they saw acts as corrupt, in this survey the procedure was simplified by requesting that for each scenario respondents answer the question:

Do you think this behaviour is corrupt?

with the possible responses being 'yes' or 'no'.

Recording action chosen

A further aim of this study was to explore the relationship between perceptions of the behaviour and the action, if any, respondents said that they would take about it. While studies of whistleblowing or potential whistleblowing have examined the behaviours of reporting and not reporting, we wanted to include options for action other than reporting.

To simply ask respondents to choose whether or not they would report a behaviour is to deny the range of alternatives available when dealing with corrupt conduct. A witness may well choose to do nothing about the conduct; alternatively, instead of reporting they may also, for example, talk to the perpetrator about their conduct, or change the work environment somehow to not allow the behaviour to continue. Furthermore, action taken by a witness may depend on the actions available to him or her. For example, a supervisor may be in a better position than a non-supervisor to deal with the conduct of a junior officer, without having to report it elsewhere.

Recognising this, for each scenario, respondents were asked to choose one of four responses to the question 'what would you do about it'? These were:

- nothing
- talk to the employee
- talk to employee's supervisor or another appropriate person within the organisation
- report it outside my organisation (e.g., Police, ICAC).

Part 3 – Attitude statements

Twelve attitude statements were included in the survey to explore more general attitudes to corruption than could be elicited from responses to the individual scenarios. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they 'strongly disagree', 'disagree', 'agree' or 'strongly agree' with each of the statements.

Three of the items concerned defining corruption:

Q66 Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt.

Q68 If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt.

Q70 You can't call something corrupt if everybody does it.

For each of these items, those who disagreed or strongly disagreed were acknowledging a more inclusive definition of what could be called corrupt.

Three of the items concerned the range of behaviours which are considered acceptable:

Q67 Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape.

Q69 The Government can afford to sustain minor theft without worrying about it.

Q71 There is nothing wrong with private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business.

For each of these items, those who agreed or strongly agreed were expressing a broader range of what they considered to be acceptable behaviour (that is, a narrower definition of unacceptable behaviour).

Five of the items concerned the value of reporting corruption:

Q72 There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful WILL be done about it.

Q73 There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful CAN be done about it.

Q74 People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it.

Q75 Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting.

Q77 People who report corruption are just troublemakers.

For each of these items, those who disagreed or strongly disagreed were expressing that there is value in reporting corruption.

The final item concerned knowing where to report corruption:

Q76 I would not know where to go to report corruption.

Considerations

Listed below are some points to consider when examining the 1999 survey results and the differences between the 1993 and 1999 results.

- Since only 52.2% of the sample responded in 1999, we cannot know how the responses of those who did not respond would have differed from those who did respond.

- The fact that the research study was being conducted by the ICAC could potentially have affected the results, possibly inflating both the percentages of respondents who considered each of the scenarios to be corrupt as well as the percentages who said that they would take some form of action about the scenarios. The possible impact of this was considered at all stages of the project from the design of the survey to the discussion with potential respondents, and in the consideration of the results. Care was taken to minimise any such effect by:
 - having questionnaires designed in such a way that people could express condemnation of the behaviour without having to apply the label 'corrupt';
 - stressing the study's focus exploring the range of *personal* views held about corruption (hence there being no right or wrong answers);
 - reassuring respondents that neither they nor their organisations could be identified at any stage; and
 - enabling responses to be returned directly to the researchers rather than through senior officers of their own organisations.

Despite this care, however, we are unable to quantify the size or nature of any effect of having the study conducted by the ICAC.

- The results of the study reflect the nature of the scenarios used in the questionnaire. The conclusions we may draw are restricted to the nature of the specific 12 scenarios we supplied. If we had used other scenarios describing other types of behaviour or where other aspects such as the amounts of money had been different our results may well have been different.
- There are no right or wrong answers in the survey. The study simply explores the types of conduct that respondents were prepared to describe as 'corrupt' and the features of that conduct. As such it addresses definitional issues, seeking to determine public sector employees' understanding of 'corruption' rather than being used as a measure of public sector integrity.

Because these considerations applied to both the 1993 and 1999 surveys the final three of these considerations, in particular, should not affect comparisons of the results between the two surveys.

APPENDIX 2 1999 QUESTIONNAIRE

Not available on internet.


APPENDIX 3 – PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

Figures A3.1 to A3.4 summarise the length of service, supervisory role, salary level and gender comparisons of those who responded to the 1993 and 1999 surveys. As can be seen from these graphs, the majority of respondents to the 1999 survey were male (68.3%) and had been employed in the public sector for more than 10 years (66.1%). It is also apparent from the information that follows that the 1999 respondents differed significantly from the 1993 respondents in some background characteristics. Since the same methodology was used for drawing both the 1993 and 1999 random samples of public sector employees there is no reason to say that one is a better or a poorer sample than the other. Allowance was made within the analysis for any differences in background characteristics by separately examining differences in the 1999 responses from the 1993 responses for each demographic subgroup (for example, female respondents, males respondents, supervisors, non-supervisors, etc.).

Length of employment in the NSW public sector


As can be seen from Figure A3.1, in 1999 there tended to be a higher proportion of respondents who had been employed in the public sector for more than 10 years than had been the case in 1993^{xxi}.

Figure A3.1: Length of employment in NSW public sector - 1993 and 1999



Supervisory role


Figure A3.2: Supervisory status of respondents - 1993 and 1999



There was no statistically significant difference in the proportion of respondents who were supervisors (or not supervisors) in 1993 and 1999.

Salary levels


Figure A3.3: Salary level of respondents - 1993 and 1999



As can be seen from Figure A3.3, in 1999 there tended to be a higher proportion of respondents in the two highest salary categories than there had been in 1993^{coxii}.

Gender

Figure A3.4: Gender of respondents - 1993 and 1999




As can be seen from Figure A3.4, in 1999 there tended to be a higher proportion of male respondents than in 1993^{cxviii}.

Frequency of participation in different types of work

Figure A3.5 illustrates the frequency with which 1999 respondents reported participating in recruitment selection, tender selection or overnight travel as part of their current position. There was no comparative information collected in the 1993 survey.

Figure A3.5: Frequency of participation in different types of work activities in 1999 survey



Interrelationships between background factors

As would be expected, the different demographic and employment factors were found to be interrelated. Examples of some of these interrelationships in 1999 include:

- male respondents tended to have been employed in the NSW public sector longer than had female respondents^{cxxiv}
- length of employment in the NSW public sector was also found to be related to: salary^{cxv}, participation in recruitment selection^{cxvi}, and participation in overnight travel for work^{cxvii}. However, it was not found to be statistically associated with participation in tender selection
- male respondents were more likely to directly supervise staff than were female respondents^{cxviii}
- supervisors were more likely than non-supervisors to: have been employed in the NSW public sector for longer^{cxix}, have a higher salary^{cxx}, participate in recruitment selection^{cxxi}, participate in tender selection^{cxxii}, and participate in overnight travel for work^{cxxiii}
- male respondents were more likely to be receiving higher salaries than female respondents^{cxxiv}
- respondent's salary category was found to be statistically related to: participation in recruitment selection^{cxxv}; participation in tender selection^{cxxvi}; and participation in overnight travel for work^{cxxvii}
- there was no statistically significant difference between male and female respondents in their stated participation in recruitment selection
- female respondents were more likely to state that they never participated in tender selection than were male respondents^{cxxviii}
- female respondents were more likely to state that they never participated in overnight travel for work than were male respondents^{cxxix} while male respondents were more likely to state that they regularly participate in overnight travel for work than were female respondents^{cxl}.

Table A3.1: Interrelationship between gender and other background factors, 1999

| Background factors | | Males (n=515) | % of sample Females (n=239) | Total ^{CKII} (n=785) |
|---|-----------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Length of employment in NSW public sector | | | | |
| | Less than 1 year | 1.2 | 16.3 | 5.8 |
| | 1 year to less than 5 years | 8.9 | 25.5 | 13.9 |
| | 5 to 10 years | 12.8 | 18.8 | 14.2 |
| | More than 10 years | 77.1 | 39.3 | 66.1 |
| Directly supervise any staff in current position? | | | | |
| | Yes | 50.4 | 26.8 | 43.2 |
| | No | 49.6 | 73.2 | 56.8 |
| Salary | | | | |
| | Less than \$40,607 | 20.4 | 43.5 | 27.4 |
| | \$40,608 to \$55,070 | 36.0 | 34.3 | 35.1 |
| | \$55,071 to \$75,857 | 34.2 | 17.6 | 29.7 |
| | More than \$75,857 | 9.3 | 4.6 | 7.8 |
| Participation in recruitment selection | | | | |
| | Never | 55.7 | 55.3 | 55.3 |
| | Occasionally | 37.0 | 38.7 | 37.9 |
| | Regularly | 7.3 | 6.0 | 6.8 |
| Participation in tender selection | | | | |
| | Never | 57.1 | 78.8 | 62.9 |
| | Occasionally | 33.8 | 16.4 | 29.2 |
| | Regularly | 9.1 | 4.9 | 7.8 |
| Participation in overnight travel for work | | | | |
| | Never | 38.1 | 58.4 | 44.2 |
| | Occasionally | 45.0 | 35.9 | 42.5 |
| | Regularly | 16.9 | 5.6 | 13.3 |

APPENDIX 4: ADDITIONAL STATISTICAL DETAILS

This section is provided for those who are interested in statistical details in addition to the information given in the body of the report.

Table A4.1*: Comparison of percentage who considered each scenario corrupt in 1993 with 1999

| Scenario | % who considered the behaviour to be corrupt | | Statistical significance** |
|--------------------------|--|------|---|
| | 1993 | 1999 | |
| STEREO | 96.4 | 98.5 | Yes ($\chi^2=7.504$, d.f.=1, $p<.006$) ^{cdii} |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | 62.5 | 68.1 | Yes ($\chi^2=6.681$, d.f.=1, $p<.010$) |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 60.8 | 65.6 | Yes ($\chi^2=4.670$, d.f.=1, $p<.031$) |
| LEATHER DIARY | 20.4 | 24.2 | Yes ($\chi^2=4.193$, d.f.=1, $p<.041$) |
| 2 ND JOB | 73.7 | 80.3 | Yes ($\chi^2=11.473$, d.f.=1, $p<.001$) |
| COMPUTER TENDER | 56.2 | 63.2 | Yes ($\chi^2=9.611$, d.f.=1, $p<.002$) |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | 64.4 | 68.1 | No |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | 94.8 | 97.1 | Yes ($\chi^2=6.020$, d.f.=1, $p<.014$) |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 92.9 | 93.4 | No |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | 93.6 | 96.9 | Yes ($\chi^2=11.108$, d.f.=1, $p<.001$) |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 76.7 | 79.3 | No |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 92.2 | 95.3 | Yes ($\chi^2=7.226$, d.f.=1, $p<.007$) |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 2 in the body of the report.

** Statistical significance refers to differences between the percentage that considered the behaviour to be corrupt in 1993 and the percentage that considered the behaviour to be corrupt in 1999.

Table A4.2*: Background factors related to perception that behaviour was corrupt in 1999

| Scenario | Entire sample % | % who considered behaviour to be corrupt in 1999 Significant differences between subgroups Those who were more likely to consider the behaviour to be corrupt were those who: |
|--------------------------|-----------------|---|
| STEREO | 98.5 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">had been employed in the public sector for 1 year or more (98.9%) rather than those employed in the public sector for less than 1 year (91.1%) ($\chi^2= 18.240$, d.f.=3, $p<.001$)occasionally or regularly participate in recruitment (99.4%) rather than those who never participate in recruitment (97.6%) ($\chi^2= 3.877$, d.f.=1, $p<.049$)occasionally or regularly participate in tender selection (99.6%) rather than those who never participate in tender selection (97.7%) ($\chi^2= 4.312$, d.f.=1, $p<.038$) |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | 68.1 | (No significant respondent characteristics) |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 65.6 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">are in the three lowest of the four salary categories (66.9%) rather than earning more than this (49.2%) ($\chi^2= 8.428$, d.f.=3, $p<.038$) |
| LEATHER DIARY | 24.2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">are in the two lowest salary categories (27.7%) rather than those in the two highest categories (19.0%) ($\chi^2= 7.472$, d.f.=1, $p<.006$)male respondents (26.5%) rather than female respondents (19.8%) ($\chi^2= 3.921$, d.f.=1, $p<.048$) |
| 2 ND JOB | 80.3 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">occasionally or regularly participate in recruitment (83.4%) rather than those who never participate in recruitment (77.1%) ($\chi^2= 4.537$, d.f.=1, $p<.033$)occasionally or regularly participate in overnight travel for work (83.8%) rather than those who never participate in overnight travel for work (75.4%) ($\chi^2= 8.068$, d.f.=1, $p<.005$) |
| COMPUTER TENDER | 63.2 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">are in the lowest of the four salary categories (73.5%) rather than those in the three highest salary categories (59.4%) ($\chi^2= 13.111$, d.f.=1, $p<.001$)never participate in recruitment (67.0%) rather than those who occasionally or regularly participate in recruitment (58.9%) ($\chi^2= 5.309$, d.f.=1, $p<.021$) |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | 68.1 | (No significant respondent characteristics) |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | 97.1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">non-supervisors (98.2%) rather than supervisors (95.5%) ($\chi^2= 4.671$, d.f.=1, $p<.031$) |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 93.4 | (No significant respondent characteristics) |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | 96.9 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">had been employed in the public sector for 1-5 years (100.0%) and those employed in the public sector for more than 10 years (97.1%) rather than were those employed in the public sector from 5 to 10 years (95.5%) or those employed there for less than 1 year (91.1%) ($\chi^2= 9.289$, d.f.=3, $p<.026$)occasionally or regularly participate in tender selection (98.9%) rather than those who never participate in tender selection (96.0%) ($\chi^2= 5.367$, d.f.=1, $p<.021$) |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 79.3 | (No significant respondent characteristics) |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 95.3 | (No significant respondent characteristics) |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 5 in the body of the report.

Table A4.3*: Comparison of percentages of male and female respondents who considered each scenario corrupt in 1993 with 1999

| Scenario | % who considered the behaviour to be corrupt | | | | Significant changes between 1993 and 1999? |
|--------------------------|--|------|---------|------|--|
| | Males | | Females | | |
| | 1993 | 1999 | 1993 | 1999 | |
| STEREO | 95.8 | 98.6 | 97.3 | 97.9 | Males – yes ($\chi^2=8.279$, d.f.=1, p<.004) Females - no |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | 59.5 | 68.8 | 66.2 | 68.6 | Males – yes ($\chi^2=10.913$, d.f.=1, p<.001) Females - no |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 56.7 | 66.8 | 65.8 | 63.7 | Males – yes ($\chi^2=12.816$, d.f.=1, p<.001) Females - no |
| LEATHER DIARY | 23.0 | 26.5 | 16.6 | 19.8 | Males - no Females - no |
| 2 ND JOB | 73.1 | 80.2 | 74.7 | 79.3 | Males – yes ($\chi^2=8.031$, d.f.=1, p<.005) Females - no |
| COMPUTER TENDER | 53.0 | 62.1 | 60.2 | 65.3 | Males – yes ($\chi^2=9.955$, d.f.=1, p<.002) Females - no |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | 61.7 | 69.7 | 67.2 | 63.9 | Males – yes ($\chi^2=8.191$, d.f.=1, p<.004) Females - no |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | 93.1 | 96.9 | 96.9 | 97.5 | Males – yes ($\chi^2=8.564$, d.f.=1, p<.003) Females - no |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 90.9 | 93.3 | 95.7 | 93.7 | Males - no Females - no |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | 93.9 | 96.5 | 93.0 | 97.5 | Males - yes ($\chi^2=4.270$, d.f.=1, p<.039) Females – yes ($\chi^2=6.325$, d.f.=1, p<.012) |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 73.9 | 80.2 | 80.2 | 77.2 | Males - yes ($\chi^2=6.444$, d.f.=1, p<.011) Females - no |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 90.5 | 95.1 | 94.4 | 95.4 | Males - yes ($\chi^2=9.150$, d.f.=1, p<.002) Females - no |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 6 in the body of the report.

Table A4.4*: Comparison of percentages of supervisors and non-supervisors who considered each scenario corrupt in 1993 with 1999

| Scenario | % who considered the behaviour to be corrupt | | | | Significant changes between 1993 and 1999? |
|-----------------------------|--|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|--|
| | Supervisors 1993 | Supervisors 1999 | Non-supervisors 1993 | Non-supervisors 1999 | |
| STEREO | 98.7 | 98.2 | 94.5 | 98.6 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes ($\chi^2=12.266$, d.f.=1, $p<.001$) |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | 65.3 | 71.3 | 60.0 | 65.8 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes ($\chi^2=3.828$, d.f.=1, $p<.050$) |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 63.7 | 64.1 | 58.2 | 67.0 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes ($\chi^2=8.843$, d.f.=1, $p<.003$) |
| LEATHER DIARY | 20.4 | 25.4 | 20.3 | 23.7 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - no |
| 2 ND JOB | 74.3 | 80.1 | 73.4 | 80.4 | Supervisors - yes ($\chi^2=3.870$, d.f.=1, $p<.049$) Non-supervisors - yes ($\chi^2=7.124$, d.f.=1, $p<.008$) |
| COMPUTER TENDER | 55.4 | 60.2 | 56.7 | 65.5 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes ($\chi^2=8.652$, d.f.=1, $p<.003$) |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | 67.1 | 65.2 | 61.8 | 70.3 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes ($\chi^2=8.629$, d.f.=1, $p<.003$) |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | 96.0 | 95.5 | 93.9 | 98.2 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes ($\chi^2=11.816$, d.f.=1, $p<.001$) |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 94.2 | 93.4 | 91.9 | 93.4 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - no |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | 96.9 | 97.0 | 91.1 | 96.8 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes ($\chi^2=14.292$, d.f.=1, $p<.001$) |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 79.4 | 79.0 | 74.2 | 79.4 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes ($\chi^2=4.056$, d.f.=1, $p<.044$) |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 93.4 | 94.9 | 91.3 | 95.5 | Supervisors - no Non-supervisors - yes ($\chi^2=7.235$, d.f.=1, $p<.007$) |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 7 in the body of the report.

Table A4.5*: Comparison of perceived desirability, harmfulness and justification in 1993 and 1999

| Scenario | Significant changes in perceptions between 1993 and 1999 ^{cxliii} |
|--------------------------|--|
| STEREO | In 1999, a greater proportion considered this conduct harmful (98.1% in 1999 versus 95.4% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 10.111$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) and unjustified (98.6% in 1999 versus 97.3% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 3.902$, d.f.=1, $p < .048$) |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | In 1999, a greater proportion considered this conduct undesirable (90.5% in 1999 versus 84.6% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 14.860$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) and unjustified (90.8% in 1999 versus 84.3% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 17.413$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | In 1999, a greater proportion considered this conduct undesirable (85.9% in 1999 versus 79.1% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 14.606$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$), harmful (82.3% in 1999 and 76.3% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 10.456$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) and unjustified (82.2% in 1999 versus 77.1% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 7.531$, d.f.=1, $p < .006$) |
| LEATHER BOUND DIARY | In 1999, a greater proportion considered this conduct undesirable (57.6% in 1999 versus 47.4% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 20.204$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$), harmful (44.5% in 1999 and 37.7% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 9.244$, d.f.=1, $p < .002$) and unjustified (53.9% in 1999 versus 45.8% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 12.874$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) |
| 2 ND JOB | In 1999, a greater proportion considered this conduct undesirable (93.6% in 1999 versus 88.9% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 12.519$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$), harmful (92.8% in 1999 and 86.7% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 18.165$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) and unjustified (94.3% in 1999 versus 88.7% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 18.193$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) |
| COMPUTER TENDER | In 1999, a greater proportion considered this conduct undesirable (88.8% in 1999 versus 81.3% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 20.424$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$), harmful (86.1% in 1999 and 79.3% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 15.235$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) and unjustified (85.9% in 1999 versus 79.1% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 14.729$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | In 1999, a greater proportion considered this conduct undesirable (86.1% in 1999 versus 80.9% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 9.398$, d.f.=1, $p < .002$), harmful (83.4% in 1999 and 78.0% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 8.754$, d.f.=1, $p < .003$) and unjustified (85.5% in 1999 versus 81.5% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 5.497$, d.f.=1, $p < .019$) |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | - |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | - |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | In 1999, a greater proportion considered this conduct harmful (96.5% in 1999 and 94.5% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 4.339$, d.f.=1, $p < .037$) and unjustified (95.9% in 1999 versus 92.6% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 9.070$, d.f.=1, $p < .003$) |
| CATERING BUSINESS | - |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | In 1999, a greater proportion considered this conduct harmful (98.5% in 1999 and 95.6% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 12.509$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) and unjustified (99.0% in 1999 versus 97.2% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 7.203$, d.f.=1, $p < .007$) |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 8 in the body of the report.

Table A4.6*: Summary of changes in responses between 1993 and 1999

| Scenario | Significant changes in responses between 1993 and 1999 |
|--------------------------|--|
| STEREO | In 1999 respondents were more likely to say that they would report internally (64.2% in 1999 compared with 59.5% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 4.601$, d.f.=1, $p < .032$) |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | (No significant changes) |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | In 1999 respondents were more likely to say that they would report internally (56.5% in 1999 compared with 50.3% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 7.475$, d.f.=1, $p < .006$) |
| LEATHER DIARY | In 1999 respondents were less likely to say that they would do nothing (66.5% in 1999 compared with 72.7% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 9.123$, d.f.=1, $p < .003$) In 1999 respondents were more likely to say that they would report internally (12.7% in 1999 compared with 8.6% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 8.907$, d.f.=1, $p < .003$) |
| 2 ND JOB | (No significant changes) |
| COMPUTER TENDER | In 1999 respondents were less likely to say that they would do nothing (21.3% in 1999 compared with 27.9% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 98.797$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) or talk to the employee (11.8% in 1999 compared with 14.9% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 3.984$, d.f.=1, $p < .046$) In 1999 respondents were more likely to say that they would report internally (57.9% in 1999 compared with 49.8% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 12.572$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | (No significant changes) |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | (No significant changes) |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | In 1999 respondents were less likely to say that they would report externally (18.8% in 1999 compared with 24.8% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 9.838$, d.f.=1, $p < .002$) In 1999 respondents were more likely to say that they would report internally (62.6% in 1999 compared with 57.8% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 4.664$, d.f.=1, $p < .031$) |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | In 1999 respondents were more likely to say that they would report internally (58.7% in 1999 compared with 53.1% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 6.100$, d.f.=1, $p < .014$) |
| CATERING BUSINESS | (No significant changes) |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | In 1999 respondents were less likely to say that they would talk to the employee (14.5% in 1999 compared with 19.5% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 8.594$, d.f.=1, $p < .003$) In 1999 respondents were more likely to say that they would report internally (67.6% in 1999 compared with 62.5% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 5.719$, d.f.=1, $p < .017$) |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 9 in the body of the report.

Table A4.7*: Summary of subgroups whose responses to scenarios changed between 1993 and 1999

| Scenario | Changes in responses between 1993 and 1999 | |
|-------------------|--|--|
| | 1999 – Groups <i>less likely to:</i> | 1999 – Groups <i>more likely to:</i> |
| STEREO | <p>do nothing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - non-supervisors (10.4% in 1999 compared with 15.8% in 1993, $\chi^2=6.559$, d.f.=1, $p<.010$) - those in the public sector for 1-5 years (6.5% in 1999 compared with 14.1% in 1993, $\chi^2=6.559$, d.f.=1, $p<.010$) <p>report externally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (8.9% in 1999 compared with 13.4% in 1993, $\chi^2=5.702$, d.f.=1, $p<.017$) | <p>report internally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (63.2% in 1999 compared with 54.4% in 1993, $\chi^2=9.490$, d.f.=1, $p<.002$) - non-supervisors (63.0% in 1999 compared with 54.5% in 1993, $\chi^2=8.116$, d.f.=1, $p<.004$) |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | <p>do nothing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - non-supervisors (29.5% in 1999 compared with 35.1% in 1993, $\chi^2=3.848$, d.f.=1, $p<.050$) | <p>report internally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the lowest salary group (31.5% in 1999 compared with 23.6% in 1993, $\chi^2=4.675$, d.f.=1, $p<.031$) |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | <p>do nothing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the highest salary group (8.3% in 1999 compared with 25.9% in 1993, $\chi^2=6.437$, d.f.=1, $p<.011$) <p>talk to the employee:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (10.4% in 1999 compared with 15.9% in 1993, $\chi^2=7.082$, d.f.=1, $p<.008$) - those in the second highest salary group (12.6% in 1999 compared with 19.7% in 1993, $\chi^2=4.331$, d.f.=1, $p<.037$) | <p>report internally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (58.2% in 1999 compared with 50.7% in 1993, $\chi^2=6.708$, d.f.=1, $p<.010$) - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (60.1% in 1999 compared with 52.5% in 1993, $\chi^2=6.231$, d.f.=1, $p<.013$) - non-supervisors (54.1% in 1999 compared with 45.4% in 1993, $\chi^2=8.190$, d.f.=1, $p<.004$) - those in the highest salary group (76.7% in 1999 compared with 51.7% in 1993, $\chi^2=8.003$, d.f.=1, $p<.005$) |
| LEATHER DIARY | <p>do nothing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - supervisors (60.6% in 1999 compared with 67.2% in 1993, $\chi^2=3.983$, d.f.=1, $p<.046$) - non-supervisors (70.7% in 1999 compared with 76.9% in 1993, $\chi^2=5.402$, d.f.=1, $p<.020$) - male respondents (62.6% in 1999 compared with 68.5% in 1993, $\chi^2=4.737$, d.f.=1, $p<.030$) - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (62.2% in 1999 compared with 70.3% in 1993, $\chi^2=7.787$, d.f.=1, $p<.005$) - those in the lowest salary group (67.1% in 1999 compared with 75.7% in 1993, $\chi^2=5.361$, d.f.=1, $p<.021$) - those in the second lowest salary group (68.4% in 1999 compared with 74.9% in 1993, $\chi^2=3.830$, d.f.=1, $p<.050$) - those in the highest salary group (55.0% in 1999 compared with 72.4% in 1993, $\chi^2=3.861$, d.f.=1, $p<.049$) <p>talk to the employee:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the second highest salary group (22.2% in 1999 compared with | <p>report internally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (14.6% in 1999 compared with 10.2% in 1993, $\chi^2=5.607$, d.f.=1, $p<.018$) - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (15.3% in 1999 compared with 9.3% in 1993, $\chi^2=9.084$, d.f.=1, $p<.003$) - supervisors (14.0% in 1999 compared with 8.1% in 1993, $\chi^2=7.992$, d.f.=1, $p<.005$) - those in the second lowest salary group (14.3% in 1999 compared with 8.8% in 1993, $\chi^2=5.712$, d.f.=1, $p<.017$) |

| Scenario | Changes in responses between 1993 and 1999 | |
|---------------------|--|--|
| | 1999 – Groups <i>less</i> likely to: | 1999 – Groups <i>more</i> likely to: |
| 2 ND JOB | <p>31.2% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 4.725$, d.f.=1, $p < .030$)</p> <p>do nothing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the highest salary group (1.6% in 1999 compared with 10.2% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 3.973$, d.f.=1, $p < .046$) <p>talk to the employee:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (11.5% in 1999 compared with 16.4% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 5.151$, d.f.=1, $p < .023$) - supervisors (13.2% in 1999 compared with 18.3% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 4.049$, d.f.=1, $p < .044$) - those in the second lowest salary group (12.1% in 1999 compared with 18.1% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 4.774$, d.f.=1, $p < .029$) | <p>report externally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - supervisors (10.5% in 1999 compared with 5.5% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 7.483$, d.f.=1, $p < .006$) - those in the second highest salary group (9.2% in 1999 compared with 3.2% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 6.882$, d.f.=1, $p < .009$) |
| COMPUTER TENDER | <p>do nothing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - supervisors (16.7% in 1999 compared with 22.2% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 3.915$, d.f.=1, $p < .048$) - non-supervisors (24.9% in 1999 compared with 32.5% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 7.485$, d.f.=1, $p < .006$) - male respondents (19.3% in 1999 compared with 26.3% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 8.341$, d.f.=1, $p < .004$) - those in the public sector for 1-5 years (20.6% in 1999 compared with 31.1% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 4.340$, d.f.=1, $p < .037$) - those in the lowest salary group (25.6% in 1999 compared with 34.4% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 5.208$, d.f.=1, $p < .022$) <p>talk to the employee:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (11.7% in 1999 compared with 15.9% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 4.089$, d.f.=1, $p < .043$) - supervisors (11.3% in 1999 compared with 16.5% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 4.488$, d.f.=1, $p < .034$) - those in the second lowest salary group (10.0% in 1999 compared with 15.9% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 5.309$, d.f.=1, $p < .021$) and those in the highest salary group (11.5% in 1999 compared with 25.4% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 3.897$, d.f.=1, $p < .048$) | <p>report internally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (58.4% in 1999 compared with 49.9% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 8.689$, d.f.=1, $p < .003$) - those in the public sector for 1 to less than 5 years (61.7% in 1999 compared with 47.4% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 6.494$, d.f.=1, $p < .011$) - non-supervisors (54.8% in 1999 compared with 45.7% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 8.992$, d.f.=1, $p < .003$) - supervisors (61.9% in 1999 compared with 55.1% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 3.914$, d.f.=1, $p < .048$) - those in the lowest salary group or the highest salary group (lowest salary group: 53.1% in 1999 compared with 44.6% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 4.162$, d.f.=1, $p < .041$; highest salary group: 73.8% in 1999 compared with 54.2% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 4.977$, d.f.=1, $p < .026$) <p>report externally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (10.3% in 1999 compared with 5.6% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 8.379$, d.f.=1, $p < .004$) - supervisors (10.1% in 1999 compared with 6.2% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 4.428$, d.f.=1, $p < .035$) |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | <p>do nothing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (26.8% in 1999 compared with 32.1% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 3.981$, d.f.=1, $p < .046$) - those in the public sector for 1-5 years (25.7% in 1999 compared with 37.0% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 4.463$, d.f.=1, $p < .035$) | <p>report internally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the public sector for 1 to less than 5 years (56.2% in 1999 compared with 42.6% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 5.787$, d.f.=1, $p < .016$) <p>report externally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the second highest salary group (6.2% in 1999 compared with 1.4% in 1993, $\chi^2 = 6.796$, d.f.=1, $p < .009$) |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | - | - |

| Scenario | Changes in responses between 1993 and 1999 | |
|--------------------------|---|---|
| | 1999 – Groups less likely to: | 1999 – Groups more likely to: |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | report externally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (21.9% in 1999 compared with 29.9% in 1993, $\chi^2=9.667$, d.f.=1, $p<.002$) - supervisors (16.0% in 1999 compared with 27.2% in 1993, $\chi^2=14.828$, d.f.=1, $p<.001$) - those in the second lowest salary group (15.9% in 1999 compared with 22.1% in 1993, $\chi^2=4.324$, d.f.=1, $p<.038$) and those in the highest salary group (16.4% in 1999 compared with 37.3% in 1993, $\chi^2=6.696$, d.f.=1, $p<.010$) | talk to the employee: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the public sector for 1-5 years (17.6% in 1999 compared with 9.1% in 1993, $\chi^2=5.767$, d.f.=1, $p<.016$) report internally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - male respondents (60.3% in 1999 compared with 54.2% in 1993, $\chi^2=4.541$, d.f.=1, $p<.033$) - those in the public sector for 5 to 10 years (67.3% in 1999 compared with 55.9% in 1993, $\chi^2=4.343$, d.f.=1, $p<.037$) - supervisors (66.9% in 1999 compared with 58.4% in 1993, $\chi^2=6.326$, d.f.=1, $p<.012$) - those in the highest salary group (72.1% in 1999 compared with 49.2% in 1993, $\chi^2=6.646$, d.f.=1, $p<.010$) |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | do nothing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - non-supervisors (12.2% in 1999 compared with 17.7% in 1993, $\chi^2=8.341$, d.f.=1, $p<.004$) | report internally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - non-supervisors (55.2% in 1999 compared with 47.1% in 1993, $\chi^2=7.104$, d.f.=1, $p<.008$) |
| CATERING BUSINESS | talk to the employee: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - female respondents (22.8% in 1999 compared with 30.2% in 1993, $\chi^2=4.473$, d.f.=1, $p<.034$) | - |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | do nothing: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - non-supervisors (12.0% in 1999 compared with 16.3% in 1993, $\chi^2=3.993$, d.f.=1, $p<.046$) talk to the employee: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - female respondents (17.2% in 1999 compared with 23.5% in 1993, $\chi^2=3.835$, d.f.=1, $p<.050$) - supervisors (14.3% in 1999 compared with 20.8% in 1993, $\chi^2=5.754$, d.f.=1, $p<.016$) - those in the public sector for more than 10 years (12.2% in 1999 compared with 17.4% in 1993, $\chi^2=5.726$, d.f.=1, $p<.017$) - those in the second lowest salary group (13.6% in 1999 compared with 21.1% in 1993, $\chi^2=6.726$, d.f.=1, $p<.010$) | report internally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - non-supervisors (64.4% in 1999 compared with 58.4% in 1993, $\chi^2=4.180$, d.f.=1, $p<.041$) report externally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - those in the second lowest salary group (8.8% in 1999 compared with 4.6% in 1993, $\chi^2=5.725$, d.f.=1, $p<.017$) |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 10 in the body of the report.

Table A4.8*: Relationship between experience and response to scenarios in 1999

| Scenario | | Experience in recruitment selection | % Do nothing | Response to scenario | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----|--|--------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | | | % Talk to employee | % Report internally | % Report externally |
| JOB COLLEAGUE ^{cxliv} | FOR | Never | 33.1 | 9.8 | 52.9 | 4.3 |
| | | Occasionally | 19.4 | 14.5 | 61.6 | 4.5 |
| | | Regularly | 11.8 | 15.7 | 66.7 | 5.9 |
| | | Total | 26.4 | 12.0 | 57.1 | 4.5 |
| JOB FOR FRIEND ^{cxlv} | | Never | 36.0 | 14.3 | 44.8 | 5.0 |
| | | Occasionally | 22.6 | 15.5 | 57.6 | 4.2 |
| | | Regularly | 12.2 | 20.4 | 59.2 | 8.2 |
| | | Total | 29.4 | 15.2 | 50.5 | 4.9 |
| Scenario | | Experience in tender selection | % Do nothing | Response to scenario | | |
| | | | | % Talk to employee | % Report internally | % Report externally |
| STEREO ^{cxlvi} | | Never | 11.8 | 19.0 | 60.7 | 8.5 |
| | | Occasionally | 3.6 | 19.1 | 70.5 | 6.8 |
| | | Regularly | 5.1 | 13.6 | 69.5 | 11.9 |
| | | Total | 8.9 | 18.6 | 66.3 | 8.2 |
| HOSPITAL BILLS ^{cxlvii} | | Never | 12.7 | 24.4 | 53.8 | 9.1 |
| | | Occasionally | 6.4 | 20.9 | 65.9 | 6.8 |
| | | Regularly | 5.1 | 13.6 | 72.9 | 8.5 |
| | | Total | 10.3 | 22.5 | 58.9 | 8.4 |
| COMPUTERTENDER ^{cxlviii} | | Never | 25.1 | 9.6 | 55.0 | 10.4 |
| | | Occasionally | 15.0 | 15.5 | 64.1 | 5.5 |
| | | Regularly | 17.2 | 15.5 | 62.1 | 5.2 |
| | | Total | 21.5 | 11.7 | 58.2 | 8.5 |
| Scenario | | Experience in overnight travel for work | % Do nothing | Response to scenario | | |
| | | | | % Talk to employee | % Report internally | % Report externally |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | | Never | 11.4 | 14.4 | 64.4 | 9.9 |
| | | Occasionally | 10.2 | 14.6 | 68.1 | 7.1 |
| | | Regularly | 5.0 | 13.9 | 76.2 | 5.0 |
| | | Total | 10.0 | 14.4 | 65.7 | 8.0 |

- This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Tables 14, 15 and 16 in the body of the report.

Table A4.9*: Summary of changes over time to attitudes about what is corrupt

| Statements about defining corruption | | % who disagreed or strongly disagreed | | Statistical significance |
|--------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|------|---|
| | | 1993 | 1999 | |
| Q66 | Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt. | 71.4 | 73.2 | n.s. |
| Q68 | If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt. | 72.8 | 78.8 | Statistically significant* ($\chi^2=9.400$, d.f.=1, $p<.002$) |
| Q70 | You can't call something corrupt if everybody does it. | 91.7 | 94.1 | Statistically significant* ($\chi^2=4.048$, d.f.=1, $p<.044$) |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 18 in the body of the report.

Table A4.10*: 1999 subgroups most likely to disagree with these attitude statements

| Statements about defining corruption | 1999 subgroups most likely to disagree: |
|---|--|
| Q66. Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> were in the two highest salary categories (80.3%) rather than those in the two lower salary categories (68.8%) ($\chi^2= 12.184$, d.f.=1, $p<.001$) had been in the public sector for 1-5 years (84.0%) rather than those employed for less than one year or for more than five years (71.7%) ($\chi^2= 10.687$, d.f.=3, $p<.014$); were supervisors (77.0%) rather than non-supervisors (70.0%) ($\chi^2= 4.667$, d.f.=1, $p<.031$); occasionally or regularly participate in recruitment (77.6%) rather than those who never participate in recruitment (70.0%) ($\chi^2= 5.471$, d.f.=1, $p<.019$) occasionally or regularly participate in overnight travel for work (76.8%) rather than those who never participate in overnight travel (69.3%) ($\chi^2= 5.306$, d.f.=1, $p<.021$) |
| Q68. If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> were in the two highest salary categories (85.0%) rather than those in the two lower salary categories (75.1%) ($\chi^2= 10.584$, d.f.=1, $p<.001$) occasionally or regularly participate in recruitment (84.3%) rather than those who never participate in recruitment (74.6%) ($\chi^2= 10.540$, d.f.=1, $p<.001$) |
| Q70. You can't call something corrupt if everybody does it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> were in the two highest salary categories (96.9%) rather than those in the two lower salary categories (92.6%) ($\chi^2= 6.159$, d.f.=1, $p<.013$) |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 19 in the body of the report.

Table A4.11*: Subgroups whose perceptions changed between 1993 and 1999

| Statements about defining corruption | Changes between 1993 and 1999 |
|---|---|
| Q66. Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> those employed in the public sector for between 1-5 years (84.0% in 1999 compared with 69.3% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 8.578$, d.f.=1, $p < .003$) |
| Q68. If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> men (78.3% in 1999 compared with 68.9% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 13.364$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$); those who were not supervisors (81.0% in 1999 compared with 77.0% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 8.209$, d.f.=1, $p < .004$) those who had been employed from 1-5 years (85.0% in 1999 compared with 71.6% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 7.631$, d.f.=1, $p < .006$) or for more than 10 years (78.0% in 1999 compared with 72.6% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 4.152$, d.f.=1, $p < .042$) those in the lowest salary group (74.8% in 1999 compared with 64.1% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 7.523$, d.f.=1, $p < .006$) or in the highest salary group (94.9% in 1999 compared with 82.8% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 4.376$, d.f.=1, $p < .036$). |
| Q70. You can't call something corrupt if everybody does it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> men (94.5% in 1999 compared with 90.5% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 6.736$, d.f.=1, $p < .009$) those who were not supervisors (94.1% in 1999 compared with 89.7% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 6.742$, d.f.=1, $p < .009$) |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 20 in the body of the report.

Table A4.12*: Summary of changes over time to attitudes about acceptable behaviour

| Statements about acceptable behaviour | | % who disagreed or strongly disagreed | | Statistical significance |
|---------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|------|--|
| | | 1993 | 1999 | |
| Q67 | Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape. | 45.1 | 50.3 | Significantly different* * ($\chi^2 = 5.056$, d.f.=1, $p < .025$) |
| Q69 | The Government can afford to sustain minor theft without worrying about it. | 89.5 | 92.1 | n.s. |
| Q71 | There is nothing wrong with private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business. | 75.0 | 80.8 | Significantly different ** ($\chi^2 = 9.313$, d.f.=1, $p < .002$) |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 21 in the body of the report.

* Significantly more respondents disagreed with this attitude statement in 1999 than in 1993.

n.s. = not significantly different.

Table A4.13*: 1999 subgroups most likely to disagree with these attitude statements

| Statements about acceptable behaviour | 1999 subgroups most likely to disagree |
|---|---|
| Q67. Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> those who were in the highest salary category (63.3%) or the lowest salary category (54.8%) rather than those in the middle two salary categories (46.8%) ($\chi^2 = 8.570$, d.f.=3, $p < .036$) |
| Q69. The Government can afford to sustain minor theft without worrying about it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> those who occasionally or regularly participate in tender selection (94.9%) rather than those who never participate in tender selection (90.9%) ($\chi^2 = 4.084$, d.f.=1, $p < .043$) |
| Q71. There is nothing wrong with private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> have worked for more than 10 years in the public sector (83.4%) rather than those who have worked for less than 10 years in the public sector (76.0%) ($\chi^2 = 9.573$, d.f.=3, $p < .023$) are supervisors (85.3%) rather than non-supervisors (77.4%) ($\chi^2 = 7.610$, d.f.=1, $p < .006$) are in the highest two salary categories (87.5%) rather than those earning less than this (77.1%) ($\chi^2 = 12.898$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) are men (83.8%) rather than women (74.7%) ($\chi^2 = 8.696$, d.f.=1, $p < .003$) regularly participate in recruitment (96.2%) rather than those who are never or only occasionally involved in recruitment (79.5%) ($\chi^2 = 8.592$, d.f.=1, $p < .003$) |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 22 in the body of the report.

Table A4.14*: Subgroups whose perceptions changed between 1993 and 1999

| Statements about acceptable behaviour | Changes between 1993 and 1999 |
|--|--|
| Q67. Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> men (49.6% in 1999 compared with 40.4% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 10.321$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) those who were not supervisors (50.7% in 1999 compared with 44.5% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 4.1999$, d.f.=1, $p < .040$) those who had been employed for more than ten years (49.6% in 1999 compared with 41.8% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 6.494$, d.f.=1, $p < .011$) those in the highest salary category (63.3% in 1999 compared with 39.7% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 6.621$, d.f.=1, $p < .010$) |
| Q69. The Government can afford to sustain minor theft without worrying about it | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> men (91.4% in 1999 compared with 87.2% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 5.411$, d.f.=1, $p < .020$) those who were not supervisors (91.3% in 1999 compared with 87.2% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 4.652$, d.f.=1, $p < .031$) |
| Q71. There is nothing wrong with private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> men (83.8% in 1999 compared with 76.2% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 10.592$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) those who were supervisors (85.3% in 1999 compared with 78.2% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 6.921$, d.f.=1, $p < .009$) those who were employed for more than 10 years (83.4% in 1999 compared with 77.7% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 5.538$, d.f.=1, $p < .019$) those who were in the lowest salary group (76.3% in 1999 compared with 68.3% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 6.921$, d.f.=1, $p < .009$) or those who were in the highest salary group (91.7% in 1999 compared with 72.4% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 7.472$, d.f.=1, $p < .006$) |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 23 in the body of the report.

Table A4.15*: Summary of changes over time to attitudes about reporting corruption

| Statements about reporting corruption | | % who disagreed or strongly disagreed | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|------|--|
| | | 1993 | 1999 | Statistical significance |
| Q72 | There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful <i>will</i> be done about it. | 73.6 | 78.8 | Statistically significant** ($\chi^2=7.669$, d.f.=1, $p<.006$) |
| Q73 | There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful <i>can</i> be done about it. | 85.8 | 90.0 | Statistically significant ** ($\chi^2=7.793$ d.f.=1, $p<.005$) |
| Q74 | People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it. | 25.9 | 31.2 | Statistically significant ** ($\chi^2=6.478$, d.f.=1, $p<.011$) |
| Q75 | Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting. | 73.7 | 73.8 | n.s. |
| Q76 | I would not know where to go to report corruption. | 72.4 | 78.9 | Statistically significant ** ($\chi^2=11.099$, d.f.=1, $p<.001$) |
| Q77 | People who report corruption are just troublemakers. | 95.6 | 96.9 | n.s. |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Table 24 in the body of the report.

** Significantly more respondents disagreed with this attitude statement in 1999 than in 1993.

n.s. = not significantly different.

Table A4.16: 1999 subgroups most likely to disagree with these attitude statements (This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Tables 26 and 27 in the body of the report.)

| Statements about reporting corruption | 1999 subgroups most likely to disagree |
|--|---|
| Q72. There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful <i>will</i> be done about it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have been employed in the public sector for less than 1 year (95.6%) rather than those employed in the public sector for longer periods (77.8%) ($\chi^2 = 11.985$, d.f.=3, $p < .007$) • were supervisors (82.9%) rather than non-supervisors (75.7%) ($\chi^2 = 5.880$, d.f.=3, $p < .015$) • were in the highest two salary categories (86.5%) rather than those earning less than this (74.4%) ($\chi^2 = 15.703$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) • occasionally or regularly participate in recruitment (83.8%) rather than those who never participate in recruitment (75.5%) ($\chi^2 = 7.950$, d.f.=1, $p < .005$) • occasionally or regularly participate in tender selection (85.9%) rather than those who never participate in tender selection (75.0%) ($\chi^2 = 12.408$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) • occasionally or regularly participate in overnight travel (81.9%) rather than those who never participate in overnight travel (75.2%) ($\chi^2 = 5.003$, d.f.=3, $p < .025$) |
| Q73. There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful <i>can</i> be done about it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • were in the highest two salary groups (96.5%) rather than those earning less than this (86.4%) ($\chi^2 = 21.137$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) • occasionally or regularly participate in tender selection (95.3%) rather than those who never participate in tender selection (87.1%) ($\chi^2 = 13.119$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) • occasionally or regularly participate in overnight travel (92.4%) rather than those who never participate in overnight travel (86.9%) ($\chi^2 = 6.262$, d.f.=1, $p < .012$) |
| Q74. People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have been employed in the public sector up to 10 years (37.0%) rather than those employed in the public sector for more than 10 years (28.2%) ($\chi^2 = 10.037$, d.f.=3, $p < .018$) • occasionally or regularly participate in recruitment (35.7%) rather than those who never participate in recruitment (27.9%) ($\chi^2 = 5.351$, d.f.=1, $p < .021$) |
| Q75. Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have been employed in the public sector for more than 10 years (77.3%) rather than those employed in the public sector for more less than that time (67.3%) ($\chi^2 = 10.717$, d.f.=3, $p < .013$) • in the two highest salary categories (79.2%) rather than those earning in the two lowest of the four salary categories (70.9%) ($\chi^2 = 6.590$, d.f.=1, $p < .010$) • regularly participate in recruitment (86.5%) rather than those who never or only occasionally participate in recruitment (73.0%) ($\chi^2 = 4.593$, d.f.=1, $p < .032$) |
| Q76. I would not know where to go to report corruption. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have been employed in the public sector for more than 10 years (82.5%) rather than those employed in the public sector for more less than that time (71.5%) ($\chi^2 = 20.582$, d.f.=3, $p < .001$) • earn in the highest two salary groups (88.9%) rather than those earning in the lowest two salary groups (72.8%) ($\chi^2 = 28.115$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) • were supervisors (84.5%) rather than non-supervisors (74.5%) ($\chi^2 = 11.246$, d.f.=3, $p < .001$) • regularly participate in recruitment (94.2%) rather than those who occasionally participate in recruitment (87.2%) who in turn are more likely to disagree than those who never participate in recruitment (71.5%) ($\chi^2 = 33.268$, d.f.=2, $p < .001$) • occasionally or regularly participate in tender selection (83.8%) rather than those who never participate in tender selection (75.5%) ($\chi^2 = 7.102$, d.f.=1, $p < .008$) |
| Q77. People who report corruption are just troublemakers. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 1999 those most likely to disagree were those who are in the highest two salary categories (99.3%) rather than those in the lowest two of the four salary categories (95.7%) ($\chi^2 = 8.288$, d.f.=1, $p < .004$) |

Table A4.17*: Subgroups whose perceptions changed between 1993 and 1999

| Statements about reporting corruption | Changes between 1993 and 1999 |
|--|--|
| Q72. There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful <i>will</i> be done about it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> men (79.3% in 1999 compared with 71.1% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 10.498$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) those who were not supervisors (75.7% in 1999 compared with 70.3% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 4.015$, d.f.=1, $p < .045$) those who had been employed for less than 1 year (95.6% in 1999 compared with 81.7% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 4.806$, d.f.=1, $p < .028$) |
| Q73. There is no point in reporting corruption as nothing useful <i>can</i> be done about it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> men (90.4% in 1999 compared with 84.0% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 10.501$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$) those who were not supervisors (88.4% in 1999 compared with 83.3% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 4.015$, d.f.=1, $p < .045$) those who had been employed for more than ten years (90.8% in 1999 compared with 86.4% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 5.122$, d.f.=1, $p < .024$) |
| Q74. People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> women (34.2% in 1999 compared with 25.4% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 6.335$, d.f.=1, $p < .012$) those who were supervisors (33.9% in 1999 compared with 27.4% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 4.295$, d.f.=1, $p < .038$) those who had been employed for five to ten years (33.3% in 1999 compared with 20.9% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 7.007$, d.f.=1, $p < .008$) |
| Q75. Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting. | None of the demographic groups had changed their attitudes significantly. |
| Q76. I would not know where to go to report corruption. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> men (80.1% in 1999 compared with 73.5% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 7.303$, d.f.=1, $p < .007$) those who were supervisors (84.5% in 1999 compared with 78.2% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 5.203$, d.f.=1, $p < .023$) those who were non-supervisors (74.5% in 1999 compared with 67.8% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 5.996$, d.f.=1, $p < .014$) those who had been employed for more than ten years (82.5% in 1999 compared with 75.5% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 7.749$, d.f.=1, $p < .005$) those in the second lowest of the four salary groups (80.2% in 1999 compared with 72.2% in 1993) ($\chi^2 = 6.132$, d.f.=1, $p < .013$) |
| Q77. People who report corruption are just troublemakers. | None of the demographic groups had changed their attitudes significantly. |

* This table provides additional information to supplement that provided in Tables 25 and 26 in the body of the report.

APPENDIX 5: LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS – Background to Chapter 6

General

The information in this appendix is provided for those who are interested in more technical information about the logistic regressions reported in Chapter 6.

Logistic regression analysis is a statistical technique used to determine which of a set of variables (for example, gender, supervisory role, salary level) can be used to predict an outcome which has two possibilities (such as, consider scenario corrupt versus not corrupt). The model which is developed depends on the set of potential variables from which predictors are chosen.

While logistic regression enables the development of predictive models, in this analysis emphasis was placed on **exploring** which variables were associated with different decisions made by respondents (for example, whether a behaviour is considered to be corrupt or not) rather than attempting to develop models to predict these responses. Hence the focus is on which variables are identified as best differentiating between the two groups, rather than the parameter estimates for these models.

The order in which variables are fitted makes a difference to the resulting models. In this set of analyses the 'forward stepwise method' was used: at each step the variable which is the most strongly related of all those remaining to be entered into the model (as measured by the smallest probability of no difference) is added to the model, provided that the probability is less than the cut-off level ($p \leq 0.05$). The statistics which are reported in the tables in this appendix are derived from the forward stepwise method of fitting the variables, using the statistical package SPSS for Windows. Parameters for the logistic regression model are estimated using the maximum-likelihood method.

Some of these variables are useful in increasing the percentage which could be correctly classified by chance while others, although still statistically significant, do not contribute greatly to the percentage correctly classified. The concept of *percentage correctly classified by chance* is explained below by use of an example.

Looking at a specific example – What best distinguishes those who consider 'COMPUTER TENDER' to be corrupt from those who consider it not corrupt?

Consider the COMPUTER TENDER scenario as an example to explain logistic regression analysis. In Table 2 it was noted that 63.2% of 1999 respondents thought this behaviour was corrupt. If one had to predict whether an individual would consider the behaviour in the COMPUTER TENDER scenario to be corrupt or not, in the absence of any other information, the best strategy would be to guess that the individual would consider the behaviour to be 'corrupt'. Using this strategy, one would be correct, on average, in 63.2% of their predictions (or almost two-thirds of the time).

It is of interest to see whether having any additional information (for example, about the person's gender, supervisory role) can help predict whether an individual is likely to consider the COMPUTER TENDER scenario to be corrupt or not. The range of survey

information which was considered to see whether it assists, included sixteen different variables:

- seven respondent background variables^{cdix};
- three perceptions of the behaviour^{cd};
- six measures of attitudes to what is corrupt and to what is acceptable^{cdi}.

Of the sixteen variables which were considered, from Table A5.1^{cdii} it can be seen that four variables were found to make a statistically significant contribution to the predictive model, that is were found to differentiate between those respondents who consider the COMPUTER TENDER scenario to be corrupt from those who consider it not corrupt:

- perceived harmfulness,
- salary,
- perceived justification, and
- attitudes to Q67 *Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape.*

Table A5.1: Summary of variables found to be related to judging behaviour as corrupt for COMPUTER TENDER scenario^{cdliii}

| Scenario | Step ^{cdlv} | Variable entered ^{cdv} | χ^2 (improvement) ^{cdvi} | Probability ^{cdvii} | Nagelkerke R^2 ^{cdviii} | Correct classification % ^{cdix} |
|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--|------------------------------|--|---|
| COMPUTER TENDER | - | - | - | - | - | 63.19% |
| | 1 | Harmfulness | 229.589 | p<.0001 | 0.387 | 77.83% |
| | 2 | Salary | 25.160 | p<.0001 | 0.422 | 77.97% |
| | 3 | Justification | 19.984 | p<.0001 | 0.449 | 78.41% |
| | 4 | Q67 (Disagree) | 8.666 | p<.0032 | 0.460 | 79.28% |

Furthermore, it can also be seen from the "Correct classification %" column that the inclusion of perceived harmfulness (and no additional variables) in the model is sufficient to increase the percentage correctly classified by almost 15% from that which could be correctly classified by chance (from 63.19% to 77.83%). It can also be seen that the inclusion of the additional three variables (salary, perceived justification and attitude to Q67) only improves the percentage correctly classified by less than a further two per cent (1.45%), from 77.83% to 79.28%. From these analyses, therefore, the optimal model to predict whether the behaviour in COMPUTER TENDER is corrupt or not is a model based on perceived harmfulness and no additional variables. It is the perceived harmfulness or the way the respondents perceive the consequences which best distinguishes those who consider COMPUTER TENDER corrupt from those who consider it not corrupt.

Logistic regression predicting those who consider the scenarios corrupt from those who do not

Table A5.2 summarises the results of the 12 logistic regressions (one for each scenario) incorporating the sixteen variables (seven respondent background variables, three perceptions of the behaviour, and six measures of attitudes to what is corrupt and to what is acceptable) described in the preceding section. Table A5.2 follows the same format as Table A5.1.

It should be noted that for those five scenarios in which more than 90% agreed that the behaviour was corrupt (STEREO, WHISTLEBLOWER, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, HOSPITAL BILLS and BUSINESS TRIPS), the models derived were not able to predict whether the behaviour would be considered to be 'corrupt' or 'not corrupt' at a better than chance rate. (There are no variables that appear in bold typeface.) That is, the 90(+) % who said that the behaviours were corrupt did not differ sufficiently from the less than 10% who said that the behaviours were not corrupt, on the variables which we measured, to allow us to make useful predictions.

Table A5.2: Summary of variables found to be related to judging behaviour as corrupt^{clx}

| Scenario | Step I | Variable entered II | χ^2 (improvement) III | Probability IV | Nagel- kerke R^2 V | Correct classifi- cation % cixi |
|--------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| STEREO | - | - | - | - | - | 98.42% ^{cixi} |
| | 1 | Justification | 25.828 | p<.0001 | 0.243 | 98.42% |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | 2 | Q71 | 18.393 | p<.0001 | 0.411 | 98.99% |
| | - | - | - | - | - | 68.79% |
| | 1 | Justification | 157.006 | p<.0001 | 0.285 | 77.02% |
| | 2 | Harmfulness | 37.756 | p<.0001 | 0.345 | 76.73% |
| | 3 | Q68 | 6.870 | p<.0088 | 0.355 | 77.60% |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | 4 | Q66 | 5.022 | p<.0250 | 0.363 | 77.46% |
| | 5 | Q71 | 4.939 | p<.0263 | 0.370 | 77.46% |
| | - | - | - | - | - | 65.70% |
| | 1 | Justification | 270.817 | p<.0001 | 0.450 | 81.98% |
| LEATHER DIARY | 2 | Harmfulness | 30.101 | p<.0001 | 0.490 | 82.12% |
| | 3 | Salary | 19.169 | p<.0003 | 0.514 | 82.56% |
| | 4 | Q67 | 7.398 | p<.0065 | 0.523 | 81.98% |
| | - | - | - | - | - | 75.62% |
| 2 ND JOB | 1 | Harmfulness | 350.357 | p<.0001 | 0.594 | 88.39% |
| | 2 | Justification | 42.035 | p<.0001 | 0.647 | 89.40% |
| | 3 | Desirability | 12.266 | p<.0005 | 0.662 | 88.82% |
| | 4 | Salary | 7.999 | p<.0047 | 0.672 | 89.26% |
| COMPUTER TENDER | - | - | - | - | - | 79.57% |
| | 1 | Justification | 230.500 | p<.0001 | 0.446 | 87.97% |
| | 2 | Harmfulness | 18.394 | p<.0001 | 0.476 | 87.54% |
| | - | - | - | - | - | 63.19% |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | 1 | Harmfulness | 229.589 | p<.0001 | 0.387 | 77.83% |
| | 2 | Salary | 25.160 | p<.0001 | 0.422 | 77.97% |
| | 3 | Justification | 19.984 | p<.0001 | 0.449 | 78.41% |
| | 4 | Q67 | 8.666 | p<.0032 | 0.460 | 79.28% |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | - | - | - | - | - | 68.60% |
| | 1 | Justification | 315.243 | p<.0001 | 0.516 | 84.30% |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 2 | Desirability | 25.924 | p<.0001 | 0.549 | 84.59% |
| | - | - | - | - | - | 96.81% |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | 1 | Desirability | 33.795 | p<.0001 | 0.194 | 96.81% |
| | 2 | Q70 | 5.062 | p<.0243 | 0.223 | 96.95% |
| | - | - | - | - | - | 93.31% |
| | 1 | Justification | 44.055 | p<.0001 | 0.160 | 93.60% |
| | 2 | Q67 | 10.318 | p<.0013 | 0.196 | 93.60% |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 3 | Harmfulness | 5.816 | p<.0159 | 0.216 | 93.75% |
| | 4 | Q66 | 5.141 | p<.0234 | 0.234 | 94.04% |
| | 5 | Never recruit | 4.865 | p<.0274 | 0.250 | 93.60% |
| | - | - | - | - | - | 97.11% |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 1 | Justification | 57.216 | p<.0001 | 0.345 | 97.68% |
| | 2 | Q70 | 5.644 | p<.0175 | 0.377 | 97.68% |
| CATERING BUSINESS | - | - | - | - | - | 79.07% |
| | 1 | Harmfulness | 98.228 | p<.0001 | 0.207 | 80.09% |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 2 | Desirability | 12.578 | p<.0004 | 0.232 | 81.83% |
| | - | - | - | - | - | 95.22% |
| | 1 | Justification | 34.309 | p<.0001 | 0.152 | 95.51% |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 2 | Q68 | 7.467 | p<.0063 | 0.184 | 95.36% |
| | 3 | Harmfulness | 4.453 | p<.0348 | 0.203 | 95.36% |

Logistic regressions predicting action respondent would take in each scenario

As stated earlier, logistic regression is a statistical technique for identifying which factors (if any) can be used to differentiate people who may be classified into one of two groups. In analysing choice of action the variable is not dichotomous: four possible options were provided.

However, it was decided that logistic regression was preferable to other available statistical techniques (e.g., 'discriminant analysis' or other forms of 'loglinear regression') because of the following factors:

- the number and the nature of the possible predictors, and
- we were using the technique to explore which variables were relevant to decisions to act in a variety of ways.

Logistic regression analysis was used as this model 'requires far fewer assumptions than discriminant analysis; and even when the assumptions required for discriminant analysis are satisfied, logistic regression still performs well' according to Norusis (1992, p. 1). Similarly, when Press and Wilson (1978) compared the two methods using their empirical studies of non-normal classification problems they found that logistic regression outperformed classical linear discriminant analysis in both cases.

Where there are more than two possible outcomes, two strategies can be employed. One is to use a multivariate logistic regression. The other is to use a set of planned contrasts. The second strategy was chosen because of the difficulty in interpreting multivariate logistic regression. Hence, for each scenario, four logistic regressions were carried out to examine factors which may differentiate respondents who said that they would:

- i. do nothing (versus do anything at all)
- ii. talk to the employee (versus do anything else including nothing)
- iii. talk to the supervisor (versus do anything else including nothing)
- iv. report outside (versus do anything else including nothing).

The range of survey information which was included in each of these logistic regressions, to see whether it assisted in predicting who would choose one type of action over another, included twenty-three different variables:

- seven respondent background variables^{cxiii}
- four perceptions of the behaviour^{cxiv}
- twelve measures of attitudes to what is corrupt, to what is acceptable and to reporting corruption^{cxv}.

Table A5.3: Summary of variables found to be related to doing "nothing"^{iclxvi}

| Scenario | Step I | Variable entered II | χ^2 (improvement) III | Probability IV | Nagel- kerke R ² V | Correct classifi- cation % |
|---------------------|-----------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| STEREO | - | - | - | - | - | 90.71% |
| | 1 | Q73 | 52.470 | p<.0001 | 0.159 | 90.71% |
| | 2 | Harmfulness | 26.285 | p<.0001 | 0.234 | 90.71% |
| | 3 | Q76 | 16.552 | p<.0001 | 0.280 | 91.00% |
| | 4 | Q77 | 10.008 | p<.0016 | 0.307 | 92.02% |
| | 5 | Q72 | 7.754 | p<.0054 | 0.328 | 92.31% |
| | 6 | Never recruit | 6.429 | p<.0112 | 0.345 | 92.16% |
| | 7 | Q75 | 5.537 | p<.0186 | 0.360 | 91.87% |
| | 8 | Q66 | 4.611 | p<.0318 | 0.372 | 91.87% |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | - | - | - | - | - | 75.51% |
| | 1 | Desirability | 113.393 | p<.0001 | 0.227 | 77.41% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 45.069 | p<.0001 | 0.307 | 79.45% |
| | 3 | Q75 | 26.210 | p<.0001 | 0.351 | 80.32% |
| | 4 | Justification | 16.339 | p<.0001 | 0.378 | 81.49% |
| | 5 | Never recruit | 14.180 | p<.0002 | 0.401 | 81.05% |
| | 6 | Corrupt | 7.894 | p<.0050 | 0.413 | 81.78% |
| | 7 | Q67 | 6.102 | p<.0135 | 0.423 | 81.63% |
| | 8 | Harmfulness | 5.118 | p<.0237 | 0.431 | 81.63% |
| | 9 | Salary | 8.390 | p<.0386 | 0.444 | 81.78% |
| | 10 | Q74 | 4.682 | p<.0305 | 0.451 | 82.51% |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | - | - | - | - | - | 73.46% |
| | 1 | Justification | 180.984 | p<.0001 | 0.340 | 81.52% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 25.035 | p<.0001 | 0.380 | 81.82% |
| | 3 | Harmfulness | 20.068 | p<.0001 | 0.412 | 82.84% |
| | 4 | Corrupt | 11.355 | p<.0008 | 0.429 | 83.14% |
| | 5 | Never recruit | 12.661 | p<.0004 | 0.448 | 83.43% |
| | 6 | Desirability | 5.561 | p<.0184 | 0.456 | 83.87% |
| | 7 | Q75 | 3.757 | p<.0526 | 0.461 | 84.02% |
| | 8 | Q69 | 4.703 | p<.0301 | 0.468 | 83.72% |
| | 9 | Q77 | 4.150 | p<.0416 | 0.474 | 84.16% |
| LEATHER DIARY | - | - | - | - | - | 65.49% |
| | 1 | Harmfulness | 281.552 | p<.0001 | 0.467 | 80.18% |
| | 2 | Corrupt | 32.123 | p<.0001 | 0.510 | 82.38% |
| | 3 | Justification | 11.142 | p<.0008 | 0.524 | 82.53% |
| | 4 | Q72 | 9.624 | p<.0019 | 0.536 | 83.11% |
| | 5 | Supervisory status | 6.502 | p<.0108 | 0.544 | 82.97% |
| 2 ND JOB | - | - | - | - | - | 82.11% |
| | 1 | Justification | 158.289 | p<.0001 | 0.340 | 86.36% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 38.496 | p<.0001 | 0.411 | 88.27% |
| | 3 | Corrupt | 32.499 | p<.0001 | 0.469 | 89.30% |
| | 4 | Never recruit | 13.401 | p<.0003 | 0.492 | 89.74% |
| | 5 | Q67 | 7.606 | p<.0058 | 0.504 | 89.00% |
| | 6 | Salary | 11.332 | p<.0101 | 0.523 | 89.88% |
| | 7 | Q66 | 3.937 | p<.0472 | 0.529 | 89.30% |

Table A5.3 continued

| Scenario | Step | Variable entered | $\chi^2_{(improvement)}$ | Probability | Nagelkerke R^2_v | Correct classification % |
|--------------------------|------|------------------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| COMPUTER TENDER | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | 1 | Desirability | 146.055 | p<.0001 | 0.299 | 78.77% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 39.250 | p<.0001 | 0.369 | 83.60% |
| | 3 | Q75 | 14.220 | p<.0002 | 0.393 | 84.33% |
| | 4 | Justification | 10.808 | p<.0010 | 0.411 | 83.46% |
| | 5 | Q77 | 8.865 | p<.0029 | 0.426 | 85.36% |
| | 6 | Never tender | 8.376 | p<.0038 | 0.440 | 86.38% |
| | 7 | Corrupt | 8.697 | p<.0032 | 0.454 | 85.94% |
| | 8 | Never recruit | 4.813 | p<.0282 | 0.462 | 86.53% |
| | 9 | Q74 | 4.500 | p<.0339 | 0.469 | 86.09% |
| | 10 | Q73 | 3.888 | p<.0486 | 0.475 | 86.68% |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | 1 | Justification | 168.594 | p<.0001 | 0.314 | 70.75% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 28.478 | p<.0001 | 0.360 | 77.70% |
| | 3 | Corrupt | 16.145 | p<.0001 | 0.385 | 78.73% |
| | 4 | Salary | 20.228 | p<.0002 | 0.416 | 80.50% |
| | 5 | Q67 | 7.637 | p<.0057 | 0.427 | 80.50% |
| | 6 | Q74 | 5.863 | p<.0155 | 0.436 | 80.65% |
| | 7 | Time in PS | 8.247 | p<.0412 | 0.448 | 81.98% |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | 8 | Never travel | 4.204 | p<.0403 | 0.454 | 81.24% |
| | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | 1 | Q73 | 36.779 | p<.0001 | 0.150 | 94.43% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 13.068 | p<.0003 | 0.202 | 94.43% |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | 3 | Q68 | 6.758 | p<.0093 | 0.228 | 94.43% |
| | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | 1 | Justification | 45.941 | p<.0001 | 0.171 | 93.55% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 38.523 | p<.0001 | 0.306 | 93.84% |
| | 3 | Corrupt | 11.539 | p<.0007 | 0.345 | 94.28% |
| | 4 | Q77 | 6.918 | p<.0085 | 0.368 | 94.13% |
| | 5 | Q67 | 4.359 | p<.0368 | 0.383 | 94.28% |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | 6 | Q71 | 6.438 | p<.0112 | 0.404 | 94.28% |
| | 7 | Never recruit | 4.001 | p<.0455 | 0.417 | 94.57% |
| | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | 1 | Q72 | 62.312 | p<.0001 | 0.178 | 89.49% |
| | 2 | Q77 | 21.802 | p<.0001 | 0.236 | 89.49% |
| | 3 | Q68 | 11.264 | p<.0008 | 0.266 | 91.09% |
| | 4 | Harmfulness | 7.785 | p<.0053 | 0.286 | 91.09% |
| CATERING BUSINESS | 5 | Never recruit | 7.638 | p<.0057 | 0.305 | 90.66% |
| | 6 | Q67 | 6.486 | p<.0109 | 0.321 | 90.66% |
| | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | 1 | Desirability | 60.268 | p<.0001 | 0.153 | 86.22% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 42.500 | p<.0001 | 0.254 | 86.95% |
| | 3 | Salary | 22.242 | p<.0001 | 0.304 | 86.07% |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | 4 | Q67 | 11.272 | p<.0008 | 0.328 | 87.10% |
| | 5 | Harmfulness | 5.630 | p<.0177 | 0.341 | 87.83% |
| | 6 | Q75 | 4.253 | p<.0392 | 0.350 | 87.98% |
| | 7 | Regularly tender | 5.175 | p<.0229 | 0.361 | 87.54% |
| | 8 | Q74 | 4.455 | p<.0348 | 0.370 | 87.54% |
| | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| | 1 | Q72 | 49.384 | p<.0001 | 0.144 | 89.78% |
| | 2 | Desirability | 17.823 | p<.0001 | 0.193 | 89.78% |
| | 3 | Q68 | 12.960 | p<.0003 | 0.229 | 90.51% |
| | 4 | Q67 | 7.851 | p<.0051 | 0.250 | 90.07% |
| | 5 | Q74 | 7.131 | p<.0076 | 0.269 | 90.36% |

Table A5.4: Summary of variables found to be related to “talk to the employee”^{clxvii}

| Scenario | Step i | Variable entered ii | χ^2 (improvement) iii | Probability iv | Nagel- kerke R ² v | Correct classifi- cation % |
|--------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| STEREO | - | - | - | - | - | 82.29% |
| | 1 | Q75 | 6.753 | p<.0094 | 0.016 | 82.29% |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | - | - | - | - | - | 51.17% |
| | 1 | Never recruit | 18.684 | p<.0001 | 0.036 | 58.31% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 14.569 | p<.0001 | 0.063 | 60.20% |
| | 3 | Q75 | 7.339 | p<.0067 | 0.077 | 60.20% |
| | 4 | Desirability | 5.265 | p<.0218 | 0.086 | 59.62% |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | - | - | - | - | - | 88.42% |
| | 1 | Q69 | 13.291 | p<.0003 | 0.038 | 88.42% |
| | 2 | Corrupt | 14.536 | p<.0001 | 0.078 | 88.42% |
| | 3 | Q74 | 8.907 | p<.0028 | 0.102 | 88.56% |
| | 4 | Never tender | 7.480 | p<.0062 | 0.123 | 88.56% |
| | 5 | Q66 | 7.808 | p<.0052 | 0.143 | 88.42% |
| | 6 | Lowest salary | 5.430 | p<.0198 | 0.158 | 88.42% |
| | 7 | Q70 | 4.050 | p<.0442 | 0.168 | 88.27% |
| | 8 | Q67 | 3.940 | p<.0472 | 0.179 | 88.27% |
| LEATHER DIARY | - | - | - | - | - | 79.30% |
| | 1 | Harmfulness | 50.866 | p<.0001 | 0.113 | 79.30% |
| | 2 | Lowest salary | 8.173 | p<.0043 | 0.130 | 79.44% |
| | 3 | Q76 | 6.458 | p<.0110 | 0.143 | 79.74% |
| | 4 | Justification | 4.841 | p<.0278 | 0.153 | 79.59% |
| 2 ND JOB | - | - | - | - | - | 87.54% |
| | 1 | Corrupt | 4.511 | p<.0337 | 0.012 | 87.54% |
| | 2 | Regularly tender | 3.998 | p<.0455 | 0.023 | 87.54% |
| COMPUTER TENDER | - | - | - | - | - | 89.02% |
| | 1 | Corrupt | 16.955 | p<.0001 | 0.049 | 89.02% |
| | 2 | Never tender | 7.523 | p<.0061 | 0.070 | 89.02% |
| | 3 | Q71 | 6.672 | p<.0098 | 0.089 | 89.02% |
| | 4 | Q72 | 6.723 | p<.0095 | 0.108 | 89.02% |
| | 5 | Q70 | 5.051 | p<.0246 | 0.122 | 89.31% |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | - | - | - | - | - | 85.82% |
| | 1 | Harmfulness | 6.767 | p<.0093 | 0.018 | 85.82% |
| | 2 | Q74 | 5.679 | p<.0172 | 0.033 | 85.82% |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | - | - | - | - | - | 94.87% |
| | 1 | Harmfulness | 17.436 | p<.0001 | 0.076 | 94.87% |
| | 2 | Q69 | 10.906 | p<.0010 | 0.122 | 95.01% |
| | 3 | Q75 | 7.212 | p<.0072 | 0.153 | 95.01% |
| | 4 | Gender | 5.786 | p<.0162 | 0.177 | 94.87% |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | - | - | - | - | - | 88.42% |
| | 1 | Harmfulness | 7.999 | p<.0047 | 0.023 | 88.42% |
| | 2 | Q69 | 4.121 | p<.0424 | 0.034 | 88.27% |
| | 3 | Q77 | 10.832 | p<.0010 | 0.065 | 87.98% |
| | 4 | Lowest salary | 4.333 | p<.0374 | 0.077 | 88.12% |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | - | - | - | - | - | 77.96% |
| | 1 | Justification | 26.852 | p<.0001 | 0.059 | 76.93% |
| | 2 | Q75 | 10.778 | p<.0010 | 0.082 | 77.37% |
| | 3 | Q77 | 13.785 | p<.0002 | 0.111 | 78.25% |
| | 4 | Q73 | 6.621 | p<.0101 | 0.125 | 78.39% |
| | 5 | Q68 | 4.052 | p<.0441 | 0.133 | 78.69% |
| | 6 | Time in PS | 8.039 | p<.0452 | 0.149 | 77.81% |
| CATERING BUSINESS | - | - | - | - | - | 75.51% |
| | 1 | Corrupt | 32.661 | p<.0001 | 0.070 | 75.51% |
| | 2 | Harmfulness | 11.898 | p<.0006 | 0.094 | 75.07% |
| | 3 | Never tender | 8.295 | p<.0040 | 0.111 | 75.51% |
| | 4 | Q75 | 6.564 | p<.0104 | 0.124 | 75.95% |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | - | - | - | - | - | 86.13% |
| | 1 | Harmfulness | 18.078 | p<.0001 | 0.047 | 85.84% |

Table A5.5: Summary of variables found to be related to reporting internally^{clxviii}

| Scenario | Step | Variable entered | χ^2 (improvement) | Probability | Nagelkerke R^2 | Correct classification % |
|---------------------|------|--------------------|---------------------------|-------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| STEREO | - | - | - | - | - | 64.44% |
| | 1 | Q73 | 29.401 | p<.0001 | 0.057 | 67.73% |
| | 2 | Justification | 25.611 | p<.0001 | 0.105 | 69.52% |
| | 3 | Salary | 8.250 | p<.0041 | 0.121 | 69.38% |
| | 4 | Q75 | 7.188 | p<.0073 | 0.134 | 69.67% |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | - | - | - | - | - | 73.87% |
| | 1 | Desirability | 162.586 | p<.0001 | 0.300 | 74.44% |
| | 2 | Harmfulness | 16.906 | p<.0001 | 0.328 | 76.84% |
| | 3 | Q67 | 15.179 | p<.0001 | 0.352 | 77.97% |
| | 4 | Corrupt | 6.775 | p<.0092 | 0.363 | 78.67% |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | - | - | - | - | - | 57.10% |
| | 1 | Justification | 186.402 | p<.0001 | 0.312 | 73.58% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 25.991 | p<.0001 | 0.350 | 73.44% |
| | 3 | Corrupt | 19.660 | p<.0001 | 0.377 | 74.57% |
| | 4 | Q75 | 12.334 | p<.0004 | 0.394 | 75.28% |
| | 5 | Salary | 14.139 | p<.0027 | 0.413 | 75.28% |
| LEATHER DIARY | - | - | - | - | - | 86.49% |
| | 1 | Corrupt | 164.169 | p<.0001 | 0.381 | 86.49% |
| | 2 | Harmfulness | 61.476 | p<.0001 | 0.502 | 89.47% |
| | 3 | Justification | 5.082 | p<.0242 | 0.511 | 89.62% |
| | 4 | Q72 | 5.914 | p<.0150 | 0.522 | 90.61% |
| 2 ND JOB | - | - | - | - | - | 62.22% |
| | 1 | Justification | 132.248 | p<.0001 | 0.233 | 70.17% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 14.606 | p<.0001 | 0.256 | 73.30% |
| | 3 | Corrupt | 15.190 | p<.0001 | 0.280 | 72.30% |
| | 4 | Salary | 11.705 | p<.0085 | 0.298 | 72.16% |
| | 5 | Regularly recruit | 6.043 | p<.0140 | 0.307 | 73.01% |
| COMPUTER TENDER | - | - | - | - | - | 59.15% |
| | 1 | Justification | 127.620 | p<.0001 | 0.223 | 71.91% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 25.776 | p<.0001 | 0.264 | 72.91% |
| | 3 | Q77 | 11.791 | p<.0006 | 0.282 | 73.90% |
| | 4 | Q66 | 9.562 | p<.0020 | 0.296 | 74.47% |
| | 5 | Q70 | 7.080 | p<.0078 | 0.307 | 73.76% |
| | 6 | Harmfulness | 3.971 | p<.0463 | 0.312 | 73.33% |
| | 7 | Salary | 9.359 | p<.0249 | 0.326 | 73.19% |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | - | - | - | - | - | 51.79% |
| | 1 | Justification | 166.428 | p<.0001 | 0.283 | 69.81% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 24.006 | p<.0001 | 0.318 | 72.96% |
| | 3 | Corrupt | 10.978 | p<.0009 | 0.334 | 72.96% |
| | 4 | Supervisory status | 10.359 | p<.0013 | 0.349 | 72.39% |
| | 5 | Time in PS | 10.487 | p<.0149 | 0.363 | 72.25% |
| | 6 | Harmfulness | 4.607 | p<.0318 | 0.370 | 73.82% |

Table A5.5 continued

| Scenario | Step I | Variable entered II | χ^2 (improvement) III | Probability IV | Nagel- kerke R^2 V | Correct classifi- cation % |
|-----------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| WHISTLEBLOWER | - | - | - | - | - | 50.43% |
| | 1 | Q72 | 14.366 | p<.0002 | 0.027 | 55.54% |
| | 2 | Q69 | 4.503 | p<.0338 | 0.035 | 56.39% |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | - | - | - | - | - | 62.78% |
| | 1 | Justification | 28.997 | p<.0001 | 0.055 | 64.91% |
| | 2 | Q73 | 8.907 | p<.0028 | 0.072 | 65.06% |
| | 3 | Q75 | 4.372 | p<.0365 | 0.080 | 65.91% |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | - | - | - | - | - | 59.55% |
| | 1 | Justification | 67.949 | p<.0001 | 0.124 | 66.20% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 16.567 | p<.0001 | 0.152 | 66.20% |
| | 3 | Q75 | 11.936 | p<.0006 | 0.172 | 68.74% |
| | 4 | Q68 | 8.331 | p<.0039 | 0.186 | 68.32% |
| CATERING BUSINESS | - | - | - | - | - | 58.38% |
| | 1 | Harmfulness | 97.644 | p<.0001 | 0.174 | 67.76% |
| | 2 | Corrupt | 15.042 | p<.0001 | 0.199 | 68.18% |
| | 3 | Q72 | 12.578 | p<.0004 | 0.219 | 70.17% |
| | 4 | Never recruit | 8.374 | p<.0038 | 0.233 | 69.74% |
| | 5 | Q74 | 5.962 | p<.0146 | 0.242 | 70.45% |
| | 6 | Never tender | 5.567 | p<.0183 | 0.251 | 70.74% |
| | 7 | Salary | 11.105 | p<.0112 | 0.268 | 70.74% |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | - | - | - | - | - | 67.89% |
| | 1 | Justification | 49.592 | p<.0001 | 0.095 | 70.86% |
| | 2 | Q72 | 26.793 | p<.0001 | 0.143 | 71.00% |
| | 3 | Q68 | 11.377 | p<.0007 | 0.163 | 72.56% |
| | 4 | Q76 | 8.970 | p<.0027 | 0.179 | 73.41% |
| | 5 | Desirability | 7.213 | p<.0072 | 0.191 | 73.41% |
| | 6 | Regularly travel | 6.303 | p<.0121 | 0.202 | 74.26% |

Table A5.6: Summary of variables found to be related to reporting externally^{clix}

| Scenario | Step I | Variable entered II | χ^2 (improvement) III | Probability IV | Nagel- kerke R^2 V | Correct classifi- cation % |
|--------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| STEREO | - | - | - | - | - | 91.44% |
| | 1 | Never travel | 9.364 | p<.0022 | 0.030 | 91.44% |
| | 2 | Q67 | 7.953 | p<.0048 | 0.056 | 91.44% |
| | 3 | Q75 | 4.906 | p<.0268 | 0.072 | 91.44% |
| | 4 | Q72 | 5.201 | p<.0226 | 0.088 | 91.44% |
| | 5 | Q74 | 5.676 | p<.0172 | 0.106 | 91.44% |
| | 6 | Q76 | 4.725 | p<.0297 | 0.121 | 91.44% |
| TAKE NOTE PADS | - | No predictors | | | | |
| JOB FOR COLLEAGUE | - | - | - | - | - | 95.16% |
| | 1 | Corrupt | 20.378 | p<.0001 | 0.092 | 95.16% |
| | 2 | Justification | 6.557 | p<.0104 | 0.121 | 95.16% |
| LEATHER DIARY | - | - | - | - | - | 95.16% |
| | 3 | Q72 | 4.369 | p<.0366 | 0.140 | 95.16% |
| LEATHER DIARY | - | - | - | - | - | 99.71% |
| | 1 | Corrupt | 5.664 | p<.0173 | 0.211 | 99.71% |
| | 2 | Salary | 4.776 | p<.0289 | 0.387 | 99.71% |
| 2 ND JOB | - | - | - | - | - | 92.23% |
| | 1 | Corrupt | 25.270 | p<.0001 | 0.086 | 92.23% |
| | 2 | Gender | 8.737 | p<.0031 | 0.116 | 92.23% |
| COMPUTER TENDER | - | - | - | - | - | 92.23% |
| | 3 | Regularly recruit | 5.353 | p<.0207 | 0.133 | 92.23% |
| COMPUTER TENDER | - | - | - | - | - | 90.92% |
| | 1 | Corrupt | 43.977 | p<.0001 | 0.137 | 90.92% |
| | 2 | Q66 | 7.255 | p<.0071 | 0.159 | 90.92% |
| | 3 | Harmfulness | 4.868 | p<.0274 | 0.173 | 90.92% |
| JOB FOR FRIEND | - | - | - | - | - | 95.13% |
| | 1 | Harmfulness | 22.430 | p<.0001 | 0.101 | 95.13% |
| WHISTLEBLOWER | - | - | - | - | - | 59.68% |
| | 1 | Desirability | 10.277 | p<.0013 | 0.020 | 59.68% |
| | 2 | Regularly travel | 4.160 | p<.0414 | 0.028 | 60.41% |
| CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION | - | - | - | - | - | 80.79% |
| | 1 | Corrupt | 13.061 | p<.0003 | 0.030 | 80.79% |
| | 2 | Gender | 8.435 | p<.0037 | 0.050 | 80.79% |
| | 3 | Harmfulness | 8.224 | p<.0041 | 0.068 | 80.79% |
| | 4 | Justification | 5.694 | p<.0170 | 0.081 | 80.94% |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | - | - | - | - | - | 80.94% |
| | 5 | Q70 | 4.956 | p<.0260 | 0.092 | 80.94% |
| HOSPITAL BILLS | - | - | - | - | - | 91.24% |
| | 1 | Regularly recruit | 6.637 | p<.0100 | 0.022 | 91.24% |
| | 2 | Harmfulness | 10.253 | p<.0014 | 0.054 | 91.24% |
| | 3 | Q74 | 4.215 | p<.0401 | 0.068 | 91.24% |
| CATERING BUSINESS | - | - | - | - | - | 96.92% |
| | 1 | Harmfulness | 17.727 | p<.0001 | 0.107 | 96.92% |
| | 2 | Salary | 5.531 | p<.0187 | 0.139 | 96.92% |
| | 3 | Regularly recruit | 3.907 | p<.0481 | 0.162 | 96.92% |
| BUSINESS TRIPS | - | - | - | - | - | 91.68% |
| | 1 | Gender | 5.205 | p<.0225 | 0.017 | 91.68% |
| | 2 | Salary | 5.906 | p<.0151 | 0.037 | 91.68% |
| | 3 | Never travel | 4.716 | p<.0299 | 0.052 | 91.68% |

ENDNOTES

- i For further information on the different approaches to defining corruption and the impact of social definitions refer to Gorta and Forell (1994), pp. 4-23; Independent Commission Against Corruption (1997b) pp. 2-32.
- ii A statistical significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$ was applied. This means that the result of a statistical test is considered to be significant if the observed results are so unlikely that they would occur less than 5 times in every hundred if the null hypothesis (of no difference between groups) were true. Statistical significance reflects the likelihood of observed results. It does not simply reflect the magnitude of the difference nor does it necessarily reflect practical consequences.
- iii In this and subsequent tables, scenarios are listed in the order in which they appear in the questionnaire.
- iv WHISTLEBLOWER, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, BUSINESS TRIPS, CATERING BUSINESS, TAKE NOTE PADS, JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and COMPUTER TENDER.
- v STEREO, HOSPITAL BILLS, JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and CATERING BUSINESS.
- vi STEREO, CATERING BUSINESS and HOSPITAL BILLS.
- vii JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and COMPUTER TENDER.
- viii COMPUTER TENDER, LEATHER DIARY and JOB FOR COLLEAGUE.
- ix STEREO (97.7% in 1999 compared to 93.7% in 1993), LEATHER DIARY (28.4% in 1999 compared to 20.6% in 1993), COMPUTER TENDER (73.5% in 1999 compared to 60.0% in 1993), HOSPITAL BILLS (96.2% in 1999 compared to 90.0% in 1993), CATERING BUSINESS (80.2% in 1999 compared to 72.5% in 1993), and BUSINESS TRIPS (95.7% in 1999 compared to 90.9% in 1993).
- x LEATHER DIARY (27.1% in 1999 compared to 19.5% in 1993), 2ND JOB (81.7% in 1999 compared to 72.6% in 1993), and WHISTLEBLOWER (97.8% in 1999 compared to 94.9% in 1993).
- xi COMPUTER TENDER (61.9% in 1999 compared to 49.8% in 1993), and JOB FOR FRIEND (71.4% in 1999 compared to 61.2% in 1993).
- xii BUSINESS TRIPS (98.4% in 1999 compared to 87.7% in 1993).
- xiii In 1993, those who had been employed in the public sector for less than one year were less likely to consider the behaviours in the JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and CATERING BUSINESS to be corrupt than were those who had worked in the public sector for longer periods.
- xiv In 1999, length of time in the public sector was found to make a difference in responses to both the STEREO and HOSPITAL BILLS scenarios. For the STEREO scenario once again it was those who had been employed for less than one year who were less likely to consider the behaviour to be corrupt than were others. For the HOSPITAL BILLS scenario the relationship was less clear-cut: those who had been employed in the public sector for one to five years or for more than ten years were more likely to consider the behaviour to be corrupt than were those who had been employed in the public sector for less than one year or from five to ten years. (See Table 5.)
- xv COMPUTER TENDER (65.9% in 1999 compared to 41.5% in 1993), and BUSINESS TRIPS (100.0% in 1999 compared to 90.0% in 1993).
- xvi STEREO (100.0% in 1999 compared to 94.4% in 1993), 2ND JOB (85.8% in 1999 compared to 73.7% in 1993), JOB FOR FRIEND (74.3% in 1999 compared to 63.1% in 1993), HOSPITAL BILLS (100.0% in 1999 compared to 93.5% in 1993), and CATERING BUSINESS (85.0% in 1999 compared to 74.6% in 1993).
- xvii JOB FOR COLLEAGUE (68.0% in 1999 compared to 61.3% in 1993), 2ND JOB (80.4% in 1999 compared to 74.6% in 1993), and WHISTLEBLOWER (97.5% in 1999 compared to 94.8% in 1993).
- xviii Once again, for this analysis ratings '1', '2' or '3' were grouped together and labelled 'undesirable', 'harmful,' or 'unjustified' (depending upon the scale). Similarly ratings '4', '5' or '6' were grouped together and labelled 'desirable', 'not harmful,' or 'justified' (depending upon the scale).
- xix $t = 3.667$, d.f. = 773, $p < .001$
- xx $t = 2.917$, d.f. = 773, $p < .004$
- xxi $t = 2.360$, d.f. = 773, $p < .010$
- xxii $t = 6.983$, d.f. = 776, $p < .001$
- xxiii $t = 1.972$, d.f. = 775, $p < .049$
- xxiv $t = 7.746$, d.f. = 775, $p < .001$
- xxv $t = 2.916$, d.f. = 774, $p < .004$
- xxvi 1.17 versus 1.30 in 1999, where the smaller numbers represent less perceived desirability.
- xxvii 1.11 versus 1.35 in 1999, where the smaller numbers represent less perceived justification.
- xxviii 1.25 versus 1.37 in 1999, where the smaller numbers represent greater perceived harm.

- xxix The exceptions were the LEATHER DIARY scenario (in which most respondents said they would do nothing) and the TAKE NOTE PADS scenario (in which most indicated that they would talk to the employee).
- xxx The exceptions to this were the WHISTLEBLOWER and the CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION scenarios where respondents were far more ready to say they would report externally.
- xxxi On average, 6.2 scenarios in 1999 compared with 5.6 in 1993; $t=4.048$, $df=2093$, $p<.001$
- xxxi 2.4 in 1999 compared with 2.6 in 1993.
- xxxi 2.2 in 1999 compared with 2.3 in 1993.
- xxiv 1.1 in both 1999 and 1993.
- xxv The twelve different subgroups examined were: supervisors, non-supervisors, male respondents, female respondents, those who have been employed in the NSW public sector for less than 1 year, those who have been employed in the NSW public sector for between 1 year and less than 5 years, those who have been employed in the NSW public sector for 5 to 10 years, those who have been employed in the NSW public sector for more than 10 years, salary group 1, salary group 2, salary group 3, and salary group 4.
- xxvi CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, HOSPITAL BILLS and BUSINESS TRIPS.
- xxvii STEREO, WHISTLEBLOWER and CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.
- xxviii LEATHER DIARY.
- xxix STEREO, TAKE NOTE PADS, 2ND JOB, JOB FOR FRIEND, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, HOSPITAL BILLS and BUSINESS TRIPS.
- xi LEATHER DIARY.
- xi JOB FOR COLLEAGUE, LEATHER DIARY, COMPUTER TENDER, JOB FOR FRIEND and CATERING BUSINESS.
- xiii HOSPITAL BILLS.
- xiii WHISTLEBLOWER and CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.
- xiv WHISTLEBLOWER.
- xv LEATHER DIARY.
- xvi 2ND JOB, WHISTLEBLOWER, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, HOSPITAL BILLS and BUSINESS TRIPS.
- xvii $F_{1,2038}=38.214$, $p<.001$
- xviii $F_{1,2038}=13.828$, $p<.001$
- xix $F_{1,2038}=5.150$, $p<.023$
- i STEREO, JOB FOR COLLEAGUE, LEATHER DIARY, COMPUTER TENDER and CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.
- ii LEATHER DIARY, COMPUTER TENDER and JOB FOR FRIEND.
- iii STEREO and CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.
- iii CATERING BUSINESS and BUSINESS TRIPS.
- iv All except STEREO, WHISTLEBLOWER and CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.
- iv TAKE NOTE PADS and LEATHER DIARY.
- vi COMPUTER TENDER, JOB FOR FRIEND, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, HOSPITAL BILLS, CATERING BUSINESS and BUSINESS TRIPS.
- vii 2ND JOB.
- viii $F_{1,2063}=28.337$, $p<.001$
- ix $F_{1,2063}=64.922$, $p<.001$
- ix $F_{1,2063}=6.538$, $p<.011$
- xi $F_{1,2063}=16.165$, $p<.001$
- xii STEREO, JOB FOR COLLEAGUE, COMPUTER TENDER, HOSPITAL BILLS and BUSINESS TRIPS.
- xiii STEREO, TAKE NOTE PADS, LEATHER DIARY, COMPUTER TENDER, HOSPITAL BILLS and BUSINESS TRIPS.
- xiv LEATHER DIARY, COMPUTER TENDER and CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.
- xv 2ND JOB and COMPUTER TENDER.
- xvi LEATHER DIARY and COMPUTER TENDER.
- xvii 2ND JOB, COMPUTER TENDER and BUSINESS TRIPS.
- xviii CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.
- ix Those in the two highest of the salary categories were more likely than those in other salary categories to report 2ND JOB and COMPUTER TENDER scenarios internally, while those in the highest three salary categories were more likely to report HOSPITAL BILLS and CATERING BUSINESS scenarios internally. Those in the third of the four salary categories were more likely than others to report the STEREO scenario internally.
- ix In the WHISTLEBLOWER scenario, it was those in the lowest salary category who were more likely to say that they would do nothing. Significantly more of those in the two lowest of the four salary

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| | categories said that they would do nothing in response to the majority (nine of the twelve) of the scenarios (all except LEATHER DIARY, WHISTLEBLOWER and CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION). |
| lxxi | TAKE NOTE PADS and LEATHER DIARY. |
| lxxii | STEREO, JOB FOR COLLEAGUE, 2ND JOB, COMPUTER TENDER, JOB FOR FRIEND, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, HOSPITAL BILLS, CATERING BUSINESS and BUSINESS TRIPS. |
| lxxiii | $F_{3,2062}=24.330, p<.001$ |
| lxxiv | $F_{3,2062}=15.796, p<.001$ |
| lxxv | $F_{1,2062}=11.724, p<.001$ |
| lxxvi | JOB FOR COLLEAGUE, COMPUTER TENDER and CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. |
| lxxvii | JOB FOR COLLEAGUE, LEATHER DIARY and 2ND JOB. |
| lxxviii | COMPUTER TENDER. |
| lxxix | CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. |
| lxxx | JOB FOR FRIEND. |
| lxxxi | 2 ND JOB. |
| lxxxii | JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and LEATHER DIARY. |
| lxxxiii | LEATHER DIARY. |
| lxxxiv | BUSINESS TRIPS. |
| lxxxv | LEATHER DIARY and COMPUTER TENDER. |
| lxxxvi | 2 ND JOB, COMPUTER TENDER and BUSINESS TRIPS. |
| lxxxvii | CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. |
| lxxxviii | TAKE NOTE PADS and COMPUTER TENDER. |
| lxxxix | LEATHER DIARY. |
| xc | JOB FOR COLLEAGUE, LEATHER DIARY, JOB FOR FRIEND and CATERING BUSINESS. |
| xcI | JOB FOR COLLEAGUE, LEATHER DIARY, 2ND JOB, JOB FOR FRIEND, HOSPITAL BILLS and CATERING BUSINESS. |
| xcii | $F_{3,2064}=3.464, p<.015$ |
| xciii | $F_{3,2064}=6.475, p<.001$ |
| xciv | $F_{1,2064}=39.757, p<.046$ |
| xcv | JOB FOR COLLEAGUE and LEATHER DIARY. |
| xcvi | COMPUTER TENDER. |
| xcvii | LEATHER DIARY. |
| xcviii | JOB FOR COLLEAGUE, 2 ND JOB, COMPUTER TENDER and BUSINESS TRIPS. |
| xcix | CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. |
| c | COMPUTER TENDER and JOB FOR FRIEND. |
| ci | CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. |
| cii | STEREO, COMPUTER TENDER and JOB FOR FRIEND. |
| ciii | JOB FOR COLLEAGUE: $\chi^2=5.526, d.f.=1, p<.019$; JOB FOR FRIEND: $\chi^2=10.3239, d.f.=1, p<.001$ |
| civ | JOB FOR COLLEAGUE: $\chi^2=6.948, d.f.=1, p<.008$; JOB FOR FRIEND: $\chi^2=5.423, d.f.=1, p<.020$ |
| cv | STEREO: $\chi^2=4.312, d.f.=1, p<.038$; HOSPITAL BILLS: $\chi^2=5.367, d.f.=1, p<.021$ |
| cvi | $\chi^2=9.674, d.f.=1, p<.002$ |
| cvi | $\chi^2=5.494, d.f.=1, p<.019$ |
| cvi | $\chi^2=3.930, d.f.=1, p<.047$ |
| cix | $\chi^2=12.670, d.f.=1, p<.001$ |
| cx | In the discussion which follows the term 'disagree' is used as an abbreviation for the responses 'strongly disagree' or 'disagree' as is 'agree' for the responses 'strongly agree' or 'agree'. |
| cxI | Gender, supervisory role, length of employment in the public sector, salary category, experience in recruitment selection, experience in tender selection, and experience in overnight travel for work. |
| cxii | Desirability rating, harmfulness rating, and justification rating. |
| cxiii | That is agreement/disagreement with the following six statements: Q66 <i>Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt</i> ; Q67 <i>Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape</i> ; Q68 <i>If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt</i> ; Q69 <i>The Government can afford to sustain minor theft without worrying about it</i> ; Q70 <i>You can't call something corrupt if everybody does it</i> ; and Q71 <i>There is nothing wrong with private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business</i> . |
| cxiv | That is, agreement/disagreement with the following six statements: Q72 <i>There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful will be done about it</i> ; Q73 <i>There is no point in</i> |

reporting corruption because nothing useful can be done about it; Q74 People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it; Q75 Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting; Q76 I would not know where to go to report corruption; Q77 People who report corruption are just troublemakers.

- cxv As indicated both by their position on the list of related variables and by not substantially increasing the percentage correctly classified by chance.
- cxvi Variables in this column distinguish those who say that they would do *nothing* from those who said that they would do anything at all (*talk to the employee, report internally or report externally*).
- cxvii Variables in this column distinguish those who say that they would *talk to the employee* from those who said that they would do anything else including *nothing* (*nothing, report internally or report externally*).
- cxviii Variables in this column distinguish those who say that they would *report internally* from those who said that they would do anything else including *nothing* (*nothing, talk to the employee or report externally*).
- cxix Variables in this column distinguish those who say that they would *report externally* from those who said that they would do anything else including *nothing* (*nothing, talk to the employee or report internally*).
- cx Given that the 1999 survey methodology was a replication of that used in 1993, the majority of this material is taken directly from Gorta and Forell (1994) pp. 25-35, adapted wherever necessary.
- cxod $\chi^2 = 96.053$, d.f.=3, $p < .001$
- cxodi $\chi^2 = 59.374$, d.f.=3, $p < .001$
- cxodii $\chi^2 = 28.780$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$
- cxodiv $\chi^2 = 134.214$, d.f.=3, $p < .001$
- cxodv $\chi^2 = 60.095$, d.f.=9, $p < .001$
- cxodvi $\chi^2 = 2.282$, d.f.=6, $p < .001$
- cxodvii $\chi^2 = 16.636$, d.f.=6, $p < .011$
- cxodviii $\chi^2 = 37.129$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$
- cxodix $\chi^2 = 26.194$, d.f.=3, $p < .001$
- cxodx $\chi^2 = 151.879$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$
- cxood $\chi^2 = 205.188$, d.f.=2, $p < .001$
- cxoodi $\chi^2 = 61.893$, d.f.=2, $p < .001$
- cxoodii $\chi^2 = 55.540$, d.f.=2, $p < .001$
- cxoodiv $\chi^2 = 51.784$, d.f.=3, $p < .001$
- cxoodv $\chi^2 = 174.712$, d.f.=2, $p < .001$
- cxoodvi $\chi^2 = 128.576$, d.f.=2, $p < .001$
- cxoodvii $\chi^2 = 67.509$, d.f.=2, $p < .001$
- cxoodviii $\chi^2 = 31.798$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$
- cxoodix $\chi^2 = 43.364$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$
- cxdi $\chi^2 = 17.310$, d.f.=1, $p < .001$
- cxdi Thirty-one respondents did not provide information about their gender. Hence percentages for this characteristic are based on 754 responses.
- cxdi Chi-square test [χ^2] is a statistical procedure used to test hypotheses about whether *proportions* of responses made by *different* groups are equal (come from the same population) or not. This test is appropriate when it can be assumed that individual responses are independent (e.g., when the individual responses are provided by different people).
- d.f. = degrees of freedom
- 'p' is the symbol used to refer to probability. It is used to indicate the probability of obtaining the observed results derived from the sample, if the null hypothesis is true, that is, for example, if two (or more) samples come from populations with the same means or proportions. When this probability is very small (e.g. $p < 0.05$) then it is unlikely that the characteristics (e.g., proportions) of the two populations (e.g., supervisors and non-supervisors) are equal and one would conclude that the groups differ.
- cxdi For this analysis, ratings '1', '2' or '3' were grouped together and labelled 'undesirable', 'harmful', or 'unjustified' (depending upon the scale). Similarly ratings '4', '5' or '6' were grouped together and labelled 'desirable', 'not harmful', or 'justified' (depending upon the scale).
- cxdi $\chi^2 = 19.753$, d.f. =1, $p < .001$ Those who occasionally or regularly participate in recruitment were also more likely to say that they would talk to the employee ($\chi^2 = 4.37$, d.f. =1, $p < .037$) or report internally ($\chi^2 = 6.917$, d.f. =1, $p < .009$) than were those who never participate in recruitment.

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| cxiv | $\chi^2 = 19.753$, d.f. = 1, $p < .001$ Those who occasionally or regularly participate in recruitment were also more likely to say that they would report internally than were those who never participate in recruitment ($\chi^2 = 12.670$, d.f. = 1, $p < .001$). |
| cxv | $\chi^2 = 13.484$, d.f. = 1, $p < .001$ Those who occasionally or regularly participate in tender selection were more likely to say that they would report internally than were those who never participate in tender selection ($\chi^2 = 7.002$, d.f. = 1, $p < .008$). |
| cxvii | $\chi^2 = 8.348$, d.f. = 1, $p < .004$ Those who regularly participate in tender selection were more likely to say that they would report internally than were those who occasionally participate in tender selection who, in turn, were more likely to report internally than those who never participate in tender selection ($\chi^2 = 14.268$, d.f. = 2, $p < .001$). |
| cxviii | Those who never participate in tender selection were more likely to say that they would do nothing ($\chi^2 = 9.519$, d.f. = 1, $p < .002$) or that they would report externally ($\chi^2 = 5.610$, d.f. = 1, $p < .018$) than those who occasionally or regularly participate in tender selection. Those who occasionally or regularly participate in tender selection were more likely to say that they would talk to the employee ($\chi^2 = 5.896$, d.f. = 1, $p < .015$) or report internally ($\chi^2 = 5.414$, d.f. = 1, $p < .020$) than were those who never participate in tender selection. |
| cxix | Gender, supervisory status, length of employment in the public sector, salary category, experience in recruitment selection, experience in tender selection, and experience in overnight travel for work. |
| ci | Desirability rating, harmfulness rating, and justification rating. |
| cli | That is agreement/disagreement with the following six statements: Q66 <i>Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt</i> ; Q67 <i>Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape</i> ; Q68 <i>If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt</i> ; Q69 <i>The Government can afford to sustain minor theft without worrying about it</i> ; Q70 <i>You can't call something corrupt if everybody does it</i> ; Q71 <i>There is nothing wrong with private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business</i> . |
| clii | The statistically significant variables are found in the 'Variables entered' column. Variables that are not listed in the 3rd column of the table were not found to make a statistically significant contribution over and above that made by the variables which are listed. That is, the variables listed in the 'Variable entered' column are those which were found to best differentiate between respondents who consider the behaviour to be corrupt and the respondents who consider the behaviour not to be corrupt. |
| cliii | <p>1 Variables are entered into the model in a stepwise manner: at each step the variable which is the most strongly related of those remaining to be entered into the model (as measured by the smallest probability of no difference) is added to the model, provided that the probability is less than the cut-off level ($p \leq 0.05$).</p> <p>2 Variables that are not listed in this column were not found to make a statistically significant contribution over and above the contribution of the variables that are listed.</p> <p>3 This statistic is the χ^2 value which indicates whether the additional variable has significantly added to the model. A measure of goodness of fit is calculated as -2 times the logarithm of the likelihood (-2LL). The χ^2 (improvement) is the change in -2LL between successive steps of building a model. It tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient for the additional variable added in the last step is zero (i.e., that the additional variable does not significantly contribute to the model). These χ^2 (improvement) values each have 1 degree of freedom.</p> <p>4 This is the probability of the observed χ^2 (improvement) value if the null hypothesis (that the coefficient for the additional variable added in the last step is zero) is true. Small probabilities are associated with the rejection of the null hypothesis and hence a decision that the additional variable does significantly contribute to the model.</p> <p>5 The Nagelkerke R^2 provides a means of comparing different models. The Nagelkerke R^2 is an estimate of how well the model fits the data. It attempts to quantify the proportion of 'variation' in the outcome variable (for example, judgment about whether the behaviour is corrupt or not) which is explained by the model (SPSS 1999, p. 46). For example, a Nagelkerke R^2 of 0.243 indicates that about 24% of the variation in responses is explained by the factors included in the model (and conversely that about 76% of variation in the responses is left unexplained by the model). Taking the model which has been derived for the STEREO scenario in Table A5.2 as an example, it can be seen that the model based on <i>perceived justification</i> alone explains 24% of the variation. However, when Q71 is added to the model the percentage of variation explained increases to 41%. This large relative increase in the variation explained indicates that it is useful to incorporate both predictors in the model.</p> <p>6 Another way to assess the model is to compare the predicted values which would result from the model with the observed data. Of particular interest is by how much the percentage of correctly classified observations is an improvement on the percentage which could be correctly classified by chance.</p> |

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| | 7 The initial percentage in each row represents the percentage which could have been correctly classified by chance. |
| cliv | Variables are entered into the model in a stepwise manner: at each step the variable which is the most strongly related of those remaining to be entered into the model (as measured by the smallest probability of no difference) is added to the model, provided that the probability is less than the cut-off level ($p \leq 0.05$). |
| clv | Variables that are not listed in this column were not found to make a statistically significant contribution over and above the contribution of the variables that are listed. |
| clvi | This statistic is the χ^2 value which indicates whether the additional variable has significantly added to the model. A measure of goodness of fit is calculated as -2 times the logarithm of the likelihood ($-2LL$). The χ^2 (improvement) is the change in $-2LL$ between successive steps of building a model. It tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient for the additional variable added in the last step is zero (i.e., that the additional variable does not significantly contribute to the model). These χ^2 (improvement) values each have 1 degree of freedom. |
| clvii | This is the probability of the observed χ^2 (improvement) value if the null hypothesis (that the coefficient for the additional variable added in the last step is zero) is true. Small probabilities are associated with the rejection of the null hypothesis and hence a decision that the additional variable does significantly contribute to the model. |
| clviii | The Nagelkerke R^2 provides a means of comparing different models. The Nagelkerke R^2 is an estimate of how well the model fits the data. It attempts to quantify the proportion of 'variation' in the outcome variable (for example, judgment about whether the behaviour is corrupt or not) which is explained by the model (SPSS 1999, p. 46). For example, a Nagelkerke R^2 of 0.243 indicates that about 24% of the variation in responses is explained by the factors included in the model (and conversely that about 76% of variation in the responses is left unexplained by the model). Taking the model which has been derived for the STEREO scenario in Table A5.2 as an example, it can be seen that the model based on <i>perceived justification</i> alone explains 24% of the variation. However, when Q71 is added to the model the percentage of variation explained increases to 41%. This large relative increase in the variation explained indicates that it is useful to incorporate both predictors in the model. |
| clix | Another way to assess the model is to compare the predicted values which would result from the model with the observed data. Of particular interest is by how much the percentage of correctly classified observations is an improvement on the percentage which could be correctly classified by chance. |
| clx | <p>1 Variables are entered into the model in a stepwise manner: at each step the variable which is the most strongly related of those remaining to be entered into the model (as measured by the smallest probability of no difference) is added to the model, provided that the probability is less than the cut-off level ($p \leq 0.05$).</p> <p>2 Variables that are not listed in this column were not found to make a statistically significant contribution over and above the contribution of the variables that are listed.</p> <p>3 This statistic is the χ^2 value which indicates whether the additional variable has significantly added to the model. A measure of goodness of fit is calculated as -2 times the logarithm of the likelihood ($-2LL$). The χ^2 (improvement) is the change in $-2LL$ between successive steps of building a model. It tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient for the additional variable added in the last step is zero (i.e., that the additional variable does not significantly contribute to the model). These χ^2 (improvement) values each have 1 degree of freedom.</p> <p>4 This is the probability of the observed χ^2 (improvement) value if the null hypothesis (that the coefficient for the additional variable added in the last step is zero) is true. Small probabilities are associated with the rejection of the null hypothesis and hence a decision that the additional variable does significantly contribute to the model.</p> <p>5 The Nagelkerke R^2 provides a means of comparing different models. The Nagelkerke R^2 is an estimate of how well the model fits the data. It attempts to quantify the proportion of 'variation' in the outcome variable (for example, judgment about whether the behaviour is corrupt or not) which is explained by the model (SPSS 1999, p. 46). For example, a Nagelkerke R^2 of 0.243 indicates that about 24% of the variation in responses is explained by the factors included in the model (and conversely that about 76% of variation in the responses is left unexplained by the model). Taking the model which has been derived for the STEREO scenario in Table A5.2 as an example, it can be seen that the model based on <i>perceived justification</i> alone explains 24% of the variation. However, when Q71 is added to the model the percentage of variation explained increases to 41%. This large relative increase in the variation explained indicates that it is useful to incorporate both predictors in the model.</p> <p>6 Another way to assess the model is to compare the predicted values which would result from the model with the observed data. Of particular interest is by how much the percentage of correctly classified observations is an improvement on the percentage which could be correctly classified by chance.</p> |

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| | 7 The initial percentage in each row represents the percentage which could have been correctly classified by chance. |
| clxi | It should be noted that these 'chance' percentages vary slightly from those given in Table 2 (e.g., for the "TAKE NOTE PADS" scenario the percentage correctly classified by chance is 68.79% in Table A5.2, rather than 68.1%). This is because logistic regression analyses are based only on those cases which do not have any missing values in any of the variables which are to be considered for inclusion in the model. Hence each logistic regression is based on a subgroup of the total sample, with different sets of analyses which test different variables being based on slightly different subgroups of the total sample. |
| clxii | The initial percentage in each row represents the percentage which could have been correctly classified by chance. |
| clxiii | Gender, supervisory role, length of employment in the public sector, salary category, experience in recruitment selection, experience in tender selection, and experience in overnight travel for work. |
| clxiv | Desirability rating, harmfulness rating, justification rating and whether considered corrupt or not corrupt. |
| clxv | That is, agreement/disagreement with the following twelve statements: Q66 <i>Conduct must be illegal for it to be called corrupt</i> ; Q67 <i>Avoiding procedure is sometimes justifiable to get past bureaucratic red tape</i> ; Q68 <i>If something is done for the right reasons, it cannot be called corrupt</i> ; Q69 <i>The Government can afford to sustain minor theft without worrying about it</i> ; Q70 <i>You can't call something corrupt if everybody does it</i> ; Q71 <i>There is nothing wrong with private companies offering gifts to public sector employees to attract business</i> ; Q72 <i>There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful WILL be done about it</i> ; Q73 <i>There is no point in reporting corruption because nothing useful CAN be done about it</i> ; Q74 <i>People who report corruption are likely to suffer for it</i> ; Q75 <i>Most corruption is too trivial to be worth reporting</i> ; Q76 <i>I would not know where to go to report corruption</i> ; Q77 <i>People who report corruption are just troublemakers</i> . |
| clxvi | <p>1 Variables are entered into the model in a stepwise manner: at each step the variable which is the most strongly related of those remaining to be entered into the model (as measured by the smallest probability of no difference) is added to the model, provided that the probability is less than the cut-off level ($p \leq 0.05$).</p> <p>2 Variables that are not listed in this column were not found to make a statistically significant contribution over and above the contribution of the variables that are listed.</p> <p>3 This statistic is the χ^2 value which indicates whether the additional variable has significantly added to the model. A measure of goodness of fit is calculated as -2 times the logarithm of the likelihood (-2LL). The χ^2 (improvement) is the change in -2LL between successive steps of building a model. It tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient for the additional variable added in the last step is zero (i.e., that the additional variable does not significantly contribute to the model). These χ^2 (improvement) values each have 1 degree of freedom.</p> <p>4 This is the probability of the observed χ^2 (improvement) value if the null hypothesis (that the coefficient for the additional variable added in the last step is zero) is true. Small probabilities are associated with the rejection of the null hypothesis and hence a decision that the additional variable does significantly contribute to the model.</p> <p>5 The Nagelkerke R^2 provides a means of comparing different models. The Nagelkerke R^2 is an estimate of how well the model fits the data. It attempts to quantify the proportion of 'variation' in the outcome variable (for example, judgment about whether the behaviour is corrupt or not) which is explained by the model (SPSS 1999, p. 46). For example, a Nagelkerke R^2 of 0.243 indicates that about 24% of the variation in responses is explained by the factors included in the model (and conversely that about 76% of variation in the responses is left unexplained by the model). Taking the model which has been derived for the STEREO scenario in Table A5.2 as an example, it can be seen that the model based on <i>perceived justification</i> alone explains 24% of the variation. However, when Q71 is added to the model the percentage of variation explained increases to 41%. This large relative increase in the variation explained indicates that it is useful to incorporate both predictors in the model.</p> <p>6 Another way to assess the model is to compare the predicted values which would result from the model with the observed data. Of particular interest is by how much the percentage of correctly classified observations is an improvement on the percentage which could be correctly classified by chance.</p> <p>7 The initial percentage in each row represents the percentage which could have been correctly classified by chance.</p> |
| clxvii | 1 Variables are entered into the model in a stepwise manner: at each step the variable which is the most strongly related of those remaining to be entered into the model (as measured by the smallest probability of no difference) is added to the model, provided that the probability is less than the cut-off level ($p \leq 0.05$). |

2 Variables that are not listed in this column were not found to make a statistically significant contribution over and above the contribution of the variables that are listed.

3 This statistic is the χ^2 value which indicates whether the additional variable has significantly added to the model. A measure of goodness of fit is calculated as -2 times the logarithm of the likelihood ($-2LL$). The χ^2 (improvement) is the change in $-2LL$ between successive steps of building a model. It tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient for the additional variable added in the last step is zero (i.e., that the additional variable does not significantly contribute to the model). These χ^2 (improvement) values each have 1 degree of freedom.

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5 The Nagelkerke R^2 provides a means of comparing different models. The Nagelkerke R^2 is an estimate of how well the model fits the data. It attempts to quantify the proportion of 'variation' in the outcome variable (for example, judgment about whether the behaviour is corrupt or not) which is explained by the model (SPSS 1999, p. 46). For example, a Nagelkerke R^2 of 0.243 indicates that about 24% of the variation in responses is explained by the factors included in the model (and conversely that about 76% of variation in the responses is left unexplained by the model). Taking the model which has been derived for the STEREO scenario in Table A5.2 as an example, it can be seen that the model based on *perceived justification* alone explains 24% of the variation. However, when Q71 is added to the model the percentage of variation explained increases to 41%. This large relative increase in the variation explained indicates that it is useful to incorporate both predictors in the model.

6 Another way to assess the model is to compare the predicted values which would result from the model with the observed data. Of particular interest is by how much the percentage of correctly classified observations is an improvement on the percentage which could be correctly classified by chance.

7 The initial percentage in each row represents the percentage which could have been correctly classified by chance.

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1 Variables are entered into the model in a stepwise manner: at each step the variable which is the most strongly related of those remaining to be entered into the model (as measured by the smallest probability of no difference) is added to the model, provided that the probability is less than the cut-off level ($p \leq 0.05$).

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